Logiques du renseignement

Intelligence and National Security, 1986-2015

Last update : August 2015.

Quoting the editors, "articles on the historical development of professional intelligence agencies provide new perspectives on the evolution of intelligence as a factor in state power in both the domestic and international contexts. Contemporary issues are also addressed using conceptual tools developed in the fields of sociology, law, anthropology, philosophy, political science and international relations."

List of citations (linked to the text on Taylor & Francis Online) extracted from the bibliographic base of Logiques du renseignement. First version whithout abstracts, notes and keywords, but sortable by author, title, year or issue.

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    BibTeX-Key Author / Editor Title Year Journal / Proceedings / Book Type Keywords
    Aan De Wiel, Jérôme Austria-Hungary, France, Germany and the Irish crisis from 1899 to the outbreak of the first world war 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (2) , pp. 237-257  
    article
    Abstract: This article examines Ireland's strategic and diplomatic importance for foreign continental European powers in the early years of the twentieth century, a subject much neglected by historians. It focuses on how Austria-Hungary, France and Germany analyzed the Irish crisis between 1899 and 1914. It shows how the pattern of alliances in Europe changed these powers' outlook on Ireland. After the signing of the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France in 1904, the French lost all interest in their relations with Irish separatists. The Germans took over their role as they saw a possibility to break the encirclement of the Triple Entente countries. The article argues that there was a definite "Irish factor" in the events leading to the outbreak of the First World War, notably in Germany and Austria-Hungary's decision-making process.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aan De Wiel, Jérôme},
      title = {Austria-Hungary, France, Germany and the Irish crisis from 1899 to the outbreak of the first world war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {2},
      pages = {237--257},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600620716}
    }
    					
    Aan De Wiel, Jérôme French Military Intelligence and Ireland, 1900-1923 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (1) , pp. 46-71  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract As many unused sources in the Service Historique de la Défense in Vincennes and the Quai d'Orsay in Paris reveal the French Deuxième Bureau, and also naval intelligence, monitored events during the home rule crisis, the Easter Rising, the First World War, the Peace Conference in Paris and the Civil War. Also worthy of note are the elaboration of Franco-Irish invasion plans during the Boer War and the secret mission of an Irish general in Paris shortly after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921. The aims of this article will be to give an overview of French military intelligence activities regarding Ireland and to give an assessment of its interest in the country during the period under consideration.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aan De Wiel, Jérôme},
      title = {French Military Intelligence and Ireland, 1900-1923},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {1},
      pages = {46--71},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.556359}
    }
    					
    Abedul, Hugo & R. Gerald Hughes The Comandante in his Labyrinth: Fidel Castro and his Legacy 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (4) , pp. 531-565  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Abedul, Hugo and Hughes, R. Gerald},
      title = {The Comandante in his Labyrinth: Fidel Castro and his Legacy},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {4},
      pages = {531--565},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.586541}
    }
    					
    Acton, James M. International Verification and Intelligence 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (3) , pp. 341-356  
    article
    Abstract: Both national intelligence agencies (NIAs) and international verification organizations (IVOs) attempt to assess compliance with arms control treaties. Their strengths and weaknesses are complementary. Because IVOs are seen as legitimate, they are able to conduct on-site inspections to verify declared activities and to confirm or disprove allegations of clandestine cheating. NIAs are more flexible and have a greater ability to uncover preliminary evidence of clandestine activities on which further investigations can be based. Such investigations require NIAs to share intelligence with IVOs. While this kind of intelligence sharing is generally permitted by arms control agreements, it is controversial. Nonetheless, it appears to have become more common in recent years, particularly during the International Atomic Energy Agency's investigation of Iran's nuclear program. While intelligence sharing creates risks for both IVOs and NIAs, it is ultimately critical to the effective verification of arms control agreements and steps can and should be taken to ensure it becomes more common and less controversial.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Acton, James M.},
      title = {International Verification and Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {3},
      pages = {341--356},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.895592}
    }
    					
    Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima) [Book review] Keith L. Shimko, "The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (4) , pp. 599-602  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima)},
      title = {[Book review] Keith L. Shimko, "The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {4},
      pages = {599--602},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.753782}
    }
    					
    Adamsky, Dima P. & Uri Bar-Joseph "The Russians are not coming": Israel's intelligence failure and soviet military intervention in the 'War of Attrition' 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (1) , pp. 1-25  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Adamsky, Dima P. and Bar-Joseph, Uri},
      title = {"The Russians are not coming": Israel's intelligence failure and soviet military intervention in the 'War of Attrition'},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--25},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600568238}
    }
    					
    Agrell, Wilhelm The Next 100 Years? Reflections on the Future of Intelligence 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (1) , pp. 118-132  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract A growing interest in the history of intelligence might be a way to learn more about not only the past, but also the dynamics shaping the future of intelligence. Intelligence is an evolving activity and the twentieth-century experience must be regarded as a phase in an ongoing transformation of its institutions, methods and roles. At least six fundamental processes can be identified as relevant to this re-shaping of intelligence in long perspective; the decreasing hegemony of national intelligence, the rise of new fields of knowledge with intelligence relevance, the diminishing relative importance of exclusive sources and methods, the rise of new actors producing and providing intelligence, the loss of an intellectual monopoly in a competitive knowledge environment and finally an increasing demand for reliable assessments and verification in a fragmented world of information.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Agrell, Wilhelm},
      title = {The Next 100 Years? Reflections on the Future of Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {1},
      pages = {118--132},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.621601}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. The time of troubles: The US national security agency in the twenty-first century 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (3) , pp. 1-32  
    article
    Abstract: This article seeks to ask whether the US National Security Agency (NSA) doing its job or stumbling through a midlife crisis. It reviews what has occurred at NSA during the last decade. It argues that some statements that have appeared in the American press that NSA was solely responsible for some of the US intelligence community's recent intelligence failures are factually incorrect. Furthermore, NSA's Sigint collection capabilities have actually improved considerably during the last decade, and evidence suggests that the technological obstacles that have been often cited in press reports as contributing to NSA's current problems have not yet begun to be widely used outside of the developed countries in Western Europe and East Asia. NSA's most pressing problem is, instead, an area which unfortunately has received little public attention in recent months, specifically the deterioration of the Agency's Sigint processing, analysis and reporting capabilities. It is clear that NSA must recruit substantial numbers of analysts and information technology specialists in the near future, and invest money in acquiring new processing technologies in order to begin to address this problem. The Agency must also take immediate steps to shore up its strained relations with its customers inside the US government and the armed forces. Given the transient and oftentimes fickle nature of politics, NSA must realize that it cannot depend solely on a few allies in the US Congress for its continued survival. Equally important, but more difficult, will be NSA's internal management problems, such as how to trim the Agency's large bureaucracy, eliminate duplication of effort and how to put NSA's financial accounts in order. Finally, it is time that NSA adopts a policy of greater openness about what it does and how it does it. One obvious way to do this is to declassify documents which detail the Agency's significant accomplishments since the end of World War II.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M.},
      title = {The time of troubles: The US national security agency in the twenty-first century},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {3},
      pages = {1--32},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432615}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. US humint and comint in the Korean War: From the approach of War to the Chinese intervention 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (4) , pp. 17-63  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M.},
      title = {US humint and comint in the Korean War: From the approach of War to the Chinese intervention},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {17--63},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529908432570}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. Sins of Omission and Commission: Strategic Cultural Factors and US Intelligence Failures During the Cold War 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (4) , pp. 478-494  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract American intelligence professionals have long understood that the US intelligence community is, and always has been, a closed and insular society, with each agency within the intelligence community taking pride in having its own unique bureaucratic identity, distinct corporate culture, operating environments, social dynamics, and internal behavior patterns that have been molded and shaped by external events and internal forces over the past 60 years. These "strategic cultural" factors mean that the agencies comprising the US intelligence community are, in many respects, unique bureaucratic entities, operating far differently than comparable large American corporations and government agencies. These strategic cultural factors shape and define the environment within which the US intelligence agency works, dictate how American intelligence agencies perform their mission, and also help to explain why they repeatedly make the same mistakes and find it difficult to fix the longstanding problems which contributed to the failures. Within the context of the recent 9/11 and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction intelligence failures, this article explores the role played by these strategic cultural factors in helping to explain a series of historical intelligence failures by the US intelligence community.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M.},
      title = {Sins of Omission and Commission: Strategic Cultural Factors and US Intelligence Failures During the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {4},
      pages = {478--494},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.580602}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. All Glory is Fleeting: Sigint and the Fight Against International Terrorism 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (4) , pp. 72-120  
    article
    Abstract: This article discusses the important role that Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has played, and continues to play, in the war against international terrorism. It sets out what is known or can be authoritatively established about the role that Sigint played in the events leading up to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, especially the performance of America's Sigint organization, the National Security Agency (NSA). The article also analyzes what the potential future role of Sigint may be in the war on terrorism given the ever changing nature of terrorist operations, the growing number of technological impediments to effective Sigint collection against terrorist targets, and shifting geostrategic considerations on the part of the nations engaged in the fight against the international terrorists.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M.},
      title = {All Glory is Fleeting: Sigint and the Fight Against International Terrorism},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {4},
      pages = {72--120},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520310001688880}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. American Comint in the Korean war (part II): From the Chinese intervention to the armistice 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (1) , pp. 14-49  
    article
    Abstract: This article examines American intelligence during the Korean War, from the intervention to the armistice, focusing primarily upon Comint. The role of Comint cannot be said to have been decisive, being weakest during the first year of the war, when strategic development were at their most fluid. Comint was certainly critical at the operational level after 1951 and helped the UN forces in Korea win significant battles. But Comint never came close to living up to its full potential and only came on stream in a manner that commanders found acceptable after the campaign in Korea had reached stalemate. The most dramatic military contribution of Comint during the Korean War was probably in the closing stages of the air war, where its impact was almost certainly critical.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M.},
      title = {American Comint in the Korean war (part II): From the Chinese intervention to the armistice},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {1},
      pages = {14--49},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520008432586}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. "Stella polaris" and the secret code battle in postwar Europe 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (3) , pp. 17-86  
    article
    Abstract: Much has already been written about the September 1944 evacuation of the Finnish intelligence service to Sweden, which was designated Operation "Stella Polaris". Newly declassified intelligence documents found at the US National Archives provide a fresh perspective on the role of the American wartime foreign intelligence service, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its successor, the Strategic Services Unit, in "Stella Polaris" and its aftermath. The documents reveal that throughout World War II, the OSS secretly obtained sensitive intelligence information concerning America's wartime ally, the Soviet Union, from agents within the Finnish intelligence service. The OSS Stockholm Station purchased Soviet and other foreign government code and cipher materials from the Finns, not realizing until later that the Finns had sold the same material to other states. The Americans responded by recruiting some well-placed agents within the Finnish "Stella Polaris" organization, who provided detailed information about the intelligence activities of the Finns in Sweden, and the work of Finnish intelligence officers in France after the end of the war. Among the key pieces of intelligence obtained was the fact that the French intelligence service was intercepting American radio traffic.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M.},
      title = {"Stella polaris" and the secret code battle in postwar Europe},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {3},
      pages = {17--86},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306550}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. The National Security Agency and the Cold War 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (1) , pp. 27-66  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M.},
      title = {The National Security Agency and the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {1},
      pages = {27--66},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520412331306200a}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. Prometheus embattled: A post-9/11 report card on the National Security Agency 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (6) , pp. 980-998  
    article
    Abstract: Five years after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) has risen to the position of being the largest and most powerful intelligence agency in the US. Working in close conjunction with its English-speaking partners overseas, NSA is today the most prolific producer of top-quality intelligence information reaching senior US government policymakers and field commanders. But press reports over the past year concerning the Agency's controversial domestic eavesdropping program and problem-plagued modernization effort, have raised serious questions once again about the competency of the Agency's long-troubled management practices, as well as whether NSA, at the behest of the Bush administration, exceeded its legal authority by extending its operations into the US for the first time since the mid-1970s in contravention of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M.},
      title = {Prometheus embattled: A post-9/11 report card on the National Security Agency},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {6},
      pages = {980--998},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520601046317}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. & Cees Wiebes Introduction on The Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (1) , pp. 1-26  
    article
    Abstract: This contribution presents a general overview of Signals Intelligence (Sigint), as well as a balanced assessment of the historical strengths and weaknesses of Sigint as an intelligence source, with a focus post the Cold War era. One of the key findings is that Sigint became an essential source of intelligence information on both sides of the Iron curtain because of the failings of other intelligence sources, especially Human Intelligence (Humint). It is also apparent that Sigint, together with the reconnaissance satellites operated by the US and the USSR, consistently produced the most reliable intelligence available to consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. After weighing Sigint's successes and failings during the Cold War, the authors also conclude that Sigint's true value as an intelligence source can only be achieved when it is effectively combined with information produced by other intelligence sources into an 'all-source' product.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M. and Wiebes, Cees},
      title = {Introduction on The Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--26},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714002838}
    }
    					
    Aid, Matthew M. & Cees Wiebes Conclusions 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (1) , pp. 313-332  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aid, Matthew M. and Wiebes, Cees},
      title = {Conclusions},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {1},
      pages = {313--332},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714002815}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. The UK-US intelligence alliance in 1975: Economies, evaluations and explanations 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (4) , pp. 557-567  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {The UK-US intelligence alliance in 1975: Economies, evaluations and explanations},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {4},
      pages = {557--567},
      url = {http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/929/}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. The Waldegrave Initiative and secret service archives: New materials and new policies 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (1) , pp. 192-197  
    article
    Abstract: Louise Atherton, Top Secret: An Interim Guide to Recent Releases of Intelligence Records at the Public Record Office (London: PRO Publications, 1993).
    Louise Atherton, SOE Operations in the Far East: An Introductory Guide to the Newly Released Records of the Special Operations Executive in the Public Record Office (London: PRO Publications, 1993).
    Louise Atherton, SOE Operations in Scandinavia: A Guide to the Newly Released Records in the Public Record Office (London: PRO Publications, 1994).
    FCO Historical Branch, Changes in British and Russian Records Policy: Occasional Papers No.7 (London: Historical Branch, LRD, 1993).
    FCO Historical Branch, FCO Records: Policy Practice and Posterity, 1782-1993 (London: Historical Branch, LRD, Second Edition, 1993).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {The Waldegrave Initiative and secret service archives: New materials and new policies},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {1},
      pages = {192--197},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432293}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. Soviet intelligence, British security and the end of the Red Orchestra: The Fate of Alexander Rado 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (1) , pp. 196-217  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {Soviet intelligence, British security and the end of the Red Orchestra: The Fate of Alexander Rado},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {196--217},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529108432096}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. Intelligence, Anglo-American relations and the Suez Crisis, 1956 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (3) , pp. 544-554  
    article
    Abstract: Daniel F. Calhoun, Hungary and Suez, 1956: An Exploration of Who Makes History (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1991). Pp.590. $46.50. Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Pp.359. £25.00. Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Pp.295. £19.00. Keith Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992). Pp.656. £14.99. W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991). Pp.399. £25.00.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {Intelligence, Anglo-American relations and the Suez Crisis, 1956},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {3},
      pages = {544--554},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432267}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. Conspiracy or confusion? Churchill, Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (3) , pp. 335-346  
    article
    Abstract: J. Rusbridger and E. Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbour: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt Into War (London: Michael O'Mara, New York: Summit Books, 1991). Pp.303. £15.99; $19.95.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {Conspiracy or confusion? Churchill, Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {3},
      pages = {335--346},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529208432172}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. American intelligence and the British Raj: The OSS, the SSU and India, 1942-1947 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (1) , pp. 132-164  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {American intelligence and the British Raj: The OSS, the SSU and India, 1942-1947},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {1},
      pages = {132--164},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432466}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. "A Profoundly Disruptive Force": The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (2-3) , pp. 139-158  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This essay argues that, since 1989, the CIA has been slow to understand the transformative impact of globalization upon its own activities as an intelligence agency. While the CIA spent considerable time examining global trends as part of its work on generalized strategic analysis, its thinking about how globalization would change its own business was less prescient. This problem is explained in terms of the way in which debates over the CIA have been framed historiographically. While intelligence studies as a subject has been successfully integrated into mainstream international history, it has failed to make the same connections with international relations. As a result, those debating how intelligence might change have tended to focus quite narrowly on matters of bureaucratic organization and have taken only limited interest in global politics. This is stark contrast to those working on the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism, who have engaged in wider debates about world affairs. This needs to change, since the perils of globalization remain the over-arching challenge for the CIA over the next ten years.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {"A Profoundly Disruptive Force": The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {139--158},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.559139}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. "Grow your own": cold war intelligence and history supermarkets 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (1) , pp. 135-152  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {"Grow your own": cold war intelligence and history supermarkets},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {1},
      pages = {135--152},
      url = {http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/925/}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. Legacies of Secret Service: Renegade SOE and the Karen Struggle in Burma, 1948-50 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (4) , pp. 130-148  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {Legacies of Secret Service: Renegade SOE and the Karen Struggle in Burma, 1948-50},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {130--148},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432574}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. More on Stalin's men: Some recent western studies of Soviet intelligence 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (3) , pp. 593-605  
    article
    Abstract: Stephen Koch, Double Lives: Stalin, Willi Münzenberg and the Seduction of the Intellectuals (London: HarperCollins 1994) Pp.419, 20 illus. biblio. index. £20. ISBN 0-00-255516-6. Jenny Rees, Looking for Mr Nobody: The Secret Life of Gorowny Rees (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1994) Pp.291, 30 illus. biblio. index. £18.99. ISBN 0-297-81430-3. V.E. Tarrant, The Red Orchestra: the Soviet Spy Network Inside Nazi Europe (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995) Pp.224, biblio. index. £15.99. ISBN 1-85409-216-2. Anthony Cave Brown, Treason in the Blood: H. St John Philby, Kim Philby and the Spy Case of the Century (London: Hale 1995) Pp.678, 23 illus. biblio. index. £25. ISBN 0-7090-5582-X.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {More on Stalin's men: Some recent western studies of Soviet intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {3},
      pages = {593--605},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432378}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. Putting culture into the Cold War: the Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and British Covert Information Warfare 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (2) , pp. 109-133  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {Putting culture into the Cold War: the Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and British Covert Information Warfare},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {2},
      pages = {109--133},
      url = {http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/926/}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. GCHQ and Siginit in the Early Cold War 1945-70 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (1) , pp. 67-96  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {GCHQ and Siginit in the Early Cold War 1945-70},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {1},
      pages = {67--96},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714002833}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (1) , pp. 26-56  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract The most important recent change within the realm of intelligence and security services has been the expansion of intelligence co-operation. The growing connectivity between both foreign intelligence services and also domestic security services means that we might speak - not just of growing international co-operation - but perhaps even of global co-operation. This essay considers the complex interplay of intelligence and globalization since 1989. It argues that there is an obvious tension between a developing global style of co-operative activity and the traditional mechanisms of oversight, which have tended to be national. Accordingly, it moves on to discuss the recent efforts by national, regional and international systems of inquiry to examine issues that involve intelligence co-operation. It suggests that while formal committee-type mechanisms have limited purchase, they are not the only options for oversight in a globalized context.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {1},
      pages = {26--56},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520902756812}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. Imperial rivalry: British and American intelligence in Asia, 1942-46 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (1) , pp. 5-55  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J.},
      title = {Imperial rivalry: British and American intelligence in Asia, 1942-46},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {1},
      pages = {5--55},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431928}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J. & Michael Coleman The cold war, the JIC and British signals intelligence, 1948 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (3) , pp. 535-549  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J. and Coleman, Michael},
      title = {The cold war, the JIC and British signals intelligence, 1948},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {535--549},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432015}
    }
    					
    Aldrich, Richard J., Gary D. Rawnsley & Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley Introduction: The clandestine cold war in Asia, 1945-65 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (4) , pp. 1-14  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aldrich, Richard J. and Rawnsley, Gary D. and Rawnsley, Ming-Yeh T.},
      title = {Introduction: The clandestine cold war in Asia, 1945-65},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {1--14},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432569}
    }
    					
    Aleprete, Michael E. [Book review] Mark Galeotti (ed.), "The Politics of Security in Modern Russia", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (5) , pp. 756-758  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aleprete, Michael E.},
      title = {[Book review] Mark Galeotti (ed.), "The Politics of Security in Modern Russia", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {5},
      pages = {756--758},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.755039}
    }
    					
    Alexander, Martin S. Introduction: Knowing your friends, assessing your allies - perspectives on intra-alliance intelligence 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (1) , pp. 1-17  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alexander, Martin S.},
      title = {Introduction: Knowing your friends, assessing your allies - perspectives on intra-alliance intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--17},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432460}
    }
    					
    Alexander, Martin S. Did the Deuxième Bureau work? The role of intelligence in french defence policy and strategy, 1919-39 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (2) , pp. 293-333  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alexander, Martin S.},
      title = {Did the Deuxième Bureau work? The role of intelligence in french defence policy and strategy, 1919-39},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {2},
      pages = {293--333},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529108432105}
    }
    					
    Alexander, Martin S. French Military Intelligence responds to the German Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936 - The military consequences for France of the end of Locarno 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (4) , pp. 563-572  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alexander, Martin S.},
      title = {French Military Intelligence responds to the German Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936 - The military consequences for France of the end of Locarno},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {4},
      pages = {563--572},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701640548}
    }
    					
    Alexander, Martin S. Radio-Intercepts, Reconnaissance and Raids: French Operational Intelligence and Communications in 1940 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (3) , pp. 337-376  
    article
    Abstract: Mentioned in memoirs by a few former military intelligence officers, operational intelligence has had little attention in academic writing on the Second World War before Ultra's decisive contributions began in 1941-2. Especially neglected has been the fighting provoked by the German offensive in 1940 that cleaved through France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg and drove Britain off the Continent. This article tackles this gap, analysing the military intelligence/military operations interface on the French side. It assesses the contributions and shortcomings of radio-intercept intelligence, along with intelligence-gathering by air and ground reconnaissance (demonstrating that German air superiority imposed a "battle blindness" on Allied commanders wanting intelligence on approach marches and formation switches more than a dozen kilometres into the German rear). It reveals that frontline infantry raiding - redolent of intelligence-gathering techniques familiar to veterans of 1914-18 trench warfare - was again widely employed. This proved a highly effective recourse, particularly during the positional battles on the Somme, Aisne and Oise in June 1940, filling intelligence gaps left by more technologically sophisticated but more fragile sources. The factors that kept formations fighting so as to inflict significant delays and heavy losses on the German assaults were robust communications networks (to convey operational intelligence fast enough to permit counter-manoeuvres based on it), and the preservation of French chains of command and control. When these key nodes collapsed, preventing the hard-won operational intelligence being deployed to coordinate French military resistance, the latter declined into a series of disjointed, directionless and unavailing acts of courage that could not exploit the several instances during the campaign when the Germans, too, were afflicted by battle fatigue, re-supply bottlenecks and morale wobbles.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alexander, Martin S.},
      title = {Radio-Intercepts, Reconnaissance and Raids: French Operational Intelligence and Communications in 1940},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {3},
      pages = {337--376},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2013.789636}
    }
    					
    Alexander, Martin S. & Huw Dylan A Century of Intelligence (1909-2009): International Perspectives 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (3) , pp. 297-298  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alexander, Martin S. and Dylan, Huw},
      title = {A Century of Intelligence (1909-2009): International Perspectives},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {3},
      pages = {297--298},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2013.789633}
    }
    					
    Alexander, Martin S. & William J. Philpott The entente cordiale and the next war: Anglo-French views on future military cooperation, 1928-1939 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (1) , pp. 53-84  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alexander, Martin S. and Philpott, William J.},
      title = {The entente cordiale and the next war: Anglo-French views on future military cooperation, 1928-1939},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {1},
      pages = {53--84},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432463}
    }
    					
    Allen, Louis Burmese puzzles: Two deaths that never were 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (1) , pp. 193-198  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Allen, Louis},
      title = {Burmese puzzles: Two deaths that never were},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {1},
      pages = {193--198},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432041}
    }
    					
    Al-Marashi, Ibrahim An insight into the mindset of Iraq's security apparatus 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (3) , pp. 1-23  
    article
    Abstract: Iraqi state and intelligence documents seized from the North of Iraq in 1991, provided one of the first insights into the mindset and the discourse of Iraq's security apparatus. This mindset can be characterized by a justification of brutal human rights abuses against Kurds in the name of Arab and Iraqi nationalism and euphemistic terms employed to sanitize these actions. Examining such documents not only reveal the thinking of Iraq's security organizations, but also Saddam Hussein himself.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Al-Marashi, Ibrahim},
      title = {An insight into the mindset of Iraq's security apparatus},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {3},
      pages = {1--23},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306900}
    }
    					
    Alvarez, David A German agent at the Vatican: The Gerlach affair 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 345-356  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alvarez, David},
      title = {A German agent at the Vatican: The Gerlach affair},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {345--356},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432361}
    }
    					
    Alvarez, David Vatican communications security, 1914-18 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (4) , pp. 443-453  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alvarez, David},
      title = {Vatican communications security, 1914-18},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {4},
      pages = {443--453},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529208432179}
    }
    					
