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Article de revue (à comité de lecture): ID no. (ISBN etc.):  0043-8871 Clé de citation BibTeX:  Betts1985
Richard K. Betts, 1985, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence", World Politics, vol. 37, n°2, pp. 153–179. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010141.
Ajoutée par: Lepage 2012-06-22 01:04:30
 B  
Catégories: General
Creators: Betts
Collection: World Politics

Number of views:  156
Popularity index:  33.33%

 
Résumé
Recent studies overestimate the confidence {NATO} could have in conventional deterrence because their methodological premises are too technical or inductive, and insufficiently political or deductive. Limitations include excessive reliance on: deflation of Soviet competence; new technologies whose military impact is unpredictable; a priori analysis of force balances whose implications should be tempered by a posteriori analysis of past correlations between balances, strategic intiative, and initial victory; or conventional retaliatory options that would be militarily infeasible or politically counterproductive. Consistent theories for optimizing conventional deterrence are confounded by contradictory requirements posed by different threats. The only comprehensive doctrine to hedge against all variants is one that retains a nuclear component.
Ajoutée par: Lepage

 
Informations supplémentaires en ligne :
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010141

 
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.2307/2010141

 
Notes
{ArticleType:} research-article / Full publication date: Jan., 1985 / Copyright © 1985 Trustees of Princeton University
Ajoutée par: Lepage