    Alvarez, David Vatican intelligence capabilities in the second world war 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (3) , pp. 593-607  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alvarez, David},
      title = {Vatican intelligence capabilities in the second world war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {3},
      pages = {593--607},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432119}
    }
    					
    Alvarez, David American signals intelligence and the Cuban missile crisis 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (1) , pp. 169-176  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alvarez, David},
      title = {American signals intelligence and the Cuban missile crisis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {1},
      pages = {169--176},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432591}
    }
    					
    Alvarez, David Axis Sigint collaboration: A limited partnership 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (1) , pp. 1-17  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alvarez, David},
      title = {Axis Sigint collaboration: A limited partnership},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--17},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432521}
    }
    					
    Alvarez, David Behind Venona: American signals intelligence in the early cold war 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (2) , pp. 179-186  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alvarez, David},
      title = {Behind Venona: American signals intelligence in the early cold war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {2},
      pages = {179--186},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432544}
    }
    					
    Alvarez, David No immunity: Signals intelligence and the European neutrals, 1939-45 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (2) , pp. 22-43  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Alvarez, David},
      title = {No immunity: Signals intelligence and the European neutrals, 1939-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {2},
      pages = {22--43},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432412}
    }
    					
    Amuchastegui, Domingo Cuban intelligence and the October crisis 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (3) , pp. 88-119  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Amuchastegui, Domingo},
      title = {Cuban intelligence and the October crisis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {3},
      pages = {88--119},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432495}
    }
    					
    Anderson, Scott The evolution of the Canadian intelligence establishment, 1945-1950 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (3) , pp. 448-471  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Anderson, Scott},
      title = {The evolution of the Canadian intelligence establishment, 1945-1950},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {3},
      pages = {448--471},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529408432261}
    }
    					
    Anderson, Scott "With friends like these ..." the OSS and the British in Yugoslavia 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (2) , pp. 140-171  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Anderson, Scott},
      title = {"With friends like these ..." the OSS and the British in Yugoslavia},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {2},
      pages = {140--171},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432201}
    }
    					
    Andregg, Michael M. & Peter Gill Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (4) , pp. 487-497  
    article
    Abstract: This introductory article discusses some of the main themes that are contained within this collection originally delivered as papers to two conferences. There is brief consideration of some issues of method and major themes relating to the legacy of authoritarian regimes, the process of change and the current state of "democracy" are identified. Continuing controversies and uncertainties around intelligence have important implications for democratic governance in many countries which must encourage more comparative work in this key area of intelligence studies.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Andregg, Michael M. and Gill, Peter},
      title = {Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {4},
      pages = {487--497},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.915174}
    }
    					
    Andrew, Christopher Intelligence, International Relations and 'Under-theorisation' 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (2) , pp. 170-184  
    article
    Abstract: This article submits that the conceptual framework within which intelligence is studied must continue to evolve and adapt to the new conditions of the early twenty-first century. As more intelligence and intelligence related material than ever before enters the public domain, scholars of international relations must take greater account study of the role of intelligence. Despite its obvious importance to the course of the Cold War, for example, most accounts of the Cold War tend to ignore or downplay the importance of signals intelligence in particular. Intelligence, moreover, is all but absent in most contemporary international relations theory. The essay argues that intelligence should be placed closer to the centre of new interpretations of both the course of the Cold War and of the political dynamics of authoritarian states. This article submits that the conceptual framework within which intelligence is studied must continue to evolve and adapt to the new conditions of the early twenty-first century. As more intelligence and intelligence related material than ever before enters the public domain, scholars of international relations must take greater account study of the role of intelligence. Despite its obvious importance to the course of the Cold War, for example, most accounts of the Cold War tend to ignore or downplay the importance of signals intelligence in particular. Intelligence, moreover, is all but absent in most contemporary international relations theory. The essay argues that intelligence should be placed closer to the centre of new interpretations of both the course of the Cold War and of the political dynamics of authoritarian states.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Andrew, Christopher},
      title = {Intelligence, International Relations and 'Under-theorisation'},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {2},
      pages = {170--184},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0268452042000302949}
    }
    					
    Andrew, Christopher Churchill and intelligence 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (3) , pp. 181-193  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Andrew, Christopher},
      title = {Churchill and intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {3},
      pages = {181--193},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528808431961}
    }
    					
    Andrew, Christopher Codebreaking and signals intelligence 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (1) , pp. 1-5  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Andrew, Christopher},
      title = {Codebreaking and signals intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--5},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528608431838}
    }
    					
    Andrew, Christopher KGB foreign intelligence from Brezhnev to the coup 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (3) , pp. 52-67  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Andrew, Christopher},
      title = {KGB foreign intelligence from Brezhnev to the coup},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {3},
      pages = {52--67},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529308432214}
    }
    					
    Andrew, Christopher Conclusion: An Agenda for future research 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (1) , pp. 224-233  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Andrew, Christopher},
      title = {Conclusion: An Agenda for future research},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {224--233},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432407}
    }
    					
    Andrew, Christopher American presidents and their intelligence communities 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (4) , pp. 95-112  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Andrew, Christopher},
      title = {American presidents and their intelligence communities},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {4},
      pages = {95--112},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529508432327}
    }
    					
    Andrew, Christopher The growth of the Australian intelligence community and the Anglo-American connection 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (2) , pp. 213-256  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Andrew, Christopher},
      title = {The growth of the Australian intelligence community and the Anglo-American connection},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {2},
      pages = {213--256},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908431996}
    }
    					
    Andrew, Christopher & Keith Neilson Tsarist codebreakers and British codes 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (1) , pp. 6-12  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Andrew, Christopher and Neilson, Keith},
      title = {Tsarist codebreakers and British codes},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {1},
      pages = {6--12},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528608431839}
    }
    					
    Angevine, Robert Mapping the northern frontier: Canada and the origins of the US army's Military Information Division, 1885-1898 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (3) , pp. 121-145  
    article
    Abstract: In 1885, the United States Army established its first official peacetime intelligence organization, the Military Information Division (MID), at least in part to collect intelligence enabling it to strike Canada in the event of conflict with Great Britain. Examining MID's leadership, information collection methods, intelligence objectives, organizational structure, and officer recruitment criteria during its first dozen years of existence reveals that it devoted significant resources to mapping the Canadian border, restructured its organization in part to increase the efficiency of those scouting expeditions, and selected officers to lead MID and conduct its reconnaissance missions based on their topographical skills, their knowledge of Canada, and their ability to keep their work quiet.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Angevine, Robert},
      title = {Mapping the northern frontier: Canada and the origins of the US army's Military Information Division, 1885-1898},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {3},
      pages = {121--145},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306240}
    }
    					
    Angevine, Robert G. Gentlemen do read each other's mail: American intelligence in the interwar era 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (2) , pp. 1-29  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Angevine, Robert G.},
      title = {Gentlemen do read each other's mail: American intelligence in the interwar era},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {2},
      pages = {1--29},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529208432154}
    }
    					
    Anglim, Simon MI(R), G(R) and British covert operations, 1939-42 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (4) , pp. 631-653  
    article
    Abstract: The Military Intelligence (Research) department of the British War Office was tasked in 1940 with encouraging and supporting armed resistance in occupied Europe and the Axis-controlled Middle East. The major contention of this paper is that, in doing so, MI(R) performed a key role in British strategy in 1940-42 and in the development of what are now known as covert operations. MI(R) developed an organic, but coherent doctrine for such activity which was influential upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its own sub-branch, G(R), which applied this doctrine in practice in East Africa and the Middle East in 1940-41. It was also here that a number of key figures in the development of covert operations and special forces first cut their teeth, the most notable being Major Generals Colin Gubbins and Orde Wingate.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Anglim, Simon},
      title = {MI(R), G(R) and British covert operations, 1939-42},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {4},
      pages = {631--653},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520500426073}
    }
    					
    Anonymous Echeloned positive communication 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (4) , pp. 156-156  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Anonymous},
      title = {Echeloned positive communication},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {4},
      pages = {156--156},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431977}
    }
    					
    Anonymous Editorial 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (1) , pp. 3-3  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Anonymous},
      title = {Editorial},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {1},
      pages = {3--3},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431836}
    }
    					
    Anstey, John Foreword 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (4) , pp. 7-7  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Anstey, John},
      title = {Foreword},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {7--7},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432566}
    }
    					
    Archdeacon, Maurice The heritage front affair 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 306-312  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Archdeacon, Maurice},
      title = {The heritage front affair},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {306--312},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432358}
    }
    					
    Archer, Jayne Elisabeth "There is less danger in fearing too much than too little": Sir Francis Walsingham and the Defence of the Elizabethan Realm 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (5) , pp. 748-753  
    article
    Abstract: Review essay. John Cooper, "The Queen"s Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of
    Elizabeth I", 2011.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Archer, Jayne Elisabeth},
      title = {"There is less danger in fearing too much than too little": Sir Francis Walsingham and the Defence of the Elizabethan Realm},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {5},
      pages = {748--753},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.753200}
    }
    					
    Argomaniz, Javier The European Union Policies on the Protection of Infrastructure from Terrorist Attacks: A Critical Assessment 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (2-3) , pp. 259-280  
    article
    Abstract: This article aims to provide an assessment of the evolution and contribution since 2001 of the European Union infrastructure and transport protection policies to the European fight against terrorism. Using the avowed goals of the Protect strand of the 2005 EU Counter-terrorism Strategy as a yardstick, the intention here is to evaluate the extent to which reality matches the aspirations present in the European political discourse and in particular the overall aim of "strengthen[ing] the defences of key targets, by reducing their vulnerability to attacks, and also by reducing the resulting impact of an attack". In this way, special attention is paid to the outcomes from a number of initiatives in the field such as the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN), the Action Plan for the Enhancement of the Security of Explosives, the directives and regulations on aviation and maritime security and others. Continuing the pattern set out by the other contributions in this issue, the objective is to assess the degree to which initiatives have led to practical results, the political and institutional factors that have facilitated the process of policy development and implementation, the obstacles that have stood in the way of the practical realization of the initial objectives and, finally, lessons learnt.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Argomaniz, Javier},
      title = {The European Union Policies on the Protection of Infrastructure from Terrorist Attacks: A Critical Assessment},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {259--280},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.800333}
    }
    					
    Argomaniz, Javier, Oldrich Bures & Christian Kaunert A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (2-3) , pp. 191-206  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Argomaniz, Javier and Bures, Oldrich and Kaunert, Christian},
      title = {A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {191--206},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.988445}
    }
    					
    Armour, Ian D. Colonel Redl: Fact and fantasy 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (1) , pp. 170-183  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Armour, Ian D.},
      title = {Colonel Redl: Fact and fantasy},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {1},
      pages = {170--183},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431881}
    }
    					
    Aronsen, Lawrence R. "Peace, order and good government" during the cold war: The origins and organization of Canada's internal security program 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (3) , pp. 357-380  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aronsen, Lawrence R.},
      title = {"Peace, order and good government" during the cold war: The origins and organization of Canada's internal security program},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {3},
      pages = {357--380},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431862}
    }
    					
    Aronsen, Lawrence R. Preparing for Armageddon: Jic 1 (Final) and the Soviet Attack on Canada 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (3) , pp. 490-510  
    article
    Abstract: From 1945 to 1947 Canada shifted from a dependency on Great Britain for wartime operational intelligence to a junior partnership with the United States in the production of strategic threat assessments of the Soviet Union. Working through the Military Cooperation Committee the primary objective of Canadian and American officials was to update the wartime Defence Plan (ABC-22), with a Basic Security Plan for the post-war defence of North America. Each country was to produce a detailed 'Implementation' based on an intelligence 'Appreciation' of the threats facing North America in the 'air-atomic age'. Towards this end, the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee prepared JIC 1 (Final), a report on when, where, and in what capacity the Soviet Union would strike Canada in the event of the next major war. The basic problem facing the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee was to incorporate American sources in the assessment of Soviet capabilities without simply producing a carbon copy version of the assessment of their continental ally. Moreover, the Canadians were particularly concerned that they produce a 'made in Canada' assessment of Soviet intentions. The report was completed and approved by Canadian and American defence officials in 1947 and updated versions became the basis for continental defence planning until the signing of the 1957 Norad agreement.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aronsen, Lawrence R.},
      title = {Preparing for Armageddon: Jic 1 (Final) and the Soviet Attack on Canada},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {3},
      pages = {490--510},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000316250}
    }
    					
    Aronsen, Lawrence R. Seeing Red: U.S. Air Force Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1945-1949 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (2) , pp. 103-132  
    article
    Abstract: In the immediate postwar period Army Air Force A-2 cultivated a unique intelligence culture that focussed on the air-atomic threat posed by the Soviet Union and the use of the most advanced technologies to monitor countries behind the 'Iron Curtain'. Although most intelligence reports presented a detailed analysis of Russian air power capabilities, consideration was also given to an assessment of intentions. Based on a literal interpretation of Marxist texts and an unambiguous reading of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, A-2 more than any other agency was convinced of the Soviet willingness to wage war. As for a reading of capabilities, the fact that the Soviets were developing a long-range air force was in itself evidence of intentions. A-2 was, however, left out of the national security decision-making loop until after the successful test of the Soviet A-bomb, which was accurately predicted by the Air Force in the summer of 1949. Until that time most officials in the Truman administration believed in the likelihood of the slow incremental expansion of Soviet power rather than the launching of an 'atomic Pearl harbor' against the Western bloc.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aronsen, Lawrence R.},
      title = {Seeing Red: U.S. Air Force Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1945-1949},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {2},
      pages = {103--132},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714002887}
    }
    					
    Aubourg, Valerie Organizing Atlanticism: the Bilderberg group and the Atlantic institute, 1952-1963 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (2) , pp. 92-105  
    article
    Abstract: The Bilderberg group, which originated in Europe in 1952, slowly organized an American participation in the following two years. After a first conference held in May 1954, it rapidly developed into one of the most successful private transatlantic organizations of the 1950s. The project for an Atlantic Institute, which dates back to 1953-54, took longer to develop into a concrete institution, and was formally created, after several years of preparation, in January 1961. Both organizations received funding and support from the Ford Foundation and became fully-established fora in the early 1960s. The study compares the two initiatives to see how they shed light on the more general context of a "transatlantic culture" in the Cold War. Although the networks of personnel were of a different nature and drew on different circles and professions, one can observe some interlocking, and their joint success in the early 1960s was partly due to their importance in "outflanking" Gaullism in France.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Aubourg, Valerie},
      title = {Organizing Atlanticism: the Bilderberg group and the Atlantic institute, 1952-1963},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {2},
      pages = {92--105},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306760}
    }
    					
    Austin, Roger Surveillance and intelligence under the Vichy regime: The service du controle technique, 1939-45 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (1) , pp. 123-137  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Austin, Roger},
      title = {Surveillance and intelligence under the Vichy regime: The service du controle technique, 1939-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {1},
      pages = {123--137},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431844}
    }
    					
    Avery, Donald Allied scientific co-operation and Soviet espionage in Canada, 1941-45 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (3) , pp. 100-128  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Avery, Donald},
      title = {Allied scientific co-operation and Soviet espionage in Canada, 1941-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {3},
      pages = {100--128},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432217}
    }
    					
    Backscheider, Paula R. Daniel Defoe and early modern intelligence 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (1) , pp. 1-21  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Backscheider, Paula R.},
      title = {Daniel Defoe and early modern intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--21},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432340}
    }
    					
    Badey, T. J. Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-based Threat Assessment 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (2) , pp. 39-54  
    article
    Abstract: The assumption that policies reducing the proliferation of fissile materials will automatically reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is fallacious. Even if moderately successful, anti-proliferation initiatives have a limited impact on the illegal flow of nuclear materials and are not likely to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors. Current policies focus on the containment of fissile materials rather than on non-state-actors that may wish to acquire them. Concentrating principally on management, accounting, storage and transfer procedures, policy-makers seem to ignore the fact that the primary threat of nuclear terrorism stems not from the availability of the materials but from the potential willingness of some groups to acquire them. This article attempts to shift the focus of discussion from state-centric models of analysis to a threat or actor-based model of analysis. In doing so, the article seeks to identify risk factors, which in combination may indicate a willingness by non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition it hopes to provide the basis for more effective threat assessments.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Badey, T. J.},
      title = {Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-based Threat Assessment},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {2},
      pages = {39--54},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714002889}
    }
    					
    Bailey, Roderick Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmann's Recruitment and Retention 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (1) , pp. 72-97  
    article
    Abstract: James Klugmann spent two and a half years working on the staff of the Yugoslav Section of SOE. One of the most active and overt British communists of his generation, he has long been accused of having exploited that post to manipulate operations and policy in the interests of the communist cause. With reference to SOE and MI5 records, this study reveals how he was able to join and remain in SOE in spite of his pre-war profile as a leading student activist of the left.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bailey, Roderick},
      title = {Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmann's Recruitment and Retention},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {1},
      pages = {72--97},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520500059437}
    }
    					
    Bailey, Roderick OSS-SOE relations, Albania 1943-44 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (2) , pp. 20-35  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bailey, Roderick},
      title = {OSS-SOE relations, Albania 1943-44},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {2},
      pages = {20--35},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432601}
    }
    					
    Bakker, Edwin EU Counter-radicalization Policies: A Comprehensive and Consistent Approach? 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (2-3) , pp. 281-305  
    article
    Abstract: The challenge of violent radicalization is an important part of (the Prevent pillar) of the 2005 EU Counter-terrorism Strategy and is specifically dealt with in the 2005 EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. This article assesses the EU counter-radicalization approach by comparing the above mentioned strategies and other policy documents to theoretical notions on radicalization and counter radicalization. It focuses on the comprehensiveness, implementation and consistency of the EU policies that aim to prevent individuals from turning to violence, while halting the emergence of the next generation of terrorists.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bakker, Edwin},
      title = {EU Counter-radicalization Policies: A Comprehensive and Consistent Approach?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {281--305},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.988442}
    }
    					
    Ball, Desmond Signals intelligence in India 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (3) , pp. 377-407  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ball, Desmond},
      title = {Signals intelligence in India},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {3},
      pages = {377--407},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432309}
    }
    					
    Ball, Desmond Soviet signals intelligence: Vehicular systems and operations 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (1) , pp. 5-27  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ball, Desmond},
      title = {Soviet signals intelligence: Vehicular systems and operations},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {1},
      pages = {5--27},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908431982}
    }
    					
    Ball, Desmond Over and out: Signals intelligence (Sigint) in Hong Kong 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (3) , pp. 474-496  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ball, Desmond},
      title = {Over and out: Signals intelligence (Sigint) in Hong Kong},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {3},
      pages = {474--496},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432373}
    }
    					
    Ball, Desmond & Robert Windrem Soviet signals intelligence (Sigint): Organization and management 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (4) , pp. 621-659  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ball, Desmond and Windrem, Robert},
      title = {Soviet signals intelligence (Sigint): Organization and management},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {4},
      pages = {621--659},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432022}
    }
    					
    Ball, Simon [Book review] Joe Maiolo, "Cry Havoc: The Arms Race and the Second World War, 1931-1941", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (1) , pp. 129-131  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ball, Simon},
      title = {[Book review] Joe Maiolo, "Cry Havoc: The Arms Race and the Second World War, 1931-1941", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {1},
      pages = {129--131},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.713792}
    }
    					
    Bamford, Bradley W.C. The role and effectiveness of intelligence in Northern Ireland 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (4) , pp. 581-607  
    article
    Abstract: This article examines the role and effectiveness of counter-terrorist intelligence operations in Northern Ireland. Specifically, it examines the methods of gathering intelligence as well as how the information was used, while also addressing some of the wider moral and legal implications of intelligence activities for a liberal democratic society. It argues that British intelligence was ultimately very effective but at the price of employing some highly dubious methods. "Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once". 1 Statement by the Provisional Irish Republican Army
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bamford, Bradley W.C.},
      title = {The role and effectiveness of intelligence in Northern Ireland},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {4},
      pages = {581--607},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520500425273}
    }
    					
    Bar-Joseph, Uri The wealth of information and the poverty of comprehension: Israel's intelligence failure of 1973 revisited 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (4) , pp. 229-240  
    article
    Abstract: Review of Yoel Ben-Porat, Neila: Locked-On (Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1991). Pp.175. ISBN 965-248-117-3. Arie Braun, Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War (Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1992). Pp.371. ISBN 965-248-126-2. Eli Zeira, The October 73 War: Myth Against Reality (Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 1993). Pp.288. ISBN 965-448-042-5. The Investigation Committee - The Yom Kippur War, An Additional Partial Report: Reasoning and Completion to the Partial Report of April 1, 19747 volumes (Hebrew, Jerusalem: 1974) Vol.1. Pp.184.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bar-Joseph, Uri},
      title = {The wealth of information and the poverty of comprehension: Israel's intelligence failure of 1973 revisited},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {4},
      pages = {229--240},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529508432335}
    }
    					
    Bar-Joseph, Uri A Question of Loyalty: Ashraf Marwan and Israel's Intelligence Fiasco in the Yom Kippur War 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (5) , pp. 667-685  
    article
    Abstract: Ashraf Marwan, President Nasser's son-in-law and President Sadat's close aide, was the most important spy in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, even today, six years after his mysterious murder in London, the question of whether Marwan genuinely worked for the Israeli Mossad or misled it is at the center of a heated debate. Following a brief description of Marwan's espionage career, this article lays out the main arguments advanced by the "double-agent" school, before showing them to be groundless. I conclude that Marwan had genuinely spied for Israel and was, indeed, "the best source the Mossad had ever had".
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bar-Joseph, Uri},
      title = {A Question of Loyalty: Ashraf Marwan and Israel's Intelligence Fiasco in the Yom Kippur War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {5},
      pages = {667--685},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.887632}
    }
    					
    Bar-Joseph, Uri Methodological magic 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (4) , pp. 134-155  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bar-Joseph, Uri},
      title = {Methodological magic},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {4},
      pages = {134--155},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528808431976}
    }
    					
    Bar-joseph, Uri The Intelligence Chief who went Fishing in the Cold: How Maj. Gen. (res.) Eli Zeira Exposed the Identity of Israel's Best Source Ever 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (2) , pp. 226-248  
    article
    Abstract: In March 2007, following arbitration between Israel's director of Military Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War, Maj. Gen. Eli Zeira and the Mossad chief in 1973, Zvi Zamir, it was officially ruled out that Zeira leaked the identity of Israel's most important source in Egypt to unauthorized journalists. The agent, Dr Ashraf Marwan, Nasser's son-in-law and Sadat's close advisor, had since 1969 given the Mossad excellent information about Egypt?s war preparations. He was also the source for the warning that ultimately geared Israel to war a few hours before it started on 6 October 1973. This article describes the process through which, from the early 1990s, Zeira leaked to unauthorized students of the Yom Kippur War information concerning the identity of the source and hypothesizes about what could have motivated him to take this action. In March 2007, following arbitration between Israel's director of Military Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War, Maj. Gen. Eli Zeira and the Mossad chief in 1973, Zvi Zamir, it was officially ruled out that Zeira leaked the identity of Israel's most important source in Egypt to unauthorized journalists. The agent, Dr Ashraf Marwan, Nasser's son-in-law and Sadat's close advisor, had since 1969 given the Mossad excellent information about Egypt?s war preparations. He was also the source for the warning that ultimately geared Israel to war a few hours before it started on 6 October 1973. This article describes the process through which, from the early 1990s, Zeira leaked to unauthorized students of the Yom Kippur War information concerning the identity of the source and hypothesizes about what could have motivated him to take this action.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bar-joseph, Uri},
      title = {The Intelligence Chief who went Fishing in the Cold: How Maj. Gen. (res.) Eli Zeira Exposed the Identity of Israel's Best Source Ever},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {2},
      pages = {226--248},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520801977378}
    }
    					
    Barnett, Harvey Legislation-based national security services: Australia 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (2) , pp. 287-300  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Barnett, Harvey},
      title = {Legislation-based national security services: Australia},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {2},
      pages = {287--300},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432250}
    }
    					
    Barrett, David M. A new intelligence director's diary: President truman, a young JFK, Ho Chi Minh's "Beheading", and other challenges 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (3) , pp. 380-383  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Barrett, David M.},
      title = {A new intelligence director's diary: President truman, a young JFK, Ho Chi Minh's "Beheading", and other challenges},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {3},
      pages = {380--383},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701415180}
    }
    					
    Barrett, David M. [Book review] "Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith" 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (6) , pp. 917-920  
    article
    Abstract: D.K.R. Crosswell, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Barrett, David M.},
      title = {[Book review] "Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {917--920},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.755060}
    }
    					
    Barrett, David M. & Raymond Wasko Sampling CIA's New Document Retrieval System: McCone Telephone Conversations during the Six Crises Tempest 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (2) , pp. 332-340  
    article
    Abstract: Documents recently made available at the National Archives by the CIA are accessed through non-traditional archival means: researchers use keywords at computers to obtain them. Most of the documents will be uninteresting or worthless to scholars. Some add important or colorful details to our knowledge of the Agency. An example is a small set of documents detailing 1962 telephone conversations of DCI John McCone with President Kennedy, former DCI Dulles, and former Vice President Nixon about the latter's best-selling book Six Crises, which charged Kennedy with having acted unscrupulously as a presidential candidate in 1960 by advocating covert action against Cuba.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Barrett, David M. and Wasko, Raymond},
      title = {Sampling CIA's New Document Retrieval System: McCone Telephone Conversations during the Six Crises Tempest},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {2},
      pages = {332--340},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500134107}
    }
    					
    Barros, Andrew A window on the "trust": The case of Ado Birk 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (2) , pp. 273-293  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Barros, Andrew},
      title = {A window on the "trust": The case of Ado Birk},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {2},
      pages = {273--293},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529508432299}
    }
    					
    Baxter, Christopher Forgeries and Spies: The Foreign Office and the "Cicero" Case 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (6) , pp. 807-826  
    article
    Abstract: This article seeks to analyze the Foreign Office reaction to the Cicero spy affair. Papers newly released in 2003 and 2005 provide some fascinating insights into leaks that were occurring at the Ankara embassy long before Cicero, how diplomats tried to trap the notorious spy and how the Foreign Office sought to block any outside interference in its investigations, particularly from the Security Service (MI5). The article also sheds light on how the Foreign Office attempted to deal with the fallout when the full scale of the Cicero leak became publicly known. At the time, the Foreign Office investigation into the leak failed to identify Cicero but it did highlight that Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, the British Ambassador to Turkey, was culpable in allowing documents in his possession to be photographed. It appeared, however, that Hugessen had got off lightly when he was rewarded with the ambassadorship at Brussels in September 1944. Why had this situation come about? Was the Foreign Office closing its ranks to protect one of its own? And, did this confirm oft-repeated accusations that as an institution, the Foreign Office could not be trusted when it came to security?
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Baxter, Christopher},
      title = {Forgeries and Spies: The Foreign Office and the "Cicero" Case},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {6},
      pages = {807--826},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802559894}
    }
    					
    Beach, Jim Origins of the special intelligence relationship? Anglo-American intelligence co-operation on the Western Front, 1917 - 18 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (2) , pp. 229-249  
    article
    Abstract: The origins of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship are usually dated to the early years of the Second World War. This article suggests that the First World War interaction between the intelligence staffs of the British and American Expeditionary Forces was a significant precursor to the emergence of the later relationship. Using primarily American archival sources, the article reveals an intimacy that emerged in the summer of 1917 and continued, to a lesser extent, until the armistice. The emergence of this close relationship is attributed to a common language, independent-minded intelligence leaders, and an element of chance.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Beach, Jim},
      title = {Origins of the special intelligence relationship? Anglo-American intelligence co-operation on the Western Front, 1917 - 18},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {2},
      pages = {229--249},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701303857}
    }
    					
    Bean, Hamilton Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (4) , pp. 479-498  
    article
    Abstract: Both US intelligence officials and intelligence studies scholars claim that "organizational culture" is a cause of "intelligence failure" and the proper locus of post-9/11 intelligence reform efforts. This essay uses a postmodern perspective to demonstrate how the dominant discourse of "organizational culture" shapes stakeholders' understandings of accountability and what constitutes necessary, correct, or effective intelligence reform. By exploring institutional struggles over the meanings of "culture" and "accountability", this essay calls for reconsideration of the ways US intelligence officials and intelligence studies scholars talk about "organizational culture" vis-à-vis post-9/11 intelligence reform.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bean, Hamilton},
      title = {Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {4},
      pages = {479--498},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520903069413}
    }
    					
    Bean, Hamilton Rhetorical and Critical/Cultural Intelligence Studies 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (4) , pp. 495-519  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract While the role of intelligence is to reduce uncertainty for decision-makers, a role of intelligence scholarship is to highlight uncertainty, that is, open up possibilities for ethical reflection and deliberation that conventional wisdom, institutional inertia, and mainstream research have closed off. Along these lines, this essay argues for the development and use of rhetorical and critical/cultural perspectives within the field of Intelligence Studies. It describes what rhetorical and critical/cultural research entails and explains how associated perspectives benefit the field.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bean, Hamilton},
      title = {Rhetorical and Critical/Cultural Intelligence Studies},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {4},
      pages = {495--519},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.699284}
    }
    					
    Beard, Jonathan D. [Book review] Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor (eds.), "Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (3) , pp. 433-435  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Beard, Jonathan D.},
      title = {[Book review] Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor (eds.), "Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {3},
      pages = {433--435},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628542}
    }
    					
    Beard, Jonathan D. [Book review] Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (6) , pp. 923-924  
    article
    Abstract: Ben Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory (New York: Harmony Books 2010).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Beard, Jonathan D.},
      title = {[Book review] Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {923--924},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.755064}
    }
    					
    Beckett, Ian F. W. A note on government intelligence and surveillance during the Curragh incident, March 1914 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (3) , pp. 435-440  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Beckett, Ian F. W.},
      title = {A note on government intelligence and surveillance during the Curragh incident, March 1914},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {3},
      pages = {435--440},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528608431866}
    }
    					
    Beesly, Patrick Convoy PQ 17: A study of intelligence and decision-making 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (2) , pp. 292-322  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Beesly, Patrick},
      title = {Convoy PQ 17: A study of intelligence and decision-making},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {2},
      pages = {292--322},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432054}
    }
    					
    Bellaby, Ross What's the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (1) , pp. 93-117  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract As the professional practice of intelligence collection adapts to the changing environment and new threats of the twenty-first century, many academic experts and intelligence professionals call for a coherent ethical framework that outlines exactly when, by what means and to what ends intelligence is justified. Reports of abuse at detention centres such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, the ever increasing use of technological surveillance, and the increased attention on the use of torture for intelligence collection purposes have all highlighted a need to make an explicit statement about what is and what is not permissible intelligence practice. In this article an ethical framework will be established which will outline under what circumstances the use of different intelligence collection activities would be permissible. This ethical framework will first underline what it is about intelligence collection that is "harmful" and, therefore, should be prohibited under normal circumstances. The ethical framework then outlines a set of "just intelligence principles", based on the just war tradition, which delineate when the harm caused can be justified. As a result, this article outlines a systemic ethical framework that makes it possible to understand when intelligence collection is prohibited and when it is permissible.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bellaby, Ross},
      title = {What's the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {1},
      pages = {93--117},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.621600}
    }
    					
    Bellaby, Ross [Book review] Dick Couch, "A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (1) , pp. 123-125  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bellaby, Ross},
      title = {[Book review] Dick Couch, "A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {1},
      pages = {123--125},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.713790}
    }
    					
    Ben-Israel, Isaac Philosophy and methodology of intelligence: The logic of estimate process 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (4) , pp. 660-718  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ben-Israel, Isaac},
      title = {Philosophy and methodology of intelligence: The logic of estimate process},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {4},
      pages = {660--718},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908432023}
    }
    					
    Bennett, Gill Declassification and release policies of the UK's intelligence agencies 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (1) , pp. 21-32  
    article
    Abstract: This study sets out the declassification and release policies of the three principal UK intelligence bodies - the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) - in regard to their archives. It sets out the legislative and administrative framework for the release or retention of Intelligence records, and explains that the agencies' declassification and release policies are all based on the imperative of protecting sources and methods. Where their policies differ - for example, both MI5 and GCHQ release records to the Public Record Office, while SIS does not - the reason can be found in the differing nature of their functions and operating methods.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bennett, Gill},
      title = {Declassification and release policies of the UK's intelligence agencies},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {1},
      pages = {21--32},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520412331306390}
    }
    					
    Bennett, Huw [Book review] Anthony King, "The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan" ; Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell (eds.), "A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (6) , pp. 920-923  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bennett, Huw},
      title = {[Book review] Anthony King, "The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan" ; Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell (eds.), "A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {6},
      pages = {920--923},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.713787}
    }
    					
    Bennett, Ralph A footnote to fortitude 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (1) , pp. 240-241  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bennett, Ralph},
      title = {A footnote to fortitude},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {240--241},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432099}
    }
    					
    Bennett, Ralph The "Vienna alternative", 1944: Reality or illusion? 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (2) , pp. 251-271  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bennett, Ralph},
      title = {The "Vienna alternative", 1944: Reality or illusion?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {2},
      pages = {251--271},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431944}
    }
    					
    Bennett, Ralph Fortitude, ultra and the "need to know" 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (3) , pp. 482-502  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bennett, Ralph},
      title = {Fortitude, ultra and the "need to know"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {482--502},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908432012}
    }
    					
    Bennett, Ralph Intelligence and strategy: Some observations on the war in the Mediterranean 1941-45 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (2) , pp. 444-464  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bennett, Ralph},
      title = {Intelligence and strategy: Some observations on the war in the Mediterranean 1941-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {2},
      pages = {444--464},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529008432058}
    }
    					
    Bennett, Ralph, Sir William Deakin, Sir David Hunt & Sir Peter Wilkinson Mihailović and Tito 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (3) , pp. 526-529  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bennett, Ralph and Deakin, Sir William and Hunt, Sir David and Wilkinson, Sir Peter},
      title = {Mihailović and Tito},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {3},
      pages = {526--529},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432317}
    }
    					
    Bennett-Jones, Owen Eamon Murphy, "The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism", 2013 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (5) , pp. 749-750  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bennett-Jones, Owen},
      title = {Eamon Murphy, "The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism", 2013},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {5},
      pages = {749--750},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.946328}
    }
    					
    Bennett-Jones, Owen [Book review] Mark Fitzpatrick, "Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers", 2014 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (5) , pp. 750-752  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bennett-Jones, Owen},
      title = {[Book review] Mark Fitzpatrick, "Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers", 2014},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {5},
      pages = {750--752},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.946338}
    }
    					
    Ben-Zvi, Abraham The dynamics of surprise: The defender's perspective 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (4) , pp. 113-144  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ben-Zvi, Abraham},
      title = {The dynamics of surprise: The defender's perspective},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {4},
      pages = {113--144},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432451}
    }
    					
    Berger, Mark T. The Cold War and National Liberation in Southern Africa: The United States and the Emergence of Zimbabwe 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (1) , pp. 171-179  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Berger, Mark T.},
      title = {The Cold War and National Liberation in Southern Africa: The United States and the Emergence of Zimbabwe},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {1},
      pages = {171--179},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520308559251}
    }
    					
    Berger, Mark T. (Review article) The real Cold War was hot: The global struggle for the Third World 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (1) , pp. 112-126  
    article
    Abstract: Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone: A Memoir of 1960-1967. New York, Public Affairs, 2007. Pp.xi + 304. $26.00/£15.99, hardback, ISBN-10 978-1-58648-405-2.
    Gerald Horne, Cold War in a Hot Zone: The United States Confronts Labor and Independence Struggles in the British West Indies. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2007. Pp.267. $25.95/£13.99, paperback, ISBN-13 9978-1-59213-628-5.
    Jurgen Ruland, Eva Manske and Theodor Hanf, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Third World: A Post-Cold War Assessment. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, New Edition, September 2005. Pp.xv + 269. $29.95/£19.95, paperback, ISBN 0-7656-1621-1.
    Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, eds., The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War (The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series). New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006. Pp.ix + 304. $75.00/£54.50, hardback, ISBN-10 0742553817.
    Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp.xiv + 484. £25.00/$35.00, hardback, ISBN-13 978-0-521-85364-4.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Berger, Mark T.},
      title = {(Review article) The real Cold War was hot: The global struggle for the Third World},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {1},
      pages = {112--126},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701798171}
    }
    					
    Berger, Mark T. [Book review] "From Saigon to Baghdad: Nation-building and the Specter of History" 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (2) , pp. 344-356  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Berger, Mark T.},
      title = {[Book review] "From Saigon to Baghdad: Nation-building and the Specter of History"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {2},
      pages = {344--356},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500158098}
    }
    					
    Berger, Mark T., Kenneth Burgess, James Mauldin & Michael P. Sullivan "Déjà Vu All Over Again": Counterinsurgency and the "American Way of War" 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (6) , pp. 910-931  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Berger, Mark T. and Burgess, Kenneth and Mauldin, James and Sullivan, Michael P.},
      title = {"Déjà Vu All Over Again": Counterinsurgency and the "American Way of War"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {6},
      pages = {910--931},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701770709}
    }
    					
    Berger, Stefan [Book review] Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton and Stephen Twigge (eds.), "Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume VII: German Unification 1989-1990", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (1) , pp. 127-129  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Berger, Stefan},
      title = {[Book review] Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton and Stephen Twigge (eds.), "Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume VII: German Unification 1989-1990", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {1},
      pages = {127--129},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.713791}
    }
    					
    Berridge, G.R. The ethnic "agent in place": English-speaking civil servants and nationalist South Africa, 1948-57 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (2) , pp. 257-267  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Berridge, G.R.},
      title = {The ethnic "agent in place": English-speaking civil servants and nationalist South Africa, 1948-57},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {2},
      pages = {257--267},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908431997}
    }
    					
    Berridge, Will Sudan's Security Agencies: Fragmentation, Visibility and Mimicry, 1908-89 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (6) , pp. 845-867  
    article
    Abstract: This article contends that, in the period under study, government security agencies in both colonial and post-colonial Sudan have failed to dominate society. It attributes this failure to the limited resources and limited ambitions of the state, and the fact that its security organs were thus weakly institutionalized. The fact that these failures persisted after independence, in spite of the efforts of post-colonial governments to expand their intelligence agencies, demonstrated the divisions within the state and the extent to which it could be captured by competing political and social groups.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Berridge, Will},
      title = {Sudan's Security Agencies: Fragmentation, Visibility and Mimicry, 1908-89},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {845--867},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.701435}
    }
    					
    Best Jr, Richard A. What the Intelligence Community Got Right About Iraq 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (3) , pp. 289-302  
    article
    Abstract: Although widely criticized for inaccurate estimates of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in 2002, the United States Intelligence Community was far more prescient about the likely consequences of a military campaign to remove Saddam Hussein. Intelligence assessments of the challenges likely to be faced by a post-war Iraq were widely disseminated within the Executive Branch and Congress and may have served to justify the Bush Administration's decision to undertake extensive reconstruction efforts rather than to turn power over at once to Iraqi leaders.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Best Jr, Richard A.},
      title = {What the Intelligence Community Got Right About Iraq},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {3},
      pages = {289--302},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802121174}
    }
    					
    Best, Antony Intelligence, diplomacy and the Japanese threat to British interests, 1914-41 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (1) , pp. 85-100  
    article
    Abstract: This contribution looks at the ways in which the intelligence releases in the 1990s have helped to illuminate previously unknown or misunderstood aspects of the Anglo-Japanese relationship from 1914 to 1941. Although attention in the media has been focused on the release of the Security Service's records, these are of limited use in this area of study. Much more significant are the diplomatic intercepts that were collected by the Government Code and Cipher School, which not only add new angles to old questions, but also reveal British suspicions of Japan in areas not previously studied, such as Japanese pan-Asianism.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Best, Antony},
      title = {Intelligence, diplomacy and the Japanese threat to British interests, 1914-41},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {1},
      pages = {85--100},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306420}
    }
    					
    Best, Antony Constructing an image: British intelligence and Whitehall's perception of Japan, 1931-1939 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (3) , pp. 403-423  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Best, Antony},
      title = {Constructing an image: British intelligence and Whitehall's perception of Japan, 1931-1939},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {3},
      pages = {403--423},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432369}
    }
    					
    Best, Antony "This probably over-valued military power": British intelligence and Whitehall's perception of Japan, 1939-41 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (3) , pp. 67-94  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Best, Antony},
      title = {"This probably over-valued military power": British intelligence and Whitehall's perception of Japan, 1939-41},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {3},
      pages = {67--94},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432431}
    }
    					
    Betts, Richard K. Policy-makers and intelligence analysts: Love, hate or indifference? 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (1) , pp. 184-189  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Betts, Richard K.},
      title = {Policy-makers and intelligence analysts: Love, hate or indifference?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {1},
      pages = {184--189},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528808431934}
    }
    					
    Bewley-Taylor, David Crack in the lens: Hollywood, the CIA and the African-American response to the "Dark Alliance" series 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (1) , pp. 81-102  
    article
    Abstract: The publication of a series of articles in the San Jose Mercury, though they did contain a complex combination of both fact and fiction, was given a significant degree of credibility by the pubic images of CIA activities portrayed in a variety of Hollywood movies. This paper argues that these movies, whether accurately portraying CIA activities or not, helped sustain racially based paranoia that took on a life of its own.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bewley-Taylor, David},
      title = {Crack in the lens: Hollywood, the CIA and the African-American response to the "Dark Alliance" series},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {1},
      pages = {81--102},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701798155}
    }
    					
    Bickers, Robert The business of a secret war: Operation "Remorse" and SOE salesmanship in Wartime China 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (4) , pp. 11-36  
    article
    Abstract: The prime British objective in China during the Pacific War was the re-establishment of pre-war trade and influence and the recovery of Hong Kong. Through Operation "Remorse" (1944-45) the Special Operations Executive covertly established a wide network of distributors and buyers throughout occupied and unoccupied China for high-value low-bulk goods and currencies, using the returns acccruing to buy influence, information, safety and food for Allied prisoners, subsidise politically problematic operations, and smooth the British path back into Hong Kong. "Remorse" epitomised the concerns and demonstrated the methods of the British presence in China generally: a readiness to innovate and adapt, market sensitivity and a capacity for making unlikely local alliances, all held together through a strong focus on a fixed target - a secure China base for Sino-British trade.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bickers, Robert},
      title = {The business of a secret war: Operation "Remorse" and SOE salesmanship in Wartime China},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {4},
      pages = {11--36},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306280}
    }
    					
    Biddiscombe, Perry Operation selection board: The growth and suppression of the Neo-Nazi "deutsche revolution" 1945-47 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (1) , pp. 59-77  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Biddiscombe, Perry},
      title = {Operation selection board: The growth and suppression of the Neo-Nazi "deutsche revolution" 1945-47},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {1},
      pages = {59--77},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432343}
    }
    					
    Biddiscombe, Perry The problem with glass houses: The soviet recruitment and deployment of SS men as spies and saboteurs 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (3) , pp. 131-145  
    article
    Abstract: Although the Soviets were often quick to charge the Western Powers with coddling German Nazis and with exploiting former SS men for selfish and amoral purposes, material from the US National Archives suggests that their intelligence service did the same thing and perhaps started the practice even earlier than their Western counterparts. One key report, based on the 1946 admissions of an ex-SS man who had been captured on the Eastern Front and was then recruited by the Soviets for a subversive operation code-named "Theo", is corroborated by enough supporting evidence to make it credible.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Biddiscombe, Perry},
      title = {The problem with glass houses: The soviet recruitment and deployment of SS men as spies and saboteurs},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {3},
      pages = {131--145},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432620}
    }
    					
    Bitar, Mona K. Bombs, plots and allies: Cambodia and the western powers, 1958-59 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (4) , pp. 149-180  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bitar, Mona K.},
      title = {Bombs, plots and allies: Cambodia and the western powers, 1958-59},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {149--180},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432575}
    }
    					
    Black, A. & R. Brunt Information Management in MI5 Before the Age of the Computer 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (2) , pp. 158-165  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Black, A. and Brunt, R.},
      title = {Information Management in MI5 Before the Age of the Computer},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {2},
      pages = {158--165},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714002899}
    }
    					
    Black, Ian The origins of Israeli intelligence 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (4) , pp. 151-156  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Black, Ian},
      title = {The origins of Israeli intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {4},
      pages = {151--156},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431920}
    }
    					
    Black, Jeremy British intelligence and the mid-eighteenth-century crisis 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (2) , pp. 209-229  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Black, Jeremy},
      title = {British intelligence and the mid-eighteenth-century crisis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {2},
      pages = {209--229},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431887}
    }
    					
    Black, Jeremy The Geopolitics of James Bond 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (2) , pp. 290-303  
    article
    Abstract: This article considers the politics of James Bond in order to throw light on the interaction of 'real' geopolitics and literary and cinematic representations. The Bond literature provides many opportunities for considering aspects of the popular perception of the worlds of intelligence, including, for example, the stress on covert operations and on human intelligence rather than on signals operations. The stories can also be used to consider changing images of Britain, the United States and the world, and can at times be seen as efforts to create an impression of the normality of British imperial rule and Empire. Echoes of Anglo-American competition and tension are also to be found in the Bond literature. An important, albeit concealed, theme is Britain's diminished political and military presence in Cold War confrontations and a corresponding need to adapt to the United States. Cinematic representations of Bond have presented the world with an image of global struggle through Western eyes, having depicted shifts in the Cold War and addressing themes such as the space race, nuclear confrontation and drugs.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Black, Jeremy},
      title = {The Geopolitics of James Bond},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {2},
      pages = {290--303},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302001}
    }
    					
    Blais, J.J. The political accountability of intelligence agencies - Canada 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (1) , pp. 108-118  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Blais, J.J.},
      title = {The political accountability of intelligence agencies - Canada},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {1},
      pages = {108--118},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908431986}
    }
    					
    Blanken, Leo & Justin Overbaugh Looking for Intel? … or Looking for Answers? Reforming Military Intelligence for a Counterinsurgency Environment 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (4) , pp. 559-575  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract We analyze the recent Flynn Report and assess its implications for the future of military intelligence in Afghanistan. In particular, we argue that the report seeks to expand the substantive tasks of the military intelligence practitioner, while collapsing non-trivial aspects of existing organizational hierarchies. We argue that implementation of the Flynn Report's proposals would match poorly with the traditional nature of military intelligence and the realities of human resources constraints in the military. Further, the resulting scale of unfiltered data such a system would produce might serve to overwhelm rather than assist decision-makers. Finally, we conclude that the problems expressed in the Flynn Report should not be traced to the military intelligence apparatus per se, but rather to the inability of US political leadership to map out a clear vision for current operations - both in Afghanistan, and in the counterinsurgency environment in general.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Blanken, Leo and Overbaugh, Justin},
      title = {Looking for Intel? … or Looking for Answers? Reforming Military Intelligence for a Counterinsurgency Environment},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {4},
      pages = {559--575},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.688307}
    }
    					
    Blight, James G. & David A. Welch What can intelligence tell us about the Cuban missile crisis, and what can the Cuban missile crisis tell us about intelligence? 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (3) , pp. 1-17  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Blight, James G. and Welch, David A.},
      title = {What can intelligence tell us about the Cuban missile crisis, and what can the Cuban missile crisis tell us about intelligence?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {3},
      pages = {1--17},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432492}
    }
    					
    Blight, James G. & David A. Welch The Cuban missile crisis and intelligence performance 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (3) , pp. 173-217  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Blight, James G. and Welch, David A.},
      title = {The Cuban missile crisis and intelligence performance},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {3},
      pages = {173--217},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432498}
    }
    					
    Boer, Monica Den Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (2-3) , pp. 402-419  
    article
    Abstract: In this article we seek to address the emerging role of the European Union (EU) as a security and intelligence actor from the perspective of counter-terrorism. Intelligence as a process and product has been strongly promoted by the EU as a useful and necessary tool in the fight against terrorism, radicalization, organized crime and public order problems. A range of agencies has been established that collect, analyze and operationalize intelligence in view of strategically defined security threats. Examples are Europol and Frontex. This article makes an inventory of their roles and competences in the field of intelligence and looks at the list of instruments that encourage the sharing of intelligence between different law enforcement and security agencies. Moreover, it is argued in this article that as intelligence becomes more hybrid and as the EU only holds light powers of oversight on ownership and integrity of data, considerable governance challenges lurk around the corner. As "intelligence" is usually a complex and sensitive product, it often travels outside formal bureaucratic channels, which undermines accountability and transparency of where, how and for what purpose the intelligence was gathered.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boer, Monica Den},
      title = {Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {402--419},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.988444}
    }
    					
    Boghardt, Thomas Response to Watt 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (3) , pp. 467-467  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boghardt, Thomas},
      title = {Response to Watt},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {3},
      pages = {467--467},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600750794}
    }
    					
    Bold, Christine Secret negotiations: The Spy figure in Nineteenth-century American popular fiction 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (4) , pp. 17-29  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bold, Christine},
      title = {Secret negotiations: The Spy figure in Nineteenth-century American popular fiction},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {4},
      pages = {17--29},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432077}
    }
    					
    Bonen, Z. The role of target acquisition in combat intelligence past and future 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (1) , pp. 119-126  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bonen, Z.},
      title = {The role of target acquisition in combat intelligence past and future},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {1},
      pages = {119--126},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908431987}
    }
    					
    Bonsall, Arthur Bletchley Park and the RAF Y Service: Some Recollections 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (6) , pp. 827-841  
    article
    Abstract: The RAF Y Service and the German Air Section at Bletchley Park collaborated in producing a great deal of intelligence about GAF (German Air Force) operations in World War II. However, two errors in pre-war planning reduced this output. The first error was the decision that the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) should be responsible solely for cryptography, the interpretation of Sigint to be the task of the Intelligence recipients. The second was the general assumption that the information obtainable from intercepting the low-grade codes and plain language used in the control of Air operations would only be of intelligence interest while the operations were in progress. After-the-event study of these communications by the German Air Section produced unique information needed by the RAF Commands. The Air Ministry took an unduly long time to agree that this information should be provided to them.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bonsall, Arthur},
      title = {Bletchley Park and the RAF Y Service: Some Recollections},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {6},
      pages = {827--841},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802559852}
    }
    					
    Boog, Horst German air intelligence in the second world war 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (2) , pp. 350-424  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boog, Horst},
      title = {German air intelligence in the second world war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {2},
      pages = {350--424},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432056}
    }
    					
    Boog, Horst "Josephine" and the Northern Flank 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (1) , pp. 137-160  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boog, Horst},
      title = {"Josephine" and the Northern Flank},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {1},
      pages = {137--160},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908431989}
    }
    					
    Booth, Alan R. The development of the espionage film 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (4) , pp. 136-160  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Booth, Alan R.},
      title = {The development of the espionage film},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {4},
      pages = {136--160},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432083}
    }
    					
    Borer, Douglas A., Stephen Twing & Randy P. Burkett Problems in the Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Rethinking Korea, Tet, and Afghanistan 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (6) , pp. 811-836  
    article
    Abstract: Accusations of failure by elements of the US intelligence community (IC) have followed in the wake of nearly every war and terrorist bombing since Japan's successful strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This article will illustrate how some problems that exist inside the "intelligence-policy nexus" are beyond the control of the IC. By investigating the dynamics and tensions that exist between producers of intelligence (the IC) and the consumers of those products (policy-makers), we review three different types of alleged failure. First, by revisiting the Chinese intervention in Korea, we show that a rarely listed case in the literature is in fact a classic example of producer-based failure generated from within the IC. However, in our study of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War (1968), we show that the alleged intelligence failure by producers should be more accurately described as a "failure of intelligence" by consumers. Third, by revisiting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), we conclude that there existed neither a producer nor a consumer failure. The Carter Administration made a conscious policy choice to act surprised (when it was not).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Borer, Douglas A. and Twing, Stephen and Burkett, Randy P.},
      title = {Problems in the Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Rethinking Korea, Tet, and Afghanistan},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {6},
      pages = {811--836},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.851875}
    }
    					
    Boughton, James & Roger Sandilands Politics and the attack on FDR's economists: from the grand alliance to the Cold War 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (3) , pp. 73-99  
    article
    Abstract: US government economists in the later years of the administration of Franklin Roosevelt were urged to treat the Soviet Union as an ally, in the interests of winning World War II and establishing the basis for peaceful cooperation after the war. The onset of the Cold War and the subsequent rise of McCarthyism sullied the reputations of many of them, especially the two most prominent: Lauchlin Currie (chief economist in the White House) and Harry Dexter White (chief economist in the Treasury). Close examination of the parallels between these two seemingly disparate cases reveals that recent attempts to revive the charges are no more firmly based than those of the early 1950s.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boughton, James and Sandilands, Roger},
      title = {Politics and the attack on FDR's economists: from the grand alliance to the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {3},
      pages = {73--99},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306930}
    }
    					
    Bowen, Bleddyn E. [Book review] James Clay Moltz, "The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests", 2011 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (2) , pp. 288-291  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bowen, Bleddyn E.},
      title = {[Book review] James Clay Moltz, "The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests", 2011},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {2},
      pages = {288--291},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.727071}
    }
    					
    Bowen, Wyn Q., Robert Dover & Michael S. Goodman Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: An Introduction to the Special Issue 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (3) , pp. 315-322  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bowen, Wyn Q. and Dover, Robert and Goodman, Michael S.},
      title = {Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: An Introduction to the Special Issue},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {3},
      pages = {315--322},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.895590}
    }
    					
    Boyd, Carl Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (I) the formative months before Pearl Harbor 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (1) , pp. 150-169  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boyd, Carl},
      title = {Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (I) the formative months before Pearl Harbor},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {1},
      pages = {150--169},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431880}
    }
    					
    Boyd, Carl Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (II) the crucial months after Pearl Harbor 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (2) , pp. 302-319  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boyd, Carl},
      title = {Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (II) the crucial months after Pearl Harbor},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {2},
      pages = {302--319},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431892}
    }
    					
    Boyd, Carl Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (III) the months of growing certainty 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (4) , pp. 83-102  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boyd, Carl},
      title = {Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (III) the months of growing certainty},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {4},
      pages = {83--102},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431971}
    }
    					
    Boyd, Carl Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (IV) confirming the turn of the tide on the German-Soviet front 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (1) , pp. 86-107  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boyd, Carl},
      title = {Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (IV) confirming the turn of the tide on the German-Soviet front},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {1},
      pages = {86--107},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908431985}
    }
    					
    Boyd, Carl Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (V) news of Hitler's defense preparations for Allied invasion of Western Europe 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (3) , pp. 461-481  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boyd, Carl},
      title = {Significance of MAGIC and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin: (V) news of Hitler's defense preparations for Allied invasion of Western Europe},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {461--481},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432011}
    }
    					
    Boylan, Kevin M. [Book review] Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., "Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (1) , pp. 121-123  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Boylan, Kevin M.},
      title = {[Book review] Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., "Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {1},
      pages = {121--123},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.713788}
    }
    					
    Brady, Christopher Intelligence failures: Plus Ça change ... 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (4) , pp. 86-96  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Brady, Christopher},
      title = {Intelligence failures: Plus Ça change ...},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {4},
      pages = {86--96},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432227}
    }
    					
    Brazil, Matthew Darker Corners: Less Familiar Aspects of Spying 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (3) , pp. 389-393  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Brazil, Matthew},
      title = {Darker Corners: Less Familiar Aspects of Spying},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {3},
      pages = {389--393},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.493316}
    }
    					
    Breakspear, Alan A New Definition of Intelligence 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (5) , pp. 678-693  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Intelligence is widely misunderstood. Too much is made of secrecy, and of covert operations and counter-intelligence (action domains informed by intelligence rather than integral to it). Intelligence is often focused on threats, missing opportunities for advantage. A standard definition is proposed for better understanding of intelligence by the academy, media and public. Intelligence is a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do something about it. The capability involves foresight and insight, and is intended to identify impending change which may be positive, representing opportunity, or negative, representing threat. Definitions which converge with this proposal are found in several intelligence settings.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Breakspear, Alan},
      title = {A New Definition of Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {5},
      pages = {678--693},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.699285}
    }
    					
    Briggs, Chad M. Developing Strategic and Operational Environmental Intelligence Capabilities 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (5) , pp. 653-668  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article examines the role of environmental change in conducting intelligence assessments, and the important role in integrating scientific data with background assumptions behind military and security planning. Tracing the development of environmental security concepts, recent military and intelligence interest in climate and environmental changes are based on practical concerns over critical vulnerabilities of infrastructure, energy supplies, and system stability. Examples from Central Asia illustrate the cascading nature of environmental security risks, particularly with water and energy systems. The discussion follows with how scenarios and risk assessments can be integrated with concepts from environmental net assessments, and why traditional assumptions of probabilities, uncertainties and secrecy may be misleading. It is essential to understand not only how extreme future changes might be, but what capabilities we and allies posses to adapt to environmental-related hazards.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Briggs, Chad M.},
      title = {Developing Strategic and Operational Environmental Intelligence Capabilities},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {5},
      pages = {653--668},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.708519}
    }
    					
    Brown, Andrew The Viennese Connection: Engelbert Broda, Alan Nunn May and Atomic Espionage 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (2) , pp. 173-193  
    article
    Abstract: Recently declassified materials have revealed the existence of a previously unknown network of Austrian communists in pre-war England. The group of young well-educated Viennese used unsuspecting social contacts and marriages of convenience to establish itself. Analysis of this network reveals some previously overlooked similarities between the "Cambridge" spies Kim Philby and Alan Nunn May, as well as the emergence of a new nuclear spy, Engelbert Broda. Their wartime espionage as individuals took place at a time when non-communist British scientists were promoting the international sharing of atomic knowledge through unofficial channels. The newly released files reflect a characteristic preference of the British secret services for intelligence gathering rather than intervention and illustrate how vital leads follow from apparently trivial observations.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Brown, Andrew},
      title = {The Viennese Connection: Engelbert Broda, Alan Nunn May and Atomic Espionage},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {2},
      pages = {173--193},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520902819594}
    }
    					
    Brown, Graham The Perils of Terrorism: Chinese Whispers, Kevin Bacon and Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia - A review essay 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (1) , pp. 150-162  
    article
    Abstract: This review examines the scholarship on Islamic terrorism and Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia, arguing that three factors undermine the academic credibility of much of this scholarship. Two points relate to the extensive reliance on interviews with various anonymous "security personnel", or media reports of such statements. Firstly, these sources are in themselves problematic in that they cannot be independently checked or verified. In such circumstances, factual errors undermine the credibility of the argument. Secondly, many researchers using these sources appear to take them at face value, without interrogating their reliability and political motives. The third point relates to the way in which different types of source are utilized and, in particular, how tentative allegations are transmuted into established facts. The review concludes that such studies would benefit from greater contextualization within the domestic politics of the countries in question, rather than their current focus on specific individuals, organizations and networks.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Brown, Graham},
      title = {The Perils of Terrorism: Chinese Whispers, Kevin Bacon and Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia - A review essay},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {1},
      pages = {150--162},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600568626}
    }
    					
    Brown, Kathryn E. The interplay of information and mind in decision-making: Signals intelligence and Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy-shift on Indochina 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (1) , pp. 109-131  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Brown, Kathryn E.},
      title = {The interplay of information and mind in decision-making: Signals intelligence and Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy-shift on Indochina},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {1},
      pages = {109--131},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432465}
    }
    					
    Brown, Kathryn E. Intelligence and the decision to collect it: Churchill's wartime American diplomatic signals intelligence 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (3) , pp. 449-467  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Brown, Kathryn E.},
      title = {Intelligence and the decision to collect it: Churchill's wartime American diplomatic signals intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {3},
      pages = {449--467},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432312}
    }
    					
    Bruce, Gary Aufklärung und Abwehr: The lasting legacy of the Stasi under Ernst Wollweber 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (3) , pp. 364-393  
    article
    Abstract: The following article traces the development of East Germany's secret police, the Stasi, during the reign of Ernst Wollweber, the second Minister of State Security. By examining key Stasi operations during this period, notably the "concentrated strikes" strategy following the June 1953 revolution, the campaign against Ostbüros, and operations to secure the economy, and by examining Wollweber's major speeches, it argues that Wollweber's reign was a decisive one for the Stasi because of the integration of intelligence gathering outside of East Germany (Aufklärung) with domestic surveillance (Abwehr). Although this balance shifted toward external duties in Wollweber's landmark August 1955 speech, Wollweber continued to promote integration of the two duties, in particular by anchoring the intelligence gathering duties in the local-level domestic structures of the Stasi.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bruce, Gary},
      title = {Aufklärung und Abwehr: The lasting legacy of the Stasi under Ernst Wollweber},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {3},
      pages = {364--393},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600750638}
    }
    					
    Bruce-Briggs, B. Another ride on tricycle 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (2) , pp. 77-100  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bruce-Briggs, B.},
      title = {Another ride on tricycle},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {2},
      pages = {77--100},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529208432157}
    }
    					
    Brüggemann, Karsten [Book review] Tina Tamman, "The Last Ambassador: August Torma, Soldier, Diplomat, Spy", 2011 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (5) , pp. 785-787  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Brüggemann, Karsten},
      title = {[Book review] Tina Tamman, "The Last Ambassador: August Torma, Soldier, Diplomat, Spy", 2011},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {5},
      pages = {785--787},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.810932}
    }
    					
    Bruneau, Thomas [Book review] Molly Dunigan, "Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness", 2011 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (2) , pp. 303-305  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bruneau, Thomas},
      title = {[Book review] Molly Dunigan, "Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness", 2011},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {2},
      pages = {303--305},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.786615}
    }
    					
    Brunt, Rodney M. Special documentation systems at the Government Code and Cypher School, Bletchley park, during the Second World War 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (1) , pp. 129-148  
    article
    Abstract: The work of GCCS at BP has received much attention in recent years. Concentration, however, has been on the capture of Sigint by the interception services and the problems of decryption of messages in Enigma. Less attention has been placed on the documentation of the decrypts and the intelligence held by the factual indexes maintained by the Air, Military and Naval Sections. Lying behind these were the highly specialized devices which facilitated the translation and analysis of decrypted messages by providing the expansions of abbreviations common in all Sigint and the "equivalents" of German and other terms. This paper describes the work of two specialist units, serving Hut 3 (Air and Military intelligence) and Hut 4 (Naval intelligence), engaged in the creation and maintenance of such devices.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Brunt, Rodney M.},
      title = {Special documentation systems at the Government Code and Cypher School, Bletchley park, during the Second World War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {1},
      pages = {129--148},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600568444}
    }
    					
    Bryan, Ian & Michael Salter War crimes prosecutors and intelligence agencies: the case for assessing their collaboration 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (3) , pp. 93-120  
    article
    Abstract: Whilst recognizing important distinctions between different types of intelligence agency, and a range of possible contradictions between the imperatives governing the two types of agency, it is necessary to overcome the one-side quality of much existing literature, whose critique of the subversion of the rule of law by intelligence agencies tends to preclude any appreciation that such agencies can play a supportive role for war crimes prosecutors. This article challenges the assumption that analysis of the histories of Western intelligence agencies and the study of war crimes trials must be studied as entirely separate and sharply demarcated fields of inquiry; it advocates an interdisciplinary research programme, informed by a series of indepth historical case studies, capable of addressing issues arising from the interaction between these two institutional fields. The proposed research agenda could illuminate aspects of the contemporary role - and future potential of both intelligence agencies and war crimes prosecution bodies. It would investigate tensions between the prosecutors need to employ intelligence agencies to gather trial credible evidence and detain indicted defendants, often by covert and legally questionable means, and the constitutional justifications for holding war crimes trials by reference to the need to reassert the rule of law in the wake of lawless genocide.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bryan, Ian and Salter, Michael},
      title = {War crimes prosecutors and intelligence agencies: the case for assessing their collaboration},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {3},
      pages = {93--120},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306230}
    }
    					
    Budiansky, Stephen What's the Use of Cryptologic History? 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (6) , pp. 767-777  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Continued secrecy surrounding signals intelligence during the Cold War has profoundly distorted the historical record, making a full and accurate military, diplomatic, and presidential history of the last half century impossible for now. Not only history, but the ongoing intelligence enterprise itself, would be better served by significantly greater openness. This article is adapted from the Schorreck Memorial Lecture in Cryptologic History, presented by the author at the National Cryptologic Museum, Ft. Meade, Maryland, 24 May 2010, and the National Security Agency, 26 May 2010.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Budiansky, Stephen},
      title = {What's the Use of Cryptologic History?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {6},
      pages = {767--777},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.537875}
    }
    					
    Budiansky, Stephen The difficult beginnings of US-British codebreaking cooperation 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (2) , pp. 49-73  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Budiansky, Stephen},
      title = {The difficult beginnings of US-British codebreaking cooperation},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {2},
      pages = {49--73},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520008432603}
    }
    					
    Bukharin, Oleg US Atomic Energy Intelligence Against the Soviet Target, 1945-1970 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (4) , pp. 655-679  
    article
    Abstract: Throughout the Cold War, the United States and its allies mounted a massive atomic energy intelligence effort against the Soviet Union. Long-range, standoff technical systems provided the most data and allowed for successful tracking of many aspects of the Soviet nuclear program. Because of the closed nature of Soviet society and Soviet security and counter-intelligence measures, exploitation of open sources and traditional espionage operations, although important, were less productive. The relative lack of human intelligence made it difficult to understand important developments inside the Soviet nuclear complex and resulted in significant intelligence gaps.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bukharin, Oleg},
      title = {US Atomic Energy Intelligence Against the Soviet Target, 1945-1970},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {4},
      pages = {655--679},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000327555}
    }
    					
    Bull, Martin Villains of the peace: Terrorism and the secret services in Italy 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (4) , pp. 473-478  
    article
    Abstract: Raimondo Catanzaro (ed.), The Red Brigades and Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy (London: Pinter, 1991). Pp.216. £35.00 (hardback). Philip Willan, Puppet Masters. The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy (London: Constable, 1991). Pp.375. £19.95 (hardback).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bull, Martin},
      title = {Villains of the peace: Terrorism and the secret services in Italy},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {4},
      pages = {473--478},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529208432181}
    }
    					
    von Bülow, Mathilde Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1956-61 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (6) , pp. 787-820  
    article
    Abstract: During the Algerian war of independence (1954-62), Federal Germany became the theatre of a series of unexplained bombings and shootings that targeted Algerian nationalists and German arms dealers. At the time, these crimes were attributed to the Red Hand, a counter-terrorist organization or parallel secret service with a mission to defeat the enemies of l"Algérie française. This article argues that the attacks on West German territory were executed neither by vigilantes nor by renegade agents. Instead, they were carried out by the French foreign intelligence service SDECE with the full approval of the highest political authorities in Paris. Using the case of Federal Germany as an example, this article seeks to reveal how and why covert action - including state-sanctioned murder - became an integral and important part of the Algerian war, particularly of France's campaign to undermine the Algerian rebels' efforts to procure military and non-military supplies. The article will show that the Red Hand served merely as a cover to detract from the state's resort to such violent and criminal means.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {von Bülow, Mathilde},
      title = {Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1956-61},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {6},
      pages = {787--820},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701770626}
    }
    					
    von Bülow, Mathilde Franco-German Intelligence Cooperation and the Internationalization of Algeria's War of Independence (1954-62) 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (3) , pp. 397-419  
    article
    Abstract: Between 1958 and 1960, the French domestic security and intelligence services came to establish a close, multi-layered, and secret working relationship with their German counterparts. The purpose of this collaborative arrangement was to enlist German support in combating the subversive activities of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale, whose members had taken refuge in Germany. In particular, the metropolitan authorities sought to impose on their German counterparts some of the same methods of colonial policing and intelligence that characterized their own counter-insurgency in France. These efforts proved counter-productive, however, for in internationalizing the Algerian war, they drew public attention to the colonial nature of France's hold over Algeria.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {von Bülow, Mathilde},
      title = {Franco-German Intelligence Cooperation and the Internationalization of Algeria's War of Independence (1954-62)},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {3},
      pages = {397--419},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2013.789638}
    }
    					
    Bungert, Heike The OSS and its cooperation with the free Germany committees, 1944-45 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (3) , pp. 130-144  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bungert, Heike},
      title = {The OSS and its cooperation with the free Germany committees, 1944-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {3},
      pages = {130--144},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432434}
    }
    					
    Bures, Oldrich Ten Years of EU's Fight against Terrorist Financing: A Critical Assessment 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (2-3) , pp. 207-233  
    article
    Abstract: This article offers a critical assessment of the post-9/11 efforts of the European Union (EU) in the fight against terrorist finances. Using the EU's own goals from its action plans and counterterrorism strategies as the baseline criteria, it examines how successful the EU has been in implementing the relevant aspects of various United Nations Security Council counterterrorism resolutions, the special recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, and its own measures spanning across all of its three pre-Lisbon pillars. In particular, the article seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What and how much of its own counter-terrorism plans has the EU managed to achieve since 9/11? and (2) What lessons can be learned from the hitherto successes and failures for future EU efforts to counter terrorist financing? Special attention is paid to the thus far neglected role of the private sector in the fight against terrorist financing.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Bures, Oldrich},
      title = {Ten Years of EU's Fight against Terrorist Financing: A Critical Assessment},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {207--233},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.988443}
    }
    					
    Burke, Colin Automating American cryptanalysis 1930-45: Marvelous machines, a bit too late 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (1) , pp. 18-39  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Burke, Colin},
      title = {Automating American cryptanalysis 1930-45: Marvelous machines, a bit too late},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {1},
      pages = {18--39},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432522}
    }
    					
    Burke, James F. Recently released material on Soviet intelligence operations 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (2) , pp. 238-249  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Burke, James F.},
      title = {Recently released material on Soviet intelligence operations},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {2},
      pages = {238--249},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432207}
    }
    					
    Burke, James F. Romanian and Soviet intelligence in the December revolution 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (4) , pp. 26-58  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Burke, James F.},
      title = {Romanian and Soviet intelligence in the December revolution},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {4},
      pages = {26--58},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432224}
    }
    					
    Buse, Dieter K. Domestic intelligence and German military leaders, 1914-18 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (4) , pp. 42-59  
    article
    Abstract: The top of the German domestic intelligence system was taken over by the military during World War I. The rest of the system for collecting and reporting remained in local and regional political police hands. The military leaders did not make good use of the information they received, especially about labour and Social Democracy. The essay presents the ways that the system of gathering and reporting information functioned, including its wartime changes under the state of siege. Three specific issues are followed up with the reporting system for 1917-18. Then the essay shows how the military leaders responded to raw and filtered information before exploring why they made such inadequate use of the very thorough reports which they received.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Buse, Dieter K.},
      title = {Domestic intelligence and German military leaders, 1914-18},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {4},
      pages = {42--59},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432627}
    }
    					
    Byman, Daniel The Intelligence War on Terrorism 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (6) , pp. 837-863  
    article
    Abstract: What is the role of intelligence for counterterrorism? Most studies of counterterrorism ignore the vital role of intelligence, focus only on its most controversial aspects, or fail to recognize how counterterrorism intelligence differs from traditional intelligence issues. This article argues that many of the common criticisms of the CIA and other agencies misunderstand counterterrorism intelligence and what is realistic for gaining information on terrorist groups. In particular, the important role of signals intelligence, liaison relationships, document exploitation, and interrogation are overlooked. In addition, intelligence analysis and the relationship with the policymaker differ fundamentally for counterterrorism. This article emphasizes the need to recognize these differences when evaluating counterterrorism and calls for being cautious with intelligence reform. In addition, it argues for changing US detention policy and making the public more aware of the inevitable gaps related to counterterrorism intelligence.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Byman, Daniel},
      title = {The Intelligence War on Terrorism},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {6},
      pages = {837--863},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.851876}
    }
    					
    Cain, Frank Signals intelligence in Australia during the Pacific War 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (1) , pp. 40-61  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cain, Frank},
      title = {Signals intelligence in Australia during the Pacific War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {1},
      pages = {40--61},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432523}
    }
    					
    Cain, Frank Intelligence writings in Australia 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (1) , pp. 242-253  
    article
    Abstract: Andrew Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, Conservative Paramilitary Organisations in NSW 1930-32 (Sydney: New South Wales University Press, 1989). Pp.312. $19.00 (paperback). Michael Cathcart, Defending the National Tuck Shop, Australia's Secret Army Intrigue of 1931 (Melbourne: Penguin, 1988). Pp.216. $14.99 (paperback). Robert Manne, The Petrov Affair, Politics and Espionage (Sydney: Pergamon, 1987). Pp.310. $43.00 (paperback). Mark Aarons, Sanctuary, Nazi Fugitives in Australia (Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1989). Pp.365. $24.00 Desmond Ball, Pine Gap, Australia and the US Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite Program (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988). Pp.121. $15.00 (paperback). Desmond Ball, A Base for Debate, the US Satellite Station at Nurrungar (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987). Pp.122. $15.00 (paperback). Desmond Ball, Australia's Secret Space Programs (Canberra: Australian National University, 1988). Pp.86. $15.00 (paperback). Peter Morton, Fire Across the Desert, Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint Project 1946-1980 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989). Pp.561. $99.95.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cain, Frank},
      title = {Intelligence writings in Australia},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {242--253},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432100}
    }
    					
    Cain, Frank Missiles and mistrust: US intelligence responses to British and Australian missile research 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (4) , pp. 5-22  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cain, Frank},
      title = {Missiles and mistrust: US intelligence responses to British and Australian missile research},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {4},
      pages = {5--22},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431967}
    }
    					
    Cain, Frank The right to know: ASIO, historians and the Australian Parliament 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (1) , pp. 87-101  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cain, Frank},
      title = {The right to know: ASIO, historians and the Australian Parliament},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {87--101},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432193}
    }
    					
    Calkins, Laura M. Patrolling the Ether: US-UK Open Source Intelligence Cooperation and the BBC's Emergence as an Intelligence Agency, 1939-1948 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (1) , pp. 1-22  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract The British Broadcasting Corporation began recording, translating and publishing selected open radio broadcasts by foreign stations at the beginning of World War II. This open source intelligence, or "Osint", was provided to the United States starting in 1941, and America's own monitoring agencies reciprocated, albeit with certain key restrictions. By mid-1943 the BBC monitored 1.25 million broadcast words daily. At the war's end, questions arose in Whitehall about maintaining the BBC Osint operation, but an interagency coalition prevailed over the cost-conscious Treasury. US-UK Osint exchanges broadened after the war as part of a larger set of bilateral intelligence-sharing agreements.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Calkins, Laura M.},
      title = {Patrolling the Ether: US-UK Open Source Intelligence Cooperation and the BBC's Emergence as an Intelligence Agency, 1939-1948},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--22},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.556355}
    }
    					
    Campbell, John P. Some pieces in the Ostro puzzle 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 245-263  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Campbell, John P.},
      title = {Some pieces in the Ostro puzzle},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {245--263},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529608432355}
    }
    					
    Campbell, John P. Operation Starkey 1943: "A piece of harmless playacting'? 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (3) , pp. 92-113  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Campbell, John P.},
      title = {Operation Starkey 1943: "A piece of harmless playacting'?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {3},
      pages = {92--113},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431905}
    }
    					
    Campbell, John P. Roger Hesketh and the de Guingand letter 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (4) , pp. 131-142  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Campbell, John P.},
      title = {Roger Hesketh and the de Guingand letter},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {4},
      pages = {131--142},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432631}
    }
    					
    Caparini, Marina Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence Governance in East Central Europe and the Balkans 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (4) , pp. 498-522  
    article
    Abstract: This article discusses the reform of intelligence governance in two sub-regional groupings of former communist states: East Central Europe and the Balkans. These two sub-regions are delineated according to the pace and nature of transformations that they have undergone since the collapse of communist rule and their relations with respect to the European Union, the key political and economic organization in Europe. A number of lessons are drawn from comparing experiences in the two sub-regions relating to democratic reform of the security apparatus, and in particular the intelligence sector. Significant factors in the consolidation of democratic governance of intelligence include the nature of precursor communist-era regimes and the legacies they created, whether armed conflict has occurred during the transition, the extent and character of external (especially EU) assistance, and the strength of media and civil society. These factors appear to have influenced how transitional regimes have sought to introduce institutional reforms to constrain the powers of those services and their susceptibility to arbitrary use. They also have influenced measures taken to redress abuses by intelligence services under the preceding communist regime and the legitimation of the post-authoritarian state.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Caparini, Marina},
      title = {Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence Governance in East Central Europe and the Balkans},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {4},
      pages = {498--522},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.915175}
    }
    					
    Carew, Anthony The politics of productivity and the politics of anti-communism: American and European labour in the Cold War 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (2) , pp. 73-91  
    article
    Abstract: The "politics of productivity", an attempt to raise levels of industrial productivity in Europe by transcending class conflict and creating a consensus in society for economic growth, was a prominent element in Marshall Plan thinking. It constituted a central focus of the European Recovery Program's labour programme administered by American trade union officials who staffed the Marshall Plan's Labor Division. This programme was initially supported by the American Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), until hostility to collective bargaining in the local business community, combined with the unwillingness of senior Marshall Plan administrators to insist on collective bargaining as the price of receiving American assistance, blighted the project. This contribution contrasts the CIO's initial support for the productivity programme with the American Federation of Labour's (AFL) more direct strategy of combating communism at the level of organization and propaganda. It concludes by describing how the competing claims of these two American labour organizations for US government funding became a significant factor in American labour's conduct of Cold War politics.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Carew, Anthony},
      title = {The politics of productivity and the politics of anti-communism: American and European labour in the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {2},
      pages = {73--91},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306750}
    }
    					
    Catros, Simon & Bernard Wilkin Flirting with Fascism: The 1934 Report of General Renondeau 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 538-544  
    article
    Abstract: On 13 November 1934, the French military attaché to Berlin, General Renondeau, sent a dramatic report to the Head of the Army General Staff. This note compared the military ability of France to Germany. Renondeau violently attacked French conscripts, arguing teachers and the international had corrupted them. This article analyses this report, arguing that the internal political context of France was generally responsible for the alarmist tone. Domestic political turmoil led him to exaggerate the unreliability of French conscripts and underestimate the difficulties of the German army.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Catros, Simon and Wilkin, Bernard},
      title = {Flirting with Fascism: The 1934 Report of General Renondeau},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {538--544},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.945349}
    }
    					
    Cecil, Robert Correspondence 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (1) , pp. 210-210  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cecil, Robert},
      title = {Correspondence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {1},
      pages = {210--210},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432043}
    }
    					
    Cecil, Robert "C"'s war 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (2) , pp. 170-188  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cecil, Robert},
      title = {"C"'s war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {2},
      pages = {170--188},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431848}
    }
    					
    Cecil, Robert Five of six at war: Section V of MI6 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (2) , pp. 345-353  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cecil, Robert},
      title = {Five of six at war: Section V of MI6},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {2},
      pages = {345--353},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432253}
    }
    					
    Cecil, Robert Philby's Spurious War 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (4) , pp. 764-768  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cecil, Robert},
      title = {Philby's Spurious War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {4},
      pages = {764--768},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432282}
    }
    					
    Cepik, Marco & Christiano Ambros Intelligence, Crisis, and Democracy: Institutional Punctuations in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and India 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (4) , pp. 523-551  
    article
    Abstract: This article analyzes why institutional crises are bound to happen and how they impact on national intelligence systems" development. Punctuated Equilibrium theory is reviewed and employed to explain one institutional crisis in each of Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and India. In Brazil, the case study is the fall of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) director in 2008, following the Satiagraha operation conducted by the Federal Police Department (DPF). In Colombia, the 2009 wiretapping scandal known as chuzadas is examined. In South Africa, the investigation in Project Avani (2006-8) is reviewed. Finally, in India the case study is the intelligence crisis following the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008. We found that institutional crises are inevitable because there are tensions between security and democracy, both being co-evolutionary dimensions of successful contemporary state building. However, the impacts of such crises vary across the four cases pending on three variables: (1) degree of functional specialization inside the national intelligence system; (2) degree of external public control over the national intelligence system; (3) whether effectiveness, legitimacy or both were the main drivers of the crisis. Our analysis of the four case studies suggests that the amount of positive institutional change in the aftermath of an intelligence crisis is greater in countries with more functional specialization and stronger external control mechanisms.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cepik, Marco and Ambros, Christiano},
      title = {Intelligence, Crisis, and Democracy: Institutional Punctuations in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and India},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {4},
      pages = {523--551},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.915176}
    }
    					
    Champion, Brian A review of selected cases of industrial espionage and economic spying, 1568-1945 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (2) , pp. 123-143  
    article
    Abstract: Despite current dire warnings, study of episodes in the history of industrial espionage and economic spying reveal that surreptitious collection of manufacturing and other business secrets has been a methodical, calculated and abundant practice. Widespread predation of commercial information in the sixteenth to twentieth centuries is illustrative of the insatiable appetite for proprietary information for both private and governmental interests, and cases as varied as those of pre-industrial times to the sophisticated covers used by the Third Reich attest to the lengths gone to for obtaining a variety of industrial secrets. The patterns and tactics used in other eras are instructive for our own, and place contemporary commercial espionage activity in an historical context, asserting that current industrial spying is part of a larger legacy.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Champion, Brian},
      title = {A review of selected cases of industrial espionage and economic spying, 1568-1945},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {2},
      pages = {123--143},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432480}
    }
    					
    Chapman, John W.M. Pearl harbor: The Anglo-Australian dimension 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (3) , pp. 451-460  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Chapman, John W.M.},
      title = {Pearl harbor: The Anglo-Australian dimension},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {451--460},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432010}
    }
    					
    Chapman, John W. M. Tricycle recycled: Collaboration among the secret intelligence services of the Axis states, 1940-41 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (3) , pp. 268-299  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Chapman, John W. M.},
      title = {Tricycle recycled: Collaboration among the secret intelligence services of the Axis states, 1940-41},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {3},
      pages = {268--299},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529208432168}
    }
    					
    Chapman, John W. M. No final solution: A survey of the cryptanalytical capabilities of German military agencies, 1926-35 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (1) , pp. 13-47  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Chapman, John W. M.},
      title = {No final solution: A survey of the cryptanalytical capabilities of German military agencies, 1926-35},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {1},
      pages = {13--47},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431840}
    }
    					
    Charles, Douglas M. American, British and Canadian intelligence links: A critical annotated bibliography 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (2) , pp. 259-269  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Charles, Douglas M.},
      title = {American, British and Canadian intelligence links: A critical annotated bibliography},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {2},
      pages = {259--269},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432610}
    }
    					
    Charles, Douglas M. "Before the Colonel Arrived": Hoover, Donovan, Roosevelt, and the Origins of American Central Intelligence, 1940-41 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (2) , pp. 225-237  
    article
    Abstract: Credit for the origins of American central intelligence are commonly placed solely with Colonel William Donovan who visited Great Britain in 1940-41 and, based upon these experiences, subsequently reported to the Roosevelt White House on the need for a centralized American intelligence organization. Yet evidence indicates that prior to Donovan's overseas visit and report to the White House, representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation traveled to Britain, surveyed its intelligence apparatus, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover submitted a report to President Roosevelt pre-dating Donovan's. Historians, therefore, must reconsider the origins of American central intelligence as not influenced by any one individual but by multiple individuals with bureaucratic interests.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Charles, Douglas M.},
      title = {"Before the Colonel Arrived": Hoover, Donovan, Roosevelt, and the Origins of American Central Intelligence, 1940-41},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {2},
      pages = {225--237},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500133836}
    }
    					
    Charlesworth, Lorie & Michael Salter Ensuring the after-life of the Ciano diaries: Allen Dulles' provision of Nuremberg trial evidence 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (4) , pp. 568-603  
    article
    Abstract: The relationship between Western intelligence officials and Nazi war crimes prosecutors has been, and in some aspects remains, a difficult one. It is increasingly apparent that it is precisely the selective nature of support war crimes prosecutors can expect from intelligence officials that merits particular scholarly attention. One such example in this case of positive assistance concerns the provision of a specific piece of evidence, the diaries of Ciano, Mussolini's Foreign Minister, obtained for the Allies by Allen Dulles, a senior US wartime intelligence official with the OSS, based in Bern, Switzerland, and used in the prosecution case against Ribbentrop at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. This article, based largely upon recently declassified American security files, closely examines Dulles' actions undertaken to retrieve the diaries and pass them to the prosecution.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Charlesworth, Lorie and Salter, Michael},
      title = {Ensuring the after-life of the Ciano diaries: Allen Dulles' provision of Nuremberg trial evidence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {4},
      pages = {568--603},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600885749}
    }
    					
    Charters, David A. British intelligence in the Palestine campaign, 1945-47 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (1) , pp. 115-140  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Charters, David A.},
      title = {British intelligence in the Palestine campaign, 1945-47},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {115--140},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432093}
    }
    					
    Charters, David A. "Have A Go": British Army/MI5 Agent-running Operations in Northern Ireland, 1970-72 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (2) , pp. 202-229  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Early in the Northern Ireland conflict the army took the lead in intelligence operations, including Humint. This article examines the case of "Observer B", an agent run jointly with MI5. Using testimony and documents provided to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry as well as original archival sources, it offers a unique Humint case study that discusses the agent's recruitment, motivation, reliability, handling, product, and utility. This represents the most complete account that we have of this case, but gaps remain. It illustrates some of the limitations of clandestine Humint collection in situations where information may be time-sensitive. The article challenges the conventional wisdom about army/MI5 relations and shows how the two improvised and cooperated in agent-running.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Charters, David A.},
      title = {"Have A Go": British Army/MI5 Agent-running Operations in Northern Ireland, 1970-72},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {2},
      pages = {202--229},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.708217}
    }
    					
    Charters, David A. Eyes of the underground: Jewish insurgent intelligence in Palestine, 1945-47 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (4) , pp. 163-177  
    article
    Abstract: This article represents an attempt to fill in some gaps in the historiography of Israeli ingelligence. It describes the origins and development of Jewish insurgent intelligence organizations and their operations against the British in Palestine, 1945-47. The essay presents a picture of rudimentary but effective intelligence serivces that made a significant, if not decisive, contribution to the armed struggle against the Briitsh. It examines critically some mysteries and myths surrounding Jewish intelligence in that conflict. By examining insurgent intelligence from the "bottom up" - against a government - the article suggests there is a whole new "missing dimension" of intelligence studies that bears scholarly attention.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Charters, David A.},
      title = {Eyes of the underground: Jewish insurgent intelligence in Palestine, 1945-47},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {163--177},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432509}
    }
    					
    Chervonnaya, Svetlana A. & Donald J. Evans Left Behind: Boris E. Skvirsky and the Chita Delegation at the Washington Conference, 1921-22 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (1) , pp. 19-57  
    article
    Abstract: Although the story of the role of the Special Trade Delegation of the Russian short-lived Far Eastern Republic during the Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament of 1921-22, seems to be well-known from its many Western accounts published since 1922, a recent search in the records of the Russian Communist Party has uncovered many hitherto unknown or obscure details that shed the light on the fascinating intelligence origins of the secret documentation, which the delegation made public during the conference. Particularly, the Russian records indicate the central role of one of the delegates, Boris Skvirsky, who would be left behind in the United States to become the Soviet unofficial representative and back channel during the years of non-recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Chervonnaya, Svetlana A. and Evans, Donald J.},
      title = {Left Behind: Boris E. Skvirsky and the Chita Delegation at the Washington Conference, 1921-22},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {1},
      pages = {19--57},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.746413}
    }
    					
    Child, Clifton J. In defence of "Tom" Delmer and Dr Otto John: Notes for the record 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (1) , pp. 127-136  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Child, Clifton J.},
      title = {In defence of "Tom" Delmer and Dr Otto John: Notes for the record},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {1},
      pages = {127--136},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908431988}
    }
    					
    Christensen, Charles R. An assessment of general Hoyt S. Vandenberg's accomplishments as director of central intelligence 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (4) , pp. 754-764  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Christensen, Charles R.},
      title = {An assessment of general Hoyt S. Vandenberg's accomplishments as director of central intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {4},
      pages = {754--764},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432389}
    }
    					
    Clark, J. Ransom [Book review] Michael Holzman, "James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and the Craft of Counterintelligence" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (1) , pp. 158-162  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Clark, J. Ransom},
      title = {[Book review] Michael Holzman, "James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and the Craft of Counterintelligence"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {1},
      pages = {158--162},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628527}
    }
    					
    Clayton, Huw [Book review] David Brown, "Palmerston: A Biography", 2012 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (5) , pp. 745-746  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Clayton, Huw},
      title = {[Book review] David Brown, "Palmerston: A Biography", 2012},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {5},
      pages = {745--746},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.937166}
    }
    					
    Clemens, Peter Operation "cardinal": The OSS in Manchuria, August 1945 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (4) , pp. 71-106  
    article
    Abstract: To protect thousands of Allied military prisoners of war, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), China Theater parachuted a small team into Mukden the day after the Japanese surrender. Operating amid a disintegrating security situation, the OSS team's military and diplomatic skills enabled success of its humanitarian mission. Afterward, the team reverted to a secondary mission of intelligence gathering. Witnesses to the beginning of the Cold War in Asia, the team's intelligence reporting revealed the strength of the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, and how in the flush of victory over Japan, the United States was already facing problems with a resurgent Soviet Union whose ambitions were far different from those of America.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Clemens, Peter},
      title = {Operation "cardinal": The OSS in Manchuria, August 1945},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {71--106},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432505}
    }
    					
    Clemente, Jonathan D. The Fate of an Orphan: The Hawley Board and the Debates over the Postwar Organization of Medical Intelligence 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (2) , pp. 264-287  
    article
    Abstract: The US Army's medical intelligence program developed during World War II to meet the requirements for information on the medical threat facing soldiers deployed in the first truly global military conflict. The war served as a proving ground for the application of medical intelligence on a strategic, operational and tactical level. However, hasty postwar demobilization decimated many wartime intelligence programs, including medical intelligence. The US intelligence community recognized the utility of medical intelligence as part of the overall strategic scientific and technical intelligence program and sought ways to rebuild the program. During the post-World War II debates over the unification of the military services and the responsibilities of the nascent CIA, the "Hawley Board" was one of several committees which studied the problems facing the medical intelligence program. Although there was broad consensus on the need for better coordination of medical intelligence, the intelligence community ultimately failed to adopt the recommendations of the Hawley Board. The principal reasons behind the failure of the Hawley plan were the re-emergence of prewar interservice rivalries, the dominant role of the Army medical intelligence program, and the lack of a joint military-CIA vision of a centralized medical intelligence service.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Clemente, Jonathan D.},
      title = {The Fate of an Orphan: The Hawley Board and the Debates over the Postwar Organization of Medical Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {2},
      pages = {264--287},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500133935}
    }
    					
    Clipson, Edmund Bertil Lintner and Michael Black, Merchants of Madness: The Methamphetamine Explosion in the Golden Triangle 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (4) , pp. 605-606  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Clipson, Edmund},
      title = {Bertil Lintner and Michael Black, Merchants of Madness: The Methamphetamine Explosion in the Golden Triangle},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {4},
      pages = {605--606},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.688327}
    }
    					
    Clipson, Edmund [Book review] Christina Fink, "Living Silence in Burma: Surviving under Military Rule" ; Ardeth Maung "Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (2) , pp. 321-323  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Clipson, Edmund},
      title = {[Book review] Christina Fink, "Living Silence in Burma: Surviving under Military Rule" ; Ardeth Maung "Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {2},
      pages = {321--323},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628537}
    }
    					
    Clive, Nigel From war to peace in SIS 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (3) , pp. 512-513  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Clive, Nigel},
      title = {From war to peace in SIS},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {3},
      pages = {512--513},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432315}
    }
    					
    Cogan, Charles G. The in-culture of the DO 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (1) , pp. 78-86  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cogan, Charles G.},
      title = {The in-culture of the DO},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {78--86},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432192}
    }
    					
    Cogan, Charles G. From the politics of lying to the farce at Suez: What the US knew 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (2) , pp. 100-122  
    article
    Abstract: This article seeks to establish, in a definitive manner, what the US knew about the Suez invasion plan of 1956. With the benefit of the CIA's U-2 reconnaissance plane, the US was able to pinpoint, as of mid-October, the existence of nearly three times the number of Mystère fighters in Israel than had previously been notified to Washington by the French government. That plus an information blackout on the part of the British and the French, and the breakdown of negotiations with the Egyptians at the UN, roused Washington's apprehensions that a military option was being considered. However, though there was suspicion on the part of the US that an Israeli-French operation might be in the offing, Washington never seriously focused on the possibility of a tripartite operation involving the British, the French, and the Israelis. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles relied on the Anglo-American special relationship and on British good sense not to get involved. In particular, Washington completely missed the fact of the British-French-Israeli meeting at Sèvres, at which time (24 October), the decision was taken to launch the operation five days later. The transparent nature of the British-French announced decision, after the Israeli attack, to "separate" the Egyptian and Israeli forces doomed the operation from the start before the court of world opinion. In this manner, Operation "Separation of Forces" was transformed into a force.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cogan, Charles G.},
      title = {From the politics of lying to the farce at Suez: What the US knew},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {2},
      pages = {100--122},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432479}
    }
    					
    Cogan, Charles G. The response of the strong to the weak: The American raid on Libya, 1986 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (3) , pp. 608-620  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cogan, Charles G.},
      title = {The response of the strong to the weak: The American raid on Libya, 1986},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {3},
      pages = {608--620},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432120}
    }
    					
    Cogan, Charles G. Historical Fluke: US intelligence at the crossroads 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 374-378  
    article
    Abstract: Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt, US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform, (Washington and London: Brassey's, 1995). Pp.315, no index. $25.95 £20.95. ISBN 0-02-881122-4. Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counter-intelligence (Washington and London: Brassey's, 1995). Pp.337, biblio. index. $24.95 £21.95. ISBN 0-02-881036-8.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cogan, Charles G.},
      title = {Historical Fluke: US intelligence at the crossroads},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {374--378},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432365}
    }
    					
    Cogan, Charles G. Hunters not Gatherers: Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (2) , pp. 304-321  
    article
    Abstract: Because of its origins in a sort of anti-Elizabethan paranoia against centralised government, the United States is poorly set up institutionally to cope with the major danger to itself in the twenty-first century: the threat posed by Islamist terrorism. The Director of Central Intelligence is neither central nor fully directing. A large part of the intelligence community, especially in terms of budgets and supervision, is outside his direct control. There is a 'waters edge' separation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA. Essentially the CIA collects foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence overseas. The FBI, primarily a crime-oriented organisation, has had only a secondary function of domestic counter-intelligence. It is a case-oriented agency focused on establishing past facts in order to bring suspects to justice. It is psychologically ill-adapted to conceptualising threats that lie upstream, that is, in the future. In this context, September 11 can be most properly described as a failure of imagination. Remedies being proposed range from creating an internal security service à la Britain's MI5 to establishing a semi-autonomous domestic counter-intelligence agency within the FBI. In the field of covert action, intelligence in the twenty-first century likely will be characterised by what could be termed an offensive hunt strategy. Put in another way, intelligence operatives in the twenty-first century will become hunters, not gatherers. They will not simply sit back and gather information that comes in, analyse it, and then decide what to do about it. Rather they will have to go and hunt out intelligence that will enable them to track down or kill terrorists. This will involve sending operatives into countries with which we are not at war, indeed in some cases countries with which we have correct relations. In many circumstances, however, terrorist leaders will be hunted down with the help of host country elements. The likelihood is that this new strategy will be implemented primarily in terms of Special Forces operations aided by CIA elements. Modalities will have to be worked out between the Department of Defense and the CIA as to how such offensive hunt operations are to be carried out and how congressional oversight will be exercised.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cogan, Charles G.},
      title = {Hunters not Gatherers: Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {2},
      pages = {304--321},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302010}
    }
    					
    Cogan, Charles G. In the shadow of Venona 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (3) , pp. 190-195  
    article
    Abstract: John F. Neville, The Press, the Rosenbergs, and the Cold War (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1995). Pp.207, biblio, index. ISBN 0-275-94995-8. John E. Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996). Pp.214, biblio, index. $24.95. ISBN 1-56663-090-8.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cogan, Charles G.},
      title = {In the shadow of Venona},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {3},
      pages = {190--195},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432439}
    }
    					
    Cogan, Charles G. Intelligence and crisis management: The importance of the pre-crisis 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (4) , pp. 633-650  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cogan, Charles G.},
      title = {Intelligence and crisis management: The importance of the pre-crisis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {4},
      pages = {633--650},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432274}
    }
    					
    Cohen, Eliot A. "Only half the battle": American intelligence and the Chinese intervention in Korea, 1950 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (1) , pp. 129-149  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cohen, Eliot A.},
      title = {"Only half the battle": American intelligence and the Chinese intervention in Korea, 1950},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {1},
      pages = {129--149},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432038}
    }
    					
    Cohen, Paul The police, the home office and surveillance of the British Union of fascists 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (3) , pp. 416-434  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cohen, Paul},
      title = {The police, the home office and surveillance of the British Union of fascists},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {3},
      pages = {416--434},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431865}
    }
    					
    Cohen, Raymond Threat assessment in military intelligence: The case of Israel and Syria, 1985-86 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (4) , pp. 735-764  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cohen, Raymond},
      title = {Threat assessment in military intelligence: The case of Israel and Syria, 1985-86},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {4},
      pages = {735--764},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908432025}
    }
    					
    Cohen, Raymond Israeli military intelligence before the 1956 Sinai Campaign 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (1) , pp. 100-140  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cohen, Raymond},
      title = {Israeli military intelligence before the 1956 Sinai Campaign},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {1},
      pages = {100--140},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431931}
    }
    					
    Cole, Benjamin British technical intelligence and the Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile threat, 1952-60 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (2) , pp. 70-93  
    article
    Abstract: This article looks at the shifting intricacies of British assessments of the Soviet IRBM threat to the United Kingdom during the 1950s. Based on JIC, Cabinet and Air Ministry records of the period, as well as political memoirs, it looks at the assessments in parallel with the development of the British Blue Streak nuclear ballistic missile programme. This land-based weapon was eventually cancelled in April 1960 on strategic not cost grounds, too early in this author's opinion.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cole, Benjamin},
      title = {British technical intelligence and the Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile threat, 1952-60},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {2},
      pages = {70--93},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432540}
    }
    					
    Comber, Leon The Malayan Security Service (1945-1948) 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (3) , pp. 128-153  
    article
    Abstract: The Malayan Security Service (MSS) was the main intelligence agency of the British when they returned to Singapore in September 1945 following the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II. It was responsible for obtaining and collating information on subversive organisations and personalities in Singapore/Malaya. As there was some dissatisfaction over its alleged failure to forewarn the British colonial authorities of the impending uprising of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), it was disbanded in August 1948 just after the start of the Malayan Emergency, and its functions were taken over by the Singapore and Malayan Police Special Branches.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Comber, Leon},
      title = {The Malayan Security Service (1945-1948)},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {3},
      pages = {128--153},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306950}
    }
    					
    Comber, Leon The Malayan special branch on the Malayan-Thai frontier during the Malayan emergency (1948-60) 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (1) , pp. 77-99  
    article
    Abstract: The Malayan Special Branch was the main intelligence agency of the Malayan government during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-60. It was a critical determinant in the government's efforts to defeat the determined attempts of the Malayan Communist Party (CPM) and its guerrilla army, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), to overthrow the Malayan government and establish a Socialist People's Republic of Malaya. This paper examines the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Malayan Special Branch in southern Thailand as part of the Emergency, and the establishment of a Special Branch Border Section in Penang and a joint regional Malayan-Thai Special Branch office in Songkhla, southern Thailand, to coordinate intelligence operations against the communist insurgents.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Comber, Leon},
      title = {The Malayan special branch on the Malayan-Thai frontier during the Malayan emergency (1948-60)},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {1},
      pages = {77--99},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600568352}
    }
    					
    Comber, Leon The Singapore Mutiny (1915) and the Genesis of Political Intelligence in Singapore 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (4) , pp. 529-541  
    article
    Abstract: This paper describes how political intelligence evolved in Singapore and the establishment for the first time of a political intelligence bureau, the forerunner of the Singapore Police Special Branch and the present-day Internal Security Department (ISD). It is an example of British imperial practice as the early roots of intelligence in Singapore owed much to the experience gained earlier in British India in dealing with intelligence matters. The establishment of an intelligence bureau in Singapore came about as a direct result of the Singapore Mutiny (15 February 1915), and in the following year the newly-established bureau was renamed the Criminal Intelligence Department and absorbed into the Straits Settlements Police. In September 1933, it became the Singapore Special Branch, the forerunner of present-day Singapore's Internal Security Department.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Comber, Leon},
      title = {The Singapore Mutiny (1915) and the Genesis of Political Intelligence in Singapore},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {4},
      pages = {529--541},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520903069462}
    }
    					
    Condron, Aidan [Book review] Asaf Siniver, "Nixon, Kissinger, and US Foreign Policy-making: The Machinery of Crisis", 2011 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (2) , pp. 284-288  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Condron, Aidan},
      title = {[Book review] Asaf Siniver, "Nixon, Kissinger, and US Foreign Policy-making: The Machinery of Crisis", 2011},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {2},
      pages = {284--288},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.718214}
    }
    					
    Conway, Patrick Red Team: How the Neoconservatives Helped Cause the Iraq Intelligence Failure 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (4) , pp. 488-512  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article explains how flawed intelligence assessments of Iraq's aluminum tubes became "Exhibit A" in the Bush administration's case for the Iraq War. The assessments seem to have begun as a consequence of a debate within the administration over US Iraq policy in early 2001. The neoconservatives wanted intelligence that would help them argue for regime-change. A WINPAC "Red Team" analyst analyzed the tubes using the same methodology as 1976's infamous Team B panel, which skewed intelligence to support neoconservative policies. The Red Team analyst erroneously concluded the tubes were for a nuclear program thus countering assessments that they had a non-nuclear purpose. After the attacks of September 11 and President Bush's embrace of regime-change, the Red Team tubes assessment began to become the official position of the Intelligence Community. In September 2002, the President cited the assessment publicly, forcing the Intelligence Community to adopt it as the majority position in the Iraq NIE. "Exhibit A" in the case for war was thus the product of a Red Team and, as such, was essentially propaganda masquerading as intelligence.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Conway, Patrick},
      title = {Red Team: How the Neoconservatives Helped Cause the Iraq Intelligence Failure},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {4},
      pages = {488--512},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.688304}
    }
    					
    Cooper, James (Review essay) The Reagan Years: The Great Communicator as Diarist 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (6) , pp. 892-901  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cooper, James},
      title = {(Review essay) The Reagan Years: The Great Communicator as Diarist},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {6},
      pages = {892--901},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802591509}
    }
    					
    Coox, Alvin D. Flawed perception and its effect upon operational thinking: The case of the Japanese army, 1937-41 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (2) , pp. 239-254  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Coox, Alvin D.},
      title = {Flawed perception and its effect upon operational thinking: The case of the Japanese army, 1937-41},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {2},
      pages = {239--254},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432052}
    }
    					
    Copeland, Thomas [Book review] Thomas Graham, Jr. and Keith A. Hansen, Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (3) , pp. 429-430  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Copeland, Thomas},
      title = {[Book review] Thomas Graham, Jr. and Keith A. Hansen, Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {3},
      pages = {429--430},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628540}
    }
    					
    Corke, Sarah-Jane The Eisenhower Administration and Psychological Warfare 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (2) , pp. 277-290  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Corke, Sarah-Jane},
      title = {The Eisenhower Administration and Psychological Warfare},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {2},
      pages = {277--290},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520902826623}
    }
    					
    Corke, Sarah-Jane History, historians and the naming of foreign policy: a postmodern reflection on American strategic thinking during the Truman administration 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (3) , pp. 146-165  
    article
    Abstract: Over the last decade a spate of new works has appeared that attempt to re-evaluate early American Cold War objectives. Intelligence scholars have been on the forefront of this race to rename US strategy. In this article the author examines the recent arguments put forward and argues that despite all of these efforts we have still failed to offer a viable framework for understanding American strategic thinking in the post-war world.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Corke, Sarah-Jane},
      title = {History, historians and the naming of foreign policy: a postmodern reflection on American strategic thinking during the Truman administration},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {3},
      pages = {146--165},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306250}
    }
    					
    Cormac, Rory Organizing Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on Colonial Security 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (6) , pp. 800-822  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article introduces, places in historical context and publishes selected extracts from chapter one of the Report on Colonial Security, which deals specifically with intelligence organisation both in London and overseas. Written by General Sir Gerald Templer in 1955, the report (particularly the intelligence aspects) is significant for the following reasons: it highlights the centralized and colonial intelligence failures in a particularly frank and candid manner; it details channels of communication and liaison between London and the colonies which remain classified elsewhere; and it had a substantial impact on the subsequent reorganisation and reform of intelligence in Whitehall and across the British Empire.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cormac, Rory},
      title = {Organizing Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on Colonial Security},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {6},
      pages = {800--822},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.537878}
    }
    					
    Cormac, Rory Secret Intelligence and Economic Security: The Exploitation of a Critical Asset in an Increasingly Prominent Sphere 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (1) , pp. 99-121  
    article
    Abstract: International economic issues have become a foremost government concern since the start of the global financial crisis, leaving economic security increasingly linked to more traditional concepts of national interest and politico-military security. This prioritization has been reflected in the recent requirements of the United Kingdom's intelligence and security actors. Yet, scholarly research has neglected the relationship between intelligence, international economics, and contemporary security policy. Taking current requirements as a catalyst, this article draws on contemporary British history to explore when intelligence can be used to protect economic security and when intelligence actors can best use economic measures to achieve broader politico-military goals. The use of secret intelligence in the economic sphere does, however, have certain limitations and it should therefore only be employed when necessary.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cormac, Rory},
      title = {Secret Intelligence and Economic Security: The Exploitation of a Critical Asset in an Increasingly Prominent Sphere},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {1},
      pages = {99--121},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.748366}
    }
    					
    Coulam, Robert F. Skill versus Brutality in Interrogation: Lessons from Israel for American Policy 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (4) , pp. 566-590  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article reviews the central tenets of selection, training, doctrine, and organization in Israeli interrogation to suggest how the United States might learn from the Israeli experience. There is relatively little in the open literature on these particular issues of training and approach in Israel. The contrast between Israeli and US approaches raises questions about the effectiveness of US interrogation and suggests how the US might better use skill and cunning toward an effective, legal, and ethical American policy on interrogation. By themselves, professionalism and skill do not prevent torture, but they can provide an effective alternative to it. A change in American policy is essential, to counter pressures in Congress and elsewhere to sanction the use of torture in response to new terrorist threats.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Coulam, Robert F.},
      title = {Skill versus Brutality in Interrogation: Lessons from Israel for American Policy},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {4},
      pages = {566--590},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.699286}
    }
    					
    Cox, Sebastian A comparative analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe intelligence in the battle of Britain, 1940 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (2) , pp. 425-443  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cox, Sebastian},
      title = {A comparative analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe intelligence in the battle of Britain, 1940},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {2},
      pages = {425--443},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432057}
    }
    					
    Cox, Sebastian "The difference between white and black": Churchill, imperial politics, and intelligence before the 1941 crusader offensive 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (3) , pp. 405-447  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cox, Sebastian},
      title = {"The difference between white and black": Churchill, imperial politics, and intelligence before the 1941 crusader offensive},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {3},
      pages = {405--447},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529408432260}
    }
    					
    Craig, Bruce A matter of espionage: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and Igor Gouzenko the Canadian connection reassessed 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (2) , pp. 211-224  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Craig, Bruce},
      title = {A matter of espionage: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and Igor Gouzenko the Canadian connection reassessed},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {2},
      pages = {211--224},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432608}
    }
    					
    Craig, Tony Sabotage! The Origins, Development and Impact of the IRA's Infrastructural Bombing Campaigns 1939-1997 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (3) , pp. 309-326  
    article
    Abstract: At various moments in the twentieth century the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in its various incarnations have used the tactic of infrastructural bombing, notably in their 1939 attacks in England on electricity pylons and in the summer of 1971 in Northern Ireland on its electrical distribution network. In 1996 the British Security Service (MI5) foiled an attack by the IRA aimed at causing a total electrical blackout of the greater London area, a plan that would have seen major disruption in the capital for many weeks or months. Using recently declassified material this paper seeks to re-evaluate the impact of these IRA infrastructural sabotage campaigns that have until now either been ignored or judged to have been derisory or incongruous failures. This paper demonstrates the historical development of this tactic from both the IRA's perspective, and that of those who were tasked with hindering it, highlighting the devastating potential of such tactics in the future.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Craig, Tony},
      title = {Sabotage! The Origins, Development and Impact of the IRA's Infrastructural Bombing Campaigns 1939-1997},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {3},
      pages = {309--326},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.489781}
    }
    					
    Creevy, Matthew A critical review of the Wilson government's handling of the D-notice affair 1967 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (3) , pp. 209-227  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Creevy, Matthew},
      title = {A critical review of the Wilson government's handling of the D-notice affair 1967},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {3},
      pages = {209--227},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432560}
    }
    					
    Croft, John Reminiscences of GCHQ and GCB 1942-45 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (4) , pp. 133-143  
    article
    Abstract: This article describes the author's experiences as a wartime cryptanalyst in two, then separate, sections of the British capability, namely that located at Bletchley Park and that at Berkeley Street in London. After recruitment and training, he worked first on the German high command teleprinter network and secondly on the Russian Comintern network which started up again in 1943. The implication is that the Cold War commenced rather sooner than was generally recognised. After the lapse of more than half a century these reminiscences are necessarily impressionistic and do not go into detail about technical methods or indeed the content of the decrypts.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Croft, John},
      title = {Reminiscences of GCHQ and GCB 1942-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {133--143},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432507}
    }
    					
    Crossland, James The Mutiny That Never Was: The Special Operations Executive and the Failure of Operation "Kitchenmaid" 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (6) , pp. 808-823  
    article
    Abstract: This article analyses the development and failure of a plan by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to use a small-scale mutiny by German troops in Greece in 1944 to engender a widespread uprising within the Reichsarbeitsdienst and the ranks of non-German troops serving in the Wehrmacht. Through an analysis of this operation, codenamed "Kitchenmaid", an assessment will be made of the capabilities and motivations of SOE's Greek section (Force 133); the problem of its cooperation with Greek communist guerrillas in relation to British foreign policy towards Greece; and the strategic and political value of "Kitchenmaid".
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Crossland, James},
      title = {The Mutiny That Never Was: The Special Operations Executive and the Failure of Operation "Kitchenmaid"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {808--823},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.748367}
    }
    					
    Cubbage, T.L. The German misapprehensions regarding overlord: Understanding failure in the estimative process 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (3) , pp. 114-174  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cubbage, T.L.},
      title = {The German misapprehensions regarding overlord: Understanding failure in the estimative process},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {3},
      pages = {114--174},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431906}
    }
    					
    Cubbage, T.L. The success of operation fortitude: Hesketh's history of strategic deception 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (3) , pp. 327-346  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cubbage, T.L.},
      title = {The success of operation fortitude: Hesketh's history of strategic deception},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {3},
      pages = {327--346},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431910}
    }
    					
    Cubbage, T. L. Westmoreland vs. CBS: Was intelligence corrupted by policy demands? 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (3) , pp. 118-180  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cubbage, T. L.},
      title = {Westmoreland vs. CBS: Was intelligence corrupted by policy demands?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {3},
      pages = {118--180},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431960}
    }
    					
    Cullather, Nick Bombing at the Speed of Thought: Intelligence in the Coming Age of Cyberwar 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (4) , pp. 141-154  
    article
    Abstract: The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) puts new technology at the service of an old idea: the perfectability of intelligence. At least since the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, defense and intelligence officials have entertained fantasies of an ideal information environment in which a complete, impartial, and accurate picture of events dispels the fog of politics and war. Amid the enthusiasm among military futurists for "total information dominance", it is worth asking why the intelligence community has this recurring dream.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Cullather, Nick},
      title = {Bombing at the Speed of Thought: Intelligence in the Coming Age of Cyberwar},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {4},
      pages = {141--154},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520310001688907}
    }
    					
    Currer-Briggs, Noel Some of ultra's poor relations in Algeria, Tunisia, Sicily and Italy 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (2) , pp. 274-290  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Currer-Briggs, Noel},
      title = {Some of ultra's poor relations in Algeria, Tunisia, Sicily and Italy},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {2},
      pages = {274--290},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431890}
    }
    					
    Dacre of Glanton Correspondence 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (2) , pp. 376-376  
    article
    Abstract: The Lord Dacre of Glanton is better known as Hugh Trevor-Roper (1914-2003).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dacre of Glanton,},
      title = {Correspondence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {2},
      pages = {376--376},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432306}
    }
    					
    Dafforne, Matt [Book review] Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Wartime Journals", 2012 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (4) , pp. 606-608  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dafforne, Matt},
      title = {[Book review] Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Wartime Journals", 2012},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {4},
      pages = {606--608},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.753199}
    }
    					
    Dahl, Erik J. Why Won't They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (1) , pp. 68-90  
    article
    Abstract: After surprise attacks and other intelligence failures, the complaint is often heard that if only decision-makers had listened more closely to the warnings they had received, disaster might have been avoided. But even though it is generally agreed that intelligence is of little use unless it is received and understood by policymakers, we actually know little about why some leaders are receptive toward intelligence, while others are not. This article argues that the willingness of decision-makers to listen to intelligence depends primarily on two factors: their belief in the seriousness of the issue or threat involved, and their trust in the utility of intelligence. It examines contrasting receptivity toward intelligence in the cases of Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway, and suggests that our current models of intelligence-policy relations need to be revised.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dahl, Erik J.},
      title = {Why Won't They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {1},
      pages = {68--90},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.749061}
    }
    					
    Dahl, Erik J. Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (6) , pp. 778-799  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract After major intelligence failures it is often asked why intelligence and security officials failed to heed the many "wake-up calls" that had been provided by earlier failures and surprises. This article addresses this question by examining intelligence failures as "focusing events", which is a concept used in the literature on government policy making to explain how disasters and crises can stimulate policy change and help organizations and decision-makers learn. It argues that in order for an intelligence failure such as a major terrorist attack to inspire improved intelligence performance - to be a true wake-up call - that failure must not only act as a focusing event to bring more attention to the threat, but it must also lead to increased intelligence collection and greater receptivity toward intelligence on the part of decision-makers.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dahl, Erik J.},
      title = {Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {6},
      pages = {778--799},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.537876}
    }
    					
    Dahl, Erik J. [Book review] Matthew M. Aid, "Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror", 2012 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (3) , pp. 438-442  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dahl, Erik J.},
      title = {[Book review] Matthew M. Aid, "Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror", 2012},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {3},
      pages = {438--442},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.735075}
    }
    					
    Dalby, Simon Security, intelligence, the national interest and the global environment 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (4) , pp. 175-197  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dalby, Simon},
      title = {Security, intelligence, the national interest and the global environment},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {4},
      pages = {175--197},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432332}
    }
    					
    Danchev, Alex Will the weevil delay? Creative writing and the cold war 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (3) , pp. 525-532  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Danchev, Alex},
      title = {Will the weevil delay? Creative writing and the cold war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {3},
      pages = {525--532},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0268452052000345536}
    }
    					
    Danchev, Alex Anglo-Saxon Susceptibilities: The Special Relationship and the World 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (6) , pp. 843-855  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Danchev, Alex},
      title = {Anglo-Saxon Susceptibilities: The Special Relationship and the World},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {6},
      pages = {843--855},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.537880}
    }
    					
    Danchev, Alex The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (3) , pp. 436-466  
    article
    Abstract: The moral and political reverberations of the Iraq War of 2003 are still being felt all over the world. In the belligerent democracies of the West, official inquiries of all kinds and conditions have probed and exposed the nature of government, the reflexes of the national security state, and, most extraordinarily, the sensitive relations between rulers and intelligencers. For all parties the consequences have been severe. Focusing on Britain, and especially on the inquiries led by Lord Hutton and Lord Butler - an odd couple but a revelatory combination - this article takes stock of the reckoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Danchev, Alex},
      title = {The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {3},
      pages = {436--466},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0268452042000316232}
    }
    					
    Daugherty, William J. [Book review] Gregory F. Treverton, "Intelligence for an Age of Terror" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (3) , pp. 423-429  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Daugherty, William J.},
      title = {[Book review] Gregory F. Treverton, "Intelligence for an Age of Terror"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {3},
      pages = {423--429},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628534}
    }
    					
    Davidson, Jason [Book review] Steve Backer, "Grand Fleet Battlecruisers" 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (1) , pp. 184-186  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davidson, Jason},
      title = {[Book review] Steve Backer, "Grand Fleet Battlecruisers"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {184--186},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.875351}
    }
    					
    Davidson, Jason [Book review] Daniel G. Ridley-Kitts, "The Grand Fleet 1914-19: The Royal Navy in the First World War", 2013 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (5) , pp. 765-768  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davidson, Jason},
      title = {[Book review] Daniel G. Ridley-Kitts, "The Grand Fleet 1914-19: The Royal Navy in the First World War", 2013},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {5},
      pages = {765--768},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.960261}
    }
    					
    Davies, Graeme A.M. & Robert Johns British Public Confidence in MI6 and Government Use of Intelligence: The Effect on Support for Preventive Military Action 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (5) , pp. 669-688  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract There are considerable concerns about public perceptions of intelligence stemming directly from the highly politicized nature of intelligence estimates in the run-up to the US-UK invasion of Iraq in 2003. In this article we use a new public attitudes dataset to provide the first ever analysis of British public confidence in MI6 and Government use of intelligence. The article demonstrates that the public have relatively high confidence in the intelligence produced by MI6 but are extremely sceptical about how the Government will present that intelligence. Using an ordered logit model this article then examines the factors that influence public perceptions of both intelligence and Government, finding that women are a lot less confident in both the intelligence services and government presentation of intelligence than men, suggesting that this might help explain gender differences in support for military action. The study also demonstrates that party identifiers and Catholics have very low confidence in the intelligence produced by MI6. The study shows that public confidence in both government and intelligence has a strong effect on support for preventive military action against terror camps, suggesting that the intelligence agencies need to avoid being contaminated by political agendas as much as possible if the intelligence case for future military actions is to be supported by the public.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Graeme A.M. and Johns, Robert},
      title = {British Public Confidence in MI6 and Government Use of Intelligence: The Effect on Support for Preventive Military Action},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {5},
      pages = {669--688},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.708520}
    }
    					
    Davies, Huw The Influence of Intelligence on Wellington's Art of Command 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (5) , pp. 619-643  
    article
    Abstract: Wellington's use of intelligence developed over the course of his military career. Eventually, he became a master of information exploitation, incorporating intelligence analysis into not only his own command practices, but those of his subordinates as well. By the close of the Peninsular War, military intelligence played a major role in achieving victory over the French. This article analyses the development of Wellington's use and understanding of intelligence throughout his military career, comparing his early "command apprenticeship" in India in 1800, where he developed an understanding of the importance of intelligence, which he subsequently exported to, and developed, in the Iberian Peninsula.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Huw},
      title = {The Influence of Intelligence on Wellington's Art of Command},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {5},
      pages = {619--643},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701717999}
    }
    					
    Davies, Huw Integration of strategic and operational intelligence during the Peninsular war 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (2) , pp. 202-223  
    article
    Abstract: Wellington is well known for his understanding of the importance of intelligence, but so far history has recorded that he presided over a one-man intelligence department, himself being the only analyst of what proved to be a massive quantity of raw information. New research highlighted in this article reveals that this has been an inaccurate interpretation. The British government also acted to establish a civilian network of correspondents and agents communicating with the British ambassadors to Spain and Portugal. Wellington's main priority was to integrate the ?strategic intelligence? collected by government agents with his own ?operational intelligence?. Instead, analysis was conducted more by Wellington's subordinates in the field, applying their personal localized expertise to the information they received. In this way, an early and primitive form of the staff system later developed by the Prussians was created in the Peninsular War.
    Wellington is well known for his understanding of the importance of intelligence, but so far history has recorded that he presided over a one-man intelligence department, himself being the only analyst of what proved to be a massive quantity of raw information. New research highlighted in this article reveals that this has been an inaccurate interpretation. The British government also acted to establish a civilian network of correspondents and agents communicating with the British ambassadors to Spain and Portugal. Wellington's main priority was to integrate the ?strategic intelligence? collected by government agents with his own ?operational intelligence?. Instead, analysis was conducted more by Wellington's subordinates in the field, applying their personal localized expertise to the information they received. In this way, an early and primitive form of the staff system later developed by the Prussians was created in the Peninsular War.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Huw},
      title = {Integration of strategic and operational intelligence during the Peninsular war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {2},
      pages = {202--223},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600619874}
    }
    					
    Davies, Huw Intelligence and the Art of Command, 1799-1945 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (5) , pp. 589-600  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Huw},
      title = {Intelligence and the Art of Command, 1799-1945},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {5},
      pages = {589--600},
      url = {http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&doi=10.1080/02684520701717932&magic=crossref||D404A21C5BB053405B1A640AFFD44AE3}
    }
    					
    Davies, Pete Estimating Soviet Power: The Creation of Britain's Defence Intelligence Staff 1960-65 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (6) , pp. 818-841  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract A defining theme of defence intelligence in the UK during the early Cold War was the Service Departments' resistance to the concept of integrated intelligence. This article explains how this capability was achieved only with the amalgamation of the three Service Departments within a unified Ministry of Defence with overarching strategic and financial authority. It offers a critical analysis of the 1960 Templer review of Service intelligence, the creation of the Defence Intelligence Staff in April 1964, and its further restructuring on a functional basis in August 1965 by the Secretary of State, Denis Healey.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Pete},
      title = {Estimating Soviet Power: The Creation of Britain's Defence Intelligence Staff 1960-65},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {6},
      pages = {818--841},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.619799}
    }
    					
    Davies, Philip H. J. Intelligence scholarship as all-source analysis: The case of Tom Bower's 'the perfect English Spy' 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (3) , pp. 201-207  
    article
    Abstract: Tom Bower, The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War 1935-90 (London: Heinemann, 1995). Pp.385. ISBN 0-434-0080-9
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Philip H. J.},
      title = {Intelligence scholarship as all-source analysis: The case of Tom Bower's 'the perfect English Spy'},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {3},
      pages = {201--207},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432441}
    }
    					
    Davies, Philip H. J. British intelligence from Fenian Dynamite to the Docklands bomb, by way of two world wars, one cold war, and a jungle full of snakes 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (4) , pp. 237-244  
    article
    Abstract: Michael Smith, New Cloak, Old Dagger: How Britain's Spies Came In From The Cold (London: Gollancz, 1996) Pp.276. ISBN 0-575-06150-2.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Philip H. J.},
      title = {British intelligence from Fenian Dynamite to the Docklands bomb, by way of two world wars, one cold war, and a jungle full of snakes},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {237--244},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432515}
    }
    					
    Davies, Philip H. J. Organizational politics and the development of Britain's intelligence producer/consumer interface 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (4) , pp. 113-132  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Philip H. J.},
      title = {Organizational politics and the development of Britain's intelligence producer/consumer interface},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {4},
      pages = {113--132},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529508432328}
    }
    					
    Davies, Philip H. J. From special operations to special political action: The 'rump SOE' and SIS post-war covert action capability 1945-1977 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (3) , pp. 55-76  
    article
    Abstract: This article examines the post-war dismantling of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and amalgamation with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). It is argued that the existing literature has been unclear on this matter, confusing two very different SIS departments, the Special Operations Branch and the Special Political Action Section. The article then examines how the assets and personnel of SOE were dispersed to three different divisions of the SIS; the Directorates of Production, Training and Development and War Planning, and then examines the separate origins and function of the Special Political Action Section.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Philip H. J.},
      title = {From special operations to special political action: The 'rump SOE' and SIS post-war covert action capability 1945-1977},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {3},
      pages = {55--76},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520008432617}
    }
    					
    Davies, Philip H. J. The SIS Singapore station and the role of the far east controller: Secret intelligence structure and process in post-war colonial administration 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (4) , pp. 105-129  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davies, Philip H. J.},
      title = {The SIS Singapore station and the role of the far east controller: Secret intelligence structure and process in post-war colonial administration},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {105--129},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529908432573}
    }
    					
    Davis, Jack Intelligence analysts and policymakers: Benefits and dangers of tensions in the relationship 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (6) , pp. 999-1021  
    article
    Abstract: This article is occasioned by public interest in reported tensions between CIA analysts and policymaking officials of the administration of President George W. Bush regarding the significance of ties between the Saddam Hussein regime and Al Qaeda terrorists, an important factor in the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003. No evaluation of the latter case is provided. The article addresses, instead, general patterns of tensions between intelligence analysts and policy officials in order to provide context for public assessment of the Iraq-Al Qaeda incident when the public record is more complete and enhance understanding of similar future instances of tension.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Davis, Jack},
      title = {Intelligence analysts and policymakers: Benefits and dangers of tensions in the relationship},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {6},
      pages = {999--1021},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520601046325}
    }
    					
    Dawson, Grant [Book review] The Long Aftermath of War: Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (6) , pp. 925-926  
    article
    Abstract: André du Pisani, Reinhart Kössler and William A. Lindeke (eds),The Long
    Aftermath of War: Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia (Freiburg: Arnold-
    Bergstraesser-Institut 2010).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dawson, Grant},
      title = {[Book review] The Long Aftermath of War: Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {925--926},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.755065}
    }
    					
    De Graaff, Bob Accessibility of secret service archives in the Netherlands 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (2) , pp. 154-160  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {De Graaff, Bob},
      title = {Accessibility of secret service archives in the Netherlands},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {2},
      pages = {154--160},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432418}
    }
    					
    De Graaff, Bob What happened to the central personality index? 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (3) , pp. 317-326  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {De Graaff, Bob},
      title = {What happened to the central personality index?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {3},
      pages = {317--326},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529208432170}
    }
    					
    De Graaff, Bob The stranded baron and the upstart at the crossroads: Wolfgang zu Putlitz and Otto John 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (4) , pp. 669-700  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {De Graaff, Bob},
      title = {The stranded baron and the upstart at the crossroads: Wolfgang zu Putlitz and Otto John},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {4},
      pages = {669--700},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432127}
    }
    					
    De Graaff, Bob & Cees Wiebes Intelligence and the cold war behind the dikes: The relationship between the American and Dutch intelligence communities, 1946-1994 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (1) , pp. 41-58  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {De Graaff, Bob and Wiebes, Cees},
      title = {Intelligence and the cold war behind the dikes: The relationship between the American and Dutch intelligence communities, 1946-1994},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {41--58},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432398}
    }
    					
    De Vita, Lorena [Book review] Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr., "Adenauer's Foreign Office: West German Diplomacy in the Shadow of the Third Reich", 2012 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (5) , pp. 747-748  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {De Vita, Lorena},
      title = {[Book review] Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr., "Adenauer's Foreign Office: West German Diplomacy in the Shadow of the Third Reich", 2012},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {5},
      pages = {747--748},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.945368}
    }
    					
    De Vries, Tity The absent Dutch: Dutch intellectuals and the congress for cultural freedom 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (2) , pp. 254-266  
    article
    Abstract: During the 1950s and 1960s the Congress for Cultural Freedom was one of the main stages for anti-communist American and European writers and intellectuals to discuss the communist threat to the freedom of intellectual and cultural life. Most Western European countries were represented at CCF conferences and had their own national CCF branches, but the Netherlands was an exception. Dutch intellectuals participated very rarely in the conferences, and all efforts to establish a Dutch branch of the CCF failed. Possible explanations (the socially isolated position of some intellectuals, no strong tradition of political engagement among Dutch writers or artists, no lively climate of public debate, and an ambivalent perception of American culture and society) for this absence of Dutch intellectuals show clearly how national traditions can play a decisive role in determining the development of international networks.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {De Vries, Tity},
      title = {The absent Dutch: Dutch intellectuals and the congress for cultural freedom},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {2},
      pages = {254--266},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306840}
    }
    					
    Death, Carl Conflict and Security in Contemporary Africa 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (5) , pp. 737-745  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Death, Carl},
      title = {Conflict and Security in Contemporary Africa},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {5},
      pages = {737--745},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.620792}
    }
    					
    Debruyne, Emmanuel Intelligence in Occupied Belgium: The Business of Anglo-Belgian Espionage and Intelligence Cooperation during the Two World Wars (1914-1918, 1940-1944) 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (3) , pp. 313-336  
    article
    Abstract: During both World Wars, one of the most powerful weapons Belgian citizens possessed in resisting German occupation of their country was the gathering of intelligence on the enemy for the allied armies. But Belgian's first and second secret wars were different in several respects, one of the most important being the relationship between the Belgian secret services in exile and their British counterparts. If the First World War was essentially a story of bitter concurrency between them, the Second was mostly a tale of "jealous" partnership. The relations with the intelligence networks in occupied Belgium formed a delicate but crucial issue, where money played an important role. This article explores these dynamics and how they affected the main mission of gathering intelligence on the Germans.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Debruyne, Emmanuel},
      title = {Intelligence in Occupied Belgium: The Business of Anglo-Belgian Espionage and Intelligence Cooperation during the Two World Wars (1914-1918, 1940-1944)},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {3},
      pages = {313--336},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2013.789635}
    }
    					
    Deery, Phillip A double agent down under: Australian security and the infiltration of the left 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (3) , pp. 346-366  
    article
    Abstract: Because of its clandestine character, the world of the undercover agent has remained murky. This article attempts to illuminate this shadowy feature of intelligence operations. It examines the activities of one double agent, the Czech-born Maximilian Wechsler, who in the early 1970s successfully infiltrated two socialist organizations. Wechsler was engaged by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. However, he was "unreliable": he came in from the cold and went public. The article uses his exposés to recreate his undercover role. It seeks to throw some light on the recruitment methods of ASIO, on the techniques of infiltration, on the relationship between ASIO and the Liberal Party during a period of political volatility in Australia, and on the contradictory position of the Labor Government towards the security services.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Deery, Phillip},
      title = {A double agent down under: Australian security and the infiltration of the left},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {3},
      pages = {346--366},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701415149}
    }
    					
    Deery, P. Menzies, Macmillan and the 'Woomera spy case' of 1958 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (2) , pp. 23-38  
    article
    Abstract: In 1958 a British serviceman, based near the Woomera rocket range in South Australia, passed secrets to the Soviet Union. They concerned the joint Anglo-Australian guided missile project. Recently-released archival files reveal the intense anxiety, bordering on panic, that this security breach provoked in Canberra and London. The article places this reaction against the background of a long-term quest by Britain and Australia to convince the United States to restore wartime co-operation in the field of atomic technology and lift its embargo on the transmission of classified information. By unraveling, for the first time, the story of the Woomera spy case, the article illuminates issues of security, defence preparations and Anglo-Australian relations.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Deery, P.},
      title = {Menzies, Macmillan and the 'Woomera spy case' of 1958},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {2},
      pages = {23--38},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714002895}
    }
    					
    Defty, Andrew "Close and continuous liaison": British anti-communist propaganda and cooperation with the United States, 1950-51 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (4) , pp. 100-130  
    article
    Abstract: In January 1948 the British government launched a new anti-Communist propaganda policy, and established a new Foreign Office Information Research Department (IRD) to coordinate that policy. This article examines the extent to which anti-Communist propaganda was coordinated with Britain's principal Cold War ally the United States, following the launch of America's own anti-Communist propaganda offensive, the "Campaign of Truth" in 1950. It traces the policy and organizational machinery for cooperation which was established in 1950 and examines the implementation of the policy for "close and continuous liaison" in London, Washington and in the field.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Defty, Andrew},
      title = {"Close and continuous liaison": British anti-communist propaganda and cooperation with the United States, 1950-51},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {4},
      pages = {100--130},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306660}
    }
    					
    Defty, Andrew The future of the British intelligence memoir 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (1) , pp. 184-191  
    article
    Abstract: Desmond Bristow, with Bill Bristow, A Game of Moles: The Deceptions of an MI6 Officer (London: Little, Brown and Co., 1993). Pp.292. £18.99. ISBN 0-316-90335-3. Nicholas Elliott, Never Judge a Man by his Umbrella (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1991). Pp.201. £14.95. ISBN 0-85955-182-2. Nicholas Elliott, With My Little Eye: Observations Along the Way (Norwich: Michael Russell, 1993). Pp.111. £12.95. ISBN 0-85955-200-4.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Defty, Andrew},
      title = {The future of the British intelligence memoir},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {1},
      pages = {184--191},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432292}
    }
    					
    Defty, Andrew, Hugh Bochel & Jane Kirkpatrick Tapping the Telephones of Members of Parliament: The "Wilson Doctrine" and Parliamentary Privilege 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (5) , pp. 675-697  
    article
    Abstract: In 1966, in what has become known as the Wilson Doctrine, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, informed Parliament that he had issued an instruction that the telephones of parliamentarians were not to be intercepted by the intelligence and security agencies. Subsequent Prime Ministers have all expressed their continued commitment to the Wilson Doctrine. This article examines the nature and limitations of the Wilson Doctrine, and its continued application in the context of recent legislative changes and a number of prominent recent cases. It focuses on apparent changes to the scope and attempts to set aside the Wilson Doctrine under the Blair government and the implications of the interception of the communications of Sinn Fein Members of Parliament, and the bugging of meetings involving the Labour MP Sadiq Khan.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Defty, Andrew and Bochel, Hugh and Kirkpatrick, Jane},
      title = {Tapping the Telephones of Members of Parliament: The "Wilson Doctrine" and Parliamentary Privilege},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {5},
      pages = {675--697},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.777606}
    }
    					
    Deibert, Ronald J. Deep Probe: The Evolution of Network Intelligence 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (4) , pp. 175-193  
    article
    Abstract: Over the last several decades, civil society activists and non-governmental organizations have been employing new information and communication technologies, such as the Internet, to facilitate their activities. At the same time, an increasing number of computer scientists, hackers, and engineers have become increasingly politicized, contributing their skills to security, privacy, and networking tools used by civil society organizations worldwide. The merging of these two social forces, and their sophisticated uses of technology for political action, is giving rise to a new form of distributed information and communication networking that I refer to as "network intelligence".
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Deibert, Ronald J.},
      title = {Deep Probe: The Evolution of Network Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {4},
      pages = {175--193},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520310001688925}
    }
    					
    Deighton, Anne [Book review] Matthew Grant (ed.), "The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945-1975" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (1) , pp. 162-163  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Deighton, Anne},
      title = {[Book review] Matthew Grant (ed.), "The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945-1975"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {1},
      pages = {162--163},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628528}
    }
    					
    Deletant, Dennis The Securitate and the police state in Romania, 1964-89 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (1) , pp. 22-49  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Deletant, Dennis},
      title = {The Securitate and the police state in Romania, 1964-89},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {1},
      pages = {22--49},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432238}
    }
    					
    Deletant, Dennis The securitate and the police state in Romania: 1948-64 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (4) , pp. 1-25  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Deletant, Dennis},
      title = {The securitate and the police state in Romania: 1948-64},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {4},
      pages = {1--25},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432223}
    }
    					
    Den Boer, Monica & Irina Wiegand From Convergence to Deep Integration: Evaluating the Impact of EU Counter-Terrorism Strategies on Domestic Arenas 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (2-3) , pp. 377-401  
    article
    Abstract: With the 2001 EU Action Plan and the 2005 EU Counterterrorism Strategy, the European Union has unfolded a roadmap for counter-terrorism measures and an itinerary of actions to be undertaken by the Member States. In some respects, the EU strategies, flanked by the Action Plans in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, as well as more concrete forms of cooperation such as the adoption of the EU Arrest Warrant, the Member States have been encouraged to use the same conceptual apparatus, to adopt the precautionary logic (pre-terrorism), and to adopt similar organizational models (multi-disciplinary cooperation) and tools (surveillance, public-private cooperation, etc.). This may have led to a level of convergence between the national counter-terrorism approaches, in line with what the Action Plan on Organized Crime in 1997 sought to achieve by demanding from Member States that they would adapt their national structures. The number of policy-impulses that has emanated from the EU Counterterrorism strategy and ensuing policy documents has been rather numerous. Moreover, this article seeks to take stock of whether all proposals have led to the full adoption and implementation of instruments. The article assesses whether the EU strategies have encouraged "deep integration" between the Member States in terms of a common threat assessment, pooling resources, sharing intelligence, mutual legal assistance in anti-terrorist investigations, creating joint investigation teams and transferring suspects between Member States. The primary focus of this article will be on levels of legal convergence between six Member States.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Den Boer, Monica and Wiegand, Irina},
      title = {From Convergence to Deep Integration: Evaluating the Impact of EU Counter-Terrorism Strategies on Domestic Arenas},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {377--401},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.988450}
    }
    					
    Denniston, A. G. The government code and cypher school between the wars 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (1) , pp. 48-70  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Denniston, A. G.},
      title = {The government code and cypher school between the wars},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {1},
      pages = {48--70},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431841}
    }
    					
    Denniston, Robin Three kinds of hero: Publishing the memoirs of secret intelligence people 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (2) , pp. 112-125  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Denniston, Robin},
      title = {Three kinds of hero: Publishing the memoirs of secret intelligence people},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {2},
      pages = {112--125},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529208432159}
    }
    					
    Denniston, Robin Diplomatic eavesdropping, 1922-44: A new source discovered 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (3) , pp. 423-448  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Denniston, Robin},
      title = {Diplomatic eavesdropping, 1922-44: A new source discovered},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {3},
      pages = {423--448},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529508432311}
    }
    					
    Denniston, Robin Research note: Yanks to lunch - an early glimpse of Anglo-American signals intelligence co-operation, March 1941 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 357-359  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Denniston, Robin},
      title = {Research note: Yanks to lunch - an early glimpse of Anglo-American signals intelligence co-operation, March 1941},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {357--359},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432362}
    }
    					
    Denniston, Robin Yardley on Yap 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (1) , pp. 112-122  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Denniston, Robin},
      title = {Yardley on Yap},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {1},
      pages = {112--122},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432242}
    }
    					
    Der Derian, James Anti-diplomacy, intelligence theory and surveillance practice 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (3) , pp. 29-51  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Der Derian, James},
      title = {Anti-diplomacy, intelligence theory and surveillance practice},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {3},
      pages = {29--51},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432213}
    }
    					
    Dessants, Betty Abrahamsen Ambivalent allies: OSS" USSR division, the state department, and the bureaucracy of intelligence analysis, 1941-1945 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (4) , pp. 722-753  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dessants, Betty Abrahamsen},
      title = {Ambivalent allies: OSS" USSR division, the state department, and the bureaucracy of intelligence analysis, 1941-1945},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {4},
      pages = {722--753},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432388}
    }
    					
    Deutsch, Harold C. Commanding generals and the uses of intelligence 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (3) , pp. 194-260  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Deutsch, Harold C.},
      title = {Commanding generals and the uses of intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {3},
      pages = {194--260},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431962}
    }
    					
    Deutsch, Harold C. Sidelights on the Redl case: Russian intelligence on the eve of the great war 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (4) , pp. 827-828  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Deutsch, Harold C.},
      title = {Sidelights on the Redl case: Russian intelligence on the eve of the great war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {4},
      pages = {827--828},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432029}
    }
    					
    Deutsch, James I. "I was a Hollywood agent": Cinematic representations of the office of strategic services in 1946 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (2) , pp. 85-99  
    article
    Abstract: In 1946, not long after the Office of Strategic Services was dissolved, three Hollywood feature films were released that dramatized the agency's operations during World WarII: O.S.S. (ParamountPictures, 13 Rue Madeleine (Twentieth Century-Fox), and Cloak and Dagger (Warner Bros. Pictures). Although officials in the War Depatment wre often disturbed by many of the technical details that these, three films revealed bout the military, the intelligence establishment generally benefited from the largely positive publicity and box-office success that these films received in the early years of the Cold War.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Deutsch, James I.},
      title = {"I was a Hollywood agent": Cinematic representations of the office of strategic services in 1946},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {2},
      pages = {85--99},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432478}
    }
    					
    Díaz Fernández, Antonio M. The Spanish Intelligence Community: A Diffuse Reality 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (2) , pp. 223-244  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract The functioning and composition of the Spanish Intelligence Community is not regulated in detail by any legal regulations, and neither the intelligence service nor the government have specified these despite the repeated references they make to them. This article sets out to establish what actually constitutes the Intelligence Community in Spain; thus, after a brief theoretical discussion in which the two major categories of members ? consumers and producers ? are identified, a model of the intelligence community in Spain is set forth on the basis of the interrelations between its members and their roles in the decision-making process. In its preparation, besides analyzing the existing legislation, 52 interviews were carried out with individual participants in all the structures, so as to reach an understanding of the role played by each one, to evaluate its performance and to propose some guidelines for improvement.
    Abstract The functioning and composition of the Spanish Intelligence Community is not regulated in detail by any legal regulations, and neither the intelligence service nor the government have specified these despite the repeated references they make to them. This article sets out to establish what actually constitutes the Intelligence Community in Spain; thus, after a brief theoretical discussion in which the two major categories of members ? consumers and producers ? are identified, a model of the intelligence community in Spain is set forth on the basis of the interrelations between its members and their roles in the decision-making process. In its preparation, besides analyzing the existing legislation, 52 interviews were carried out with individual participants in all the structures, so as to reach an understanding of the role played by each one, to evaluate its performance and to propose some guidelines for improvement.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Díaz Fernández, Antonio M.},
      title = {The Spanish Intelligence Community: A Diffuse Reality},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {2},
      pages = {223--244},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.489278}
    }
    					
    Díaz Fernández, Antonio M. Halfway down the road to supervision of the Spanish intelligence services 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (3) , pp. 440-456  
    article
    Abstract: The CESID was created during the transition to democracy with obvious shortcomings in its administrative, judicial, governmental and parliamentary controls. These shortcomings contributed to the scandals of 1995 and 1998 that made deputies aware of the need for improvements in its supervision, although the timid initiatives that were finally adopted did nothing to improve the situation. The reform of 2002 that transformed CESID into CNI was presented as an opportunity to perfect supervision of the intelligence services. However, its achievements have not been as ambitious as might have been hoped. Supervision ever since the transition to democracy is still unfinished business, as was clearly demonstrated by the difficulties experienced in the work of the commission of inquiry into the terrorist attack of 11 March 2004.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Díaz Fernández, Antonio M.},
      title = {Halfway down the road to supervision of the Spanish intelligence services},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {3},
      pages = {440--456},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600750687}
    }
    					
    Dimitriu, George Interrogation, Coercion and Torture: Dutch Debates and Experiences after 9/11 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (4) , pp. 547-565  
    article
    Abstract: ABSTRACT The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent increase of counterterrorism laws and regulations in Western democracies have also spurned heavy debates on torture and ill-treatment of captured terrorist suspects. However, while the Netherlands did deploy troops to Afghanistan and adopted new laws and policies regarding counterterrorism, debates on torture remained marginal. Indeed, the Netherlands has not suffered the pressure of a constant high terrorist threat, or endured a catastrophic terrorist attack. However, the author argues that there are more reasons for the lack of heated discussions. While this article does not intend to lift the Dutch case to an exemplary one, it illustrates how Dutch government authorities made good use of the benefits of hindsight regarding torture debates and incidents elsewhere and were able to apply lessons regarding accountability and oversight concerning interrogation issues at home successfully.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dimitriu, George},
      title = {Interrogation, Coercion and Torture: Dutch Debates and Experiences after 9/11},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {4},
      pages = {547--565},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.699287}
    }
    					
    Doel, Ronald E. & Allan A. Needell Science, Scientists, and the CIA: Balancing international ideals, national needs, and professional opportunities 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (1) , pp. 59-81  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Doel, Ronald E. and Needell, Allan A.},
      title = {Science, Scientists, and the CIA: Balancing international ideals, national needs, and professional opportunities},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {59--81},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432399}
    }
    					
    Doerr, Paul W. The Changkufeng/Lake Khasan incident of 1938: British intelligence on Soviet and Japanese military performance 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (3) , pp. 184-199  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Doerr, Paul W.},
      title = {The Changkufeng/Lake Khasan incident of 1938: British intelligence on Soviet and Japanese military performance},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {3},
      pages = {184--199},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432069}
    }
    					
    Donovan, Michael National intelligence and the Iranian revolution 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (1) , pp. 143-163  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Donovan, Michael},
      title = {National intelligence and the Iranian revolution},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {143--163},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432403}
    }
    					
    Dorn, A. Walter Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006-07 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (6) , pp. 805-835  
    article
    Abstract: In the slums of Haiti, where pistol and machete wielding gangs dominated the populace through murder, intimidation, extortion, and terror, a UN peacekeeping mission managed to established law, order, and government control. The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) succeeded by "taking on" the gangs in a series of military and police "search and arrest" operations in 2006-07. The achievement was made possible by thorough "intelligence preparation of the environment". This paper tells the story of the "intelligence-led" military-police-civil operations and how they transformed the Haitian slum of Cité Soleil from a foreboding place inaccessible to police for years to one in which the UN workers could safely walk its streets. The functions, structures, problems and challenges of the mission's intelligence capability are described, especially the work of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). Human intelligence proved to be key, while technologies helped considerably. Within the United Nations, intelligence remains a controversial and sensitive matter but the Haiti mission provides a valuable model of how to gather and use actionable intelligence.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dorn, A. Walter},
      title = {Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006-07},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {6},
      pages = {805--835},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520903320410}
    }
    					
    Dorn, A. Walter Electronic Eyes on the Green Line: Surveillance by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (2) , pp. 184-207  
    article
    Abstract: The 1974 Cypriot War divided the island of Cyprus into two parts with a narrow demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the opposing Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces. The volatility and violence in this zone, called the "Green Line", necessitated a constant UN peacekeeping presence that was achieved mainly with manned observation posts (OPs). About 150 of these posts were established by 1975 to maintain stability and prevent flare-ups, including any lethal exchanges between the two sides. By the early 1990s, many of the countries contributing peacekeepers to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) had become tired of the stalemate and the lack of progress in negotiations (peacemaking), so they withdrew their troops from the force. This necessitated a reduction in the number of constantly manned OPs from 51 in 1992 to 21 in mid-1993. Further downsizing of UNFICYP by the UN Security Council in 2004 gave rise to a new approach to monitor the DMZ and produce actionable intelligence. Cameras were installed in hot-spots in the Nicosia DMZ and more responsive patrols were introduced as part of the new "concentration with mobility" concept. This was the first time a UN peace operation used unattended cameras to monitor a demilitarized zone. This article examines the UN's difficulties and successes using the remote cameras, especially during important incidents. Other technologies that aided UNFICYP are also reviewed for lessons that might assist an under-equipped United Nations in its watchkeeping function.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dorn, A. Walter},
      title = {Electronic Eyes on the Green Line: Surveillance by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {2},
      pages = {184--207},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.834216}
    }
    					
    Dorn, A. Walter Intelligence at UN headquarters? The information and research unit and the intervention in Eastern Zaire 1996 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (3) , pp. 440-465  
    article
    Abstract: For most of its history the United Nations was reluctant to deal with intelligence and major powers were reluctant to share intelligence with it. But as the UN's peacekeeping operations intensified in some of the world's hot spots in the early 1990s, the UN found it both necessary and wise to create an information analysis capability at UN headquarters in New York. To funnel selected intelligence to the headquarters, several countries (including the US, UK, France and Russia) loaned intelligence officers to the UN's Situation Centre on a secondment basis. This paper describes the activities of the SitCen's Information and Research (I&R) Unit that existed from 1993 to 1999 under the informal motto "Keeping an Eye on the World". Using a case study of I&R reporting on the situation in Eastern Zaire (1996), where UN-run refugee camps were under attack, it is possible to examine the nature and utility of the intelligence provided by the intelligence officers to UN decision-makers and the planners of the Canadian-led multinational force in the region. It reveals that the Unit provided significant and useful intelligence about arms shipments, belligerent activities, and the status of refugees and made several prescient predictions and warnings. The Unit sought to minimize national bias and incomplete information, though both problems were still in evidence. Still, in many ways, the I&R Unit remains a useful model for the development of a future intelligence capability.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dorn, A. Walter},
      title = {Intelligence at UN headquarters? The information and research unit and the intervention in Eastern Zaire 1996},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {3},
      pages = {440--465},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500268921}
    }
    					
    Dorwart, Jeffery M. Citizens under military surveillance 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (2) , pp. 236-237  
    article
    Abstract: Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775-1980 (Yale University Press, 1991). Roy Talbert, Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1914-1941 (University Press of Mississippi, 1991).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dorwart, Jeffery M.},
      title = {Citizens under military surveillance},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {2},
      pages = {236--237},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432206}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. The unknown war: Security in Italy 1943-45 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (2) , pp. 285-311  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {The unknown war: Security in Italy 1943-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {2},
      pages = {285--311},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431946}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. Cheese 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (3) , pp. 176-183  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {Cheese},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {3},
      pages = {176--183},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432068}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. Correspondence 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (2) , pp. 229-230  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {Correspondence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {2},
      pages = {229--230},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432425}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. The eighth assignment 1943-1945 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (2) , pp. 69-90  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {The eighth assignment 1943-1945},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {2},
      pages = {69--90},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432414}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. The eighth assignment, 1941-1942 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (4) , pp. 672-695  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {The eighth assignment, 1941-1942},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {4},
      pages = {672--695},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432386}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. The false going map at Alam Haifa 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (1) , pp. 165-168  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {The false going map at Alam Haifa},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {1},
      pages = {165--168},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908431991}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. Maunsell and Mure 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (1) , pp. 60-77  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {Maunsell and Mure},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {60--77},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432191}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. The house near Paris 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 264-278  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {The house near Paris},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {264--278},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432356}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. The intelligence war in Turkey 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (1) , pp. 59-87  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {The intelligence war in Turkey},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {1},
      pages = {59--87},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432240}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. Operation condor 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (2) , pp. 357-373  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {Operation condor},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {2},
      pages = {357--373},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432002}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. The middle east intelligence centre 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (4) , pp. 800-812  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {The middle east intelligence centre},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {4},
      pages = {800--812},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432027}
    }
    					
    Dovey, H. O. Security in Syria, 1941-45 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (2) , pp. 418-446  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dovey, H. O.},
      title = {Security in Syria, 1941-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {2},
      pages = {418--446},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432109}
    }
    					
    Dravis, Michael W. Storming fortress Albania: American covert operations in microcosm, 1949-54 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (4) , pp. 425-442  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dravis, Michael W.},
      title = {Storming fortress Albania: American covert operations in microcosm, 1949-54},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {4},
      pages = {425--442},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529208432178}
    }
    					
    Drea, Edward J. Ultra and the American war against Japan: A note on sources 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (1) , pp. 195-204  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Drea, Edward J.},
      title = {Ultra and the American war against Japan: A note on sources},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {1},
      pages = {195--204},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431936}
    }
    					
    Drea, Edward J. Ultra intelligence and general Douglas MacArthur's leap to Hollandia, January-April 1944 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (2) , pp. 323-349  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Drea, Edward J.},
      title = {Ultra intelligence and general Douglas MacArthur's leap to Hollandia, January-April 1944},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {2},
      pages = {323--349},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432055}
    }
    					
    Drea, Edward J. & Joseph E. Richard New evidence on breaking the Japanese army codes 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (1) , pp. 62-83  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Drea, Edward J. and Richard, Joseph E.},
      title = {New evidence on breaking the Japanese army codes},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {1},
      pages = {62--83},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529908432524}
    }
    					
    Duffy, Michael British Intelligence and the Breakout of the French Atlantic Fleet from Brest in 1799 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (5) , pp. 601-618  
    article
    Abstract: This article investigates Britain's intelligence shortcomings and French intelligence successes surrounding the breakout of the French Fleet from Brest in 1799. It involved most aspects of contemporary intelligence and counter-intelligence operations and fortunately it is the best documented case study of how naval intelligence worked in this era, revealing the extent and variety of information that was received, how it was assessed, and conflicts between naval professionals and government ministers in its interpretation. It shows how an intelligence mindset can be formed which, though temporarily swayed away by new information, very quickly snatches at any indication which led it to return to the original supposition or fear.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Duffy, Michael},
      title = {British Intelligence and the Breakout of the French Atlantic Fleet from Brest in 1799},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {5},
      pages = {601--618},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701717965}
    }
    					
    Dujmovic, Nicholas Getting CIA History Right: The Informal Partnership Between Agency Historians and Outside Scholars 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (2-3) , pp. 228-245  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract The common task of all historians is to endeavour to present history as accurately and objectively as possible despite gaps in the record or a paucity of evidence. Intelligence historians face particular challenges in making sense of what too often is history deliberately shrouded. Staff historians of the Central Intelligence Agency operate mostly in the secret world and yet rely on the fine work of "outside" historians. There is in effect a largely unstated, certainly informal, but absolutely crucial partnership between CIA historians on the "inside" and dedicated scholars on the "outside". It is not too much to say, in fact, that accurate and objective history about the CIA is possible only through this informal partnership.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dujmovic, Nicholas},
      title = {Getting CIA History Right: The Informal Partnership Between Agency Historians and Outside Scholars},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {228--245},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.559143}
    }
    					
    Dujmovic, Nicholas Hollywood, don't you go disrespectin' my culture: The Good Shepherd versus real CIA history 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (1) , pp. 25-41  
    article
    Abstract: Filmography and literature alike are full of examples of "getting the history right" either through a semi-documentary approach, like the film Tora Tora Tora, or through fictional works that nonetheless are true to the historical times they represent. Robert DeNiro's recent film, The Good Shepherd, fails on both counts while purporting to be "the untold story" of the CIA's early years. This article argues that there is no need for Hollywood to concoct fiction about intelligence and call it history, because the real stories should be compelling enough. One of the great true stories from this period is the saga of John Downey and Richard Fecteau, CIA officers captured in China in 1952 and held for two decades. But because the reality of their riveting experience does not square with Hollywood's agenda about the CIA and intelligence, it is doubtful that an accurate movie about them will ever make the silver screen.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dujmovic, Nicholas},
      title = {Hollywood, don't you go disrespectin' my culture: The Good Shepherd versus real CIA history},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {1},
      pages = {25--41},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701798080}
    }
    					
    Duke, Simon Intelligence, security and information flows in CFSP 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (4) , pp. 604-630  
    article
    Abstract: This article traces the growth of the intelligence support role that a number of relatively small bodies have assumed within the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The implications of the development of this role are considered in detail. The article concludes that a new type of intelligence capability is gradually emerging at the European level, which could not easily be reproduced at the national or bilateral levels.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Duke, Simon},
      title = {Intelligence, security and information flows in CFSP},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {4},
      pages = {604--630},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600885764}
    }
    					
    Dupont, Alan Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (4) , pp. 15-39  
    article
    Abstract: The transformation of intelligence architectures, particularly in the West, is no less profound than that of the weapons, platforms, warfighting systems and governments they are designed to support and inform. Moreover, the cumulative weight of the changes in prospect will redefine the way in which intelligence is used and conceived. The old demarcation lines between strategic and operational intelligence and between operations and intelligence, once starkly differentiated will blur. Decision-makers will have better access to intelligence as a result of advances in ?pull? technology which have made possible intelligence on demand while open source intelligence will enrich and add value to national intelligence databases. Although information will become more plentiful and less of a privileged source in the global information environment of the twenty-first century, paradoxically the demand for timely, high quality strategic and operational intelligence will intensify rather than diminish. What will distinguish the successful practitioners of twenty-first century intelligence is the ability to fuse and integrate all elements of the process to provide seamless support for policy-makers and operational commanders. However, despite impressive advances in integration, technical collection and communications no intelligence system, no matter how efficacious, will ever be able to completely dispel the fog of war.
    The transformation of intelligence architectures, particularly in the West, is no less profound than that of the weapons, platforms, warfighting systems and governments they are designed to support and inform. Moreover, the cumulative weight of the changes in prospect will redefine the way in which intelligence is used and conceived. The old demarcation lines between strategic and operational intelligence and between operations and intelligence, once starkly differentiated will blur. Decision-makers will have better access to intelligence as a result of advances in ?pull? technology which have made possible intelligence on demand while open source intelligence will enrich and add value to national intelligence databases. Although information will become more plentiful and less of a privileged source in the global information environment of the twenty-first century, paradoxically the demand for timely, high quality strategic and operational intelligence will intensify rather than diminish. What will distinguish the successful practitioners of twenty-first century intelligence is the ability to fuse and integrate all elements of the process to provide seamless support for policy-makers and operational commanders. However, despite impressive advances in integration, technical collection and communications no intelligence system, no matter how efficacious, will ever be able to completely dispel the fog of war.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dupont, Alan},
      title = {Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {4},
      pages = {15--39},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520310001688862}
    }
    					
    Durbin, Brent [Book review] Igor Lukes, "On the Edge of the Cold War: American Diplomats and Spies in Postwar Prague", 2012 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (1) , pp. 147-150  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Durbin, Brent},
      title = {[Book review] Igor Lukes, "On the Edge of the Cold War: American Diplomats and Spies in Postwar Prague", 2012},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {1},
      pages = {147--150},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2013.786609}
    }
    					
    Duyvesteyn, Isabelle Hearts and Minds, Cultural Awareness and Good Intelligence: The Blueprint for Successful Counter-insurgency? 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (4) , pp. 445-459  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Are a hearts and minds approach, reliable intelligence and cultural awareness the most important ingredients for success in counter-insurgency, as present prescriptions claim? This article focuses on some of the notable non-kinetic aspects of counter-insurgency and aims to critically reflect on their role and importance. It argues that the hearts and minds ideas, the emphasis on intelligence and cultural awareness are often problematic both for their methodological foundations and empirical weight. The article closes by identifying avenues for further research.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Duyvesteyn, Isabelle},
      title = {Hearts and Minds, Cultural Awareness and Good Intelligence: The Blueprint for Successful Counter-insurgency?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {4},
      pages = {445--459},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.580598}
    }
    					
    Duyvesteyn, Isabelle Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Some Observations 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (4) , pp. 521-530  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Intelligence and strategic culture are two important research domains which have only recently been linked. This contribution brings together some of the insights of the contributions in this special issue and it attempts to formulate some challanges for future research.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Duyvesteyn, Isabelle},
      title = {Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Some Observations},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {4},
      pages = {521--530},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.580605}
    }
    					
    Dylan, Huw The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (1) , pp. 27-45  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract In 1946 veteran British intelligence officer Kenneth Strong undertook the Directorship of a new intelligence organization, the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). The JIB absorbed the responsibilities of several wartime intelligence organs, and was responsible for economic, topographic, and aspects of scientific intelligence on an inter-service basis. Its responsibilities grew over the following 18 years; most notably, it absorbed atomic intelligence in 1957. When the Defence Intelligence Staff was created in 1964, absorbing the JIB and the individual Service agencies, JIB was at its heart and Kenneth Strong its first Director. The organization conducted key work in the early Cold War, was at the centre of an international network of Joint Intelligence Bureaux, and was an important stepping stone in the movement to centralize military and military-relevant intelligence in Britain - but the historiography pays it surprisingly little attention. This paper introduces the JIB and various aspects of its work, and demonstrates that its low profile in the historiography is unjustified.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dylan, Huw},
      title = {The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {1},
      pages = {27--45},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.621592}
    }
    					
    Dylan, Huw [Book review] Chapman Pincher, "Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders and Cover-ups: Six Decades of Espionage" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (3) , pp. 437-439  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dylan, Huw},
      title = {[Book review] Chapman Pincher, "Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders and Cover-ups: Six Decades of Espionage"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {3},
      pages = {437--439},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.630443}
    }
    					
    Dylan, Huw Britain and the Missile Gap: British Estimates on the Soviet Ballistic Missile Threat, 1957-61 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (6) , pp. 777-806  
    article
    Abstract: Between 1957 and 1961, American National Intelligence Estimates overestimated the Soviets" capabilities to produce and deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles, creating the "missile gap" controversy. This article examines the contemporaneous estimates of British intelligence on the Soviet ballistic missile program, which were based upon very similar, if not the same, raw intelligence. It demonstrates that British estimates of the Soviet ICBM program were more accurate. However, this success did not continue in the analysis of the medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile (M/IRBM) threat, which was relatively poor for most of the period. It concludes that the reasons for this lie in the different assumptions held by intelligence analysts on both sides of the Atlantic, and a degree of conservatism in both intelligence establishments.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dylan, Huw},
      title = {Britain and the Missile Gap: British Estimates on the Soviet Ballistic Missile Threat, 1957-61},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {6},
      pages = {777--806},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802560058}
    }
    					
    Dylan, Huw & Martin S. Alexander Intelligence and National Security: A Century of British Intelligence 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (1) , pp. 1-4  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dylan, Huw and Alexander, Martin S.},
      title = {Intelligence and National Security: A Century of British Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--4},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.621590}
    }
    					
    Dyson, Stephen Benedict Origins of the Psychological Profiling of Political Leaders: The US Office of Strategic Services and Adolf Hitler 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (5) , pp. 654-674  
    article
    Abstract: The US intelligence community prepares occasional psychological profiles of foreign political leaders. The origins of these practices lie in frantic and ad hoc attempts to understand the character of Adolf Hitler during the latter stages of the Second World War. The US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) commissioned profiles of Hitler, contracting with a titan of personality theory in Professor Henry A. Murray and practicing psychoanalyst Walter C. Langer. Reconstructing the history of these profiles grounds the contemporary analysis of foreign leaders in the lessons of the pioneers. Useful insights on the challenges of profiling leaders, the relationship of academic theories - and academic personnel - to government, and the role of intelligence in policy abound.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Dyson, Stephen Benedict},
      title = {Origins of the Psychological Profiling of Political Leaders: The US Office of Strategic Services and Adolf Hitler},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {5},
      pages = {654--674},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.834217}
    }
    					
    Earl Haynes, John, Mark Atwood Lawrence & Marc T. Berger Roundtable Review 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (5) , pp. 726-733  
    article
    Abstract: Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005). Pp.xxxiii + 677, Notes and index.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Earl Haynes, John and Atwood Lawrence, Mark and Berger, Marc T.},
      title = {Roundtable Review},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {5},
      pages = {726--733},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802449559}
    }
    					
    Easter, David Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and Conflicts, 1956-67 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (6) , pp. 824-844  
    article
    Abstract: This article examines British signals intelligence on Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1958 Middle East Crisis and the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen. It explains the production of signals intelligence and reviews the evidence that GCHQ could read Egyptian and other Arab communications. It then identifies some of the intelligence provided by GCHQ and considers its influence on British policy.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Easter, David},
      title = {Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and Conflicts, 1956-67},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {824--844},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.703042}
    }
    					
    Easter, David Code Words, Euphemisms and What They Can Tell Us About Cold War Anglo-American Communications Intelligence 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (6) , pp. 875-895  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This study examines the code words and euphemisms which protected Anglo-American communications intelligence (Comint) during the Cold War. It explains how the code word security system operated and identifies the main Comint code words and euphemisms in effect from 1946 to 1999. The article then uses these code words and euphemisms to interpret declassified American documents and reveal more information about Anglo-American Comint on the Congo, Bolivia, Indonesia, South Vietnam and China in the 1960s.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Easter, David},
      title = {Code Words, Euphemisms and What They Can Tell Us About Cold War Anglo-American Communications Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {6},
      pages = {875--895},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.699288}
    }
    					
    Easter, David British and Malaysian covert support for rebel movements in Indonesia during the "confrontation", 1963-66 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (4) , pp. 195-208  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Easter, David},
      title = {British and Malaysian covert support for rebel movements in Indonesia during the "confrontation", 1963-66},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {195--208},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432577}
    }
    					
    Easter, David British Intelligence and Propaganda during the 'Confrontation', 1963-1966 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (2) , pp. 83-102  
    article
    Abstract: This study examines the importance of British intelligence and propaganda in the Confrontation with Indonesia. It shows that Britain had access to human and signals intelligence on Indonesia, which influenced British policy and strategy in several ways. In particular, signals intelligence gave London the confidence to launch 'Claret' cross border raids against Indonesia from 1965. The study also reveals that Britain mounted an aggressive propaganda campaign against Indonesia during the Confrontation and especially after an abortive coup attempt in 1965. British propaganda successfully encouraged the army to destroy the Indonesian communist party, remove President Sukarno from power and end the Confrontation.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Easter, David},
      title = {British Intelligence and Propaganda during the 'Confrontation', 1963-1966},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {2},
      pages = {83--102},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714002893}
    }
    					
    Easter, David GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (5) , pp. 681-706  
    article
    Abstract: This study examines the role played by GCHQ during the 1960s. It looks at GCHQ's overseas Sigint collection network, its relationship with the NSA and the problems caused by decolonization, economic crisis and military withdrawal from East of Suez. The paper also discusses GCHQ's intelligence targets in the 1960s, its codebreaking successes and assesses how important Sigint was for British policy towards France, Egypt and Indonesia. It concludes that while Sigint gave Britain tactical benefits in dealing with France and Egypt it was only in the case of Indonesia that Sigint helped Britain to achieve its strategic goals.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Easter, David},
      title = {GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {5},
      pages = {681--706},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802449526}
    }
    					
    Eftimiades, Nicholas China's ministry of state security: Coming of age in the international arena 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (1) , pp. 23-43  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Eftimiades, Nicholas},
      title = {China's ministry of state security: Coming of age in the international arena},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {23--43},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432189}
    }
    					
    Egerton, George Diplomacy, scandal and military intelligence: The craufurd-stuart affair and Anglo-American relations 1918-20 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (4) , pp. 110-134  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Egerton, George},
      title = {Diplomacy, scandal and military intelligence: The craufurd-stuart affair and Anglo-American relations 1918-20},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {4},
      pages = {110--134},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431918}
    }
    					
    Eldridge, Justin L. C. The Blarney Stone and the Rhine: 23rd headquarters, special troops and the Rhine river crossing, March 1945 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (3) , pp. 211-241  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Eldridge, Justin L. C.},
      title = {The Blarney Stone and the Rhine: 23rd headquarters, special troops and the Rhine river crossing, March 1945},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {3},
      pages = {211--241},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529208432166}
    }
    					
    Elling, Rasmus Christian All Eyes on Iran: The Nuclear Ambitions of a People and a President 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (5) , pp. 730-753  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Elling, Rasmus Christian},
      title = {All Eyes on Iran: The Nuclear Ambitions of a People and a President},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {5},
      pages = {730--753},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520903209498}
    }
    					
    Ellwood, David The propaganda of the Marshall Plan in Italy in a Cold War context 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (2) , pp. 225-236  
    article
    Abstract: The study will highlight two key circumstances surrounding the workings of the Marshall Plan in Italy, namely the immediate Cold War context (e.g. the 1948 elections) and the fact that Italy was the country where communism had the most serious chance to come to power via the ballot box. The analysis will suggest that the European Recovery Program (ERP) propaganda effort largely failed in its short-term objectives. Left-wing strength continued to grow in various forms, and the quick-fix revolution in the customs and practices of the moderate parties, industry, and the state, as demanded by the Americans, was hopelessly unrealistic. However, the psychological boost to confidence that the ERP (and NATO) gave to the very weak ruling classes was as significant in Italy as it was elsewhere in Europe. In contrast, the Plan's long-term legacy is much more nuanced and hard to calculate. After fascism's failure, the United States offered a vision of modernization which was unprecedented in its power, internationalism and invitation to emulation. The ERP was one of the main ways that this modernization was expressed. How Italian society built mechanisms to adapt, translate, resist and domesticate this challenge had a lasting effect on the nation's development over the subsequent decades.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ellwood, David},
      title = {The propaganda of the Marshall Plan in Italy in a Cold War context},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {2},
      pages = {225--236},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306820}
    }
    					
    Enemark, Christian Biological attacks and the non-state actor: A threat assessment 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (6) , pp. 911-930  
    article
    Abstract: In a climate of political concern about the deliberate dissemination of pathogenic micro-organisms, this article assesses the nature and scope of the threat to national security posed by actors other than states. Key factors include the motivations and disincentives for carrying out a biological attack and the technical challenges likely to be encountered by a non-state organization that decides to use disease as its weapon of choice. The assessment concludes that non-state organizations do not at present pose a great threat, that biological attacks should generally not be regarded as a "WMD" issue, but also that the conduct of individual scientists engaged in pathogen research warrants careful monitoring.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Enemark, Christian},
      title = {Biological attacks and the non-state actor: A threat assessment},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {6},
      pages = {911--930},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520601046226}
    }
    					
    Ennis, Jerry D. What Did Angleton Say About Golitsyn? 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (6) , pp. 905-909  
    article
    Abstract: In an earlier issue of this journal I examined statements attributed to James J. Angleton, then Chief of the CIA Counterintelligence Staff, that Anatoli Mikhailovich Golitsyn had worked secretly for the CIA for many years prior to defecting in Helsinki in December 1961. Further research shows that Angleton had made similar remarks on a number of occasions, but intended something other than the usual meaning of the phrase "worked for".
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ennis, Jerry D.},
      title = {What Did Angleton Say About Golitsyn?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {6},
      pages = {905--909},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701770667}
    }
    					
    Ennis, Jerry D. Anatoli Golitsyn: Long-time CIA Agent? 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (1) , pp. 26-45  
    article
    Abstract: Anatoli Mikhailovich Golitsyn was probably the most difficult and disruptive defector the Central Intelligence Agency ever dealt with. He was a key player in a decade-long search for moles that devastated the careers of a number of innocent CIA officers and damaged the CIA's relations with several foreign intelligence organizations. And now comes the suggestion that Golitsyn was not "just" a KGB defector, but someone who "had worked for the CIA secretly for many years before". The source of this claim is as startling as the suggestion itself, but is it true?
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ennis, Jerry D.},
      title = {Anatoli Golitsyn: Long-time CIA Agent?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {1},
      pages = {26--45},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600568261}
    }
    					
    Epps, Shannon Mollie The Bourne actuality: A look at reality's role in the Bourne Identity novel and film 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (1) , pp. 103-111  
    article
    Abstract: This paper examines Robert Ludlum's novel, The Bourne Identity, and the film based on the novel. It argues that Ludlum and the makers of the film version of The Bourne Identity incorporated a variety of aspects of reality into their plotlines. Some of these aspects are not entirely factual, while others stick very closely to the truth. Congressional oversight, ethical dilemmas tied to assassination and real-life antagonists play significant roles in both the novel and the film. In the book the antagonists are terrorists, particularly Carlos the Jackal, but in the movie version the "bad people" are CIA officials. Although the antagonist changes between the novel and the film, they both are realistic aspects that draw the audience in. Not only do these three aspects of reality contribute to the plots of the novel and the film, but they also make the audience reflect on issues brought up in the film.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Epps, Shannon Mollie},
      title = {The Bourne actuality: A look at reality's role in the Bourne Identity novel and film},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {1},
      pages = {103--111},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701798163}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph Tunny Reveals B-Dienst Successes Against the "Convoy Code" 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (6) , pp. 868-889  
    article
    Abstract: During World War II, German naval codebreakers in the B-Dienst made extensive breaks into Naval Cypher No. 3, an enciphered code used by the Allies for the vital Atlantic convoys. It is often suggested that they did not discover that Cypher No. 3 was insecure until May 1943. This article shows that the British had learned about this much earlier, in August 1942, and that they informed the US Navy then. British solutions of messages encrypted with the Wehrmacht's Tunny teleprinter cipher machine had revealed that the B-Dienst was solving Naval Cyphers Nos. 3 and 4. Surprisingly, those ciphers were not replaced until June 1943.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {Tunny Reveals B-Dienst Successes Against the "Convoy Code"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {868--889},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.746414}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph U-boats, homing signals and HFDF 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (2) , pp. 324-330  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {U-boats, homing signals and HFDF},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {2},
      pages = {324--330},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431894}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph When a purple machine went missing: How Japan nearly discovered America's greatest secret 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (3) , pp. 185-189  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {When a purple machine went missing: How Japan nearly discovered America's greatest secret},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {3},
      pages = {185--189},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432438}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph William Friedman's Bletchley park diary: A different view 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (3) , pp. 367-379  
    article
    Abstract: "William Friedman's Bletchley Park Diary" (INS 20/4 (2005) pp. 654-69) stated that Friedman, with Col. Alfred McCormack and Lt.-Col. Telford Taylor (US Army Special Branch), visited Bletchley Park in mid-1943 to negotiate with the British Government Code and Cypher School on how the Travis-Strong Agreement of May 1943 on Sigint cooperation should be implemented. This article shows that they had no substantive negotiating powers, and that they were essentially on a fact-finding mission.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {William Friedman's Bletchley park diary: A different view},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {3},
      pages = {367--379},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701415164}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph The Holden agreement on naval Sigint: The first BRUSA? 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (2) , pp. 187-197  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {The Holden agreement on naval Sigint: The first BRUSA?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {2},
      pages = {187--197},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432545}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph Naval enigma: An astonishing blunder 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (3) , pp. 468-473  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {Naval enigma: An astonishing blunder},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {3},
      pages = {468--473},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432372}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph Naval Enigma: The breaking of Heimisch and Triton 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (1) , pp. 162-183  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {Naval Enigma: The breaking of Heimisch and Triton},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {1},
      pages = {162--183},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431933}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph Eavesdropping on "Bodden": ISOS v. the Abwehr in the straits of Gibraltar 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (3) , pp. 110-129  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {Eavesdropping on "Bodden": ISOS v. the Abwehr in the straits of Gibraltar},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {3},
      pages = {110--129},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432433}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph [Book review] Elliott Carlson, "Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway" 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 601-603  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {[Book review] Elliott Carlson, "Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {601--603},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.923602}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph [Book review] Joss Pearson (ed.), "Neil Webster's Cribs for Victory: The Untold Story of Bletchley Park's Secret Room" 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 603-605  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {[Book review] Joss Pearson (ed.), "Neil Webster's Cribs for Victory: The Untold Story of Bletchley Park's Secret Room"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {603--605},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.923603}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Ralph The Soviets and naval enigma: Some comments 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (3) , pp. 503-511  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {The Soviets and naval enigma: Some comments},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {503--511},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432013}
    }
    					
    Erskine, Toni "As Rays of Light to the Human Soul"? Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (2) , pp. 359-381  
    article
    Abstract: Calls to evaluate ethically the practices of intelligence collection have been prompted by debate over the decision to go to war in Iraq and by consideration of how best to respond to terrorist threats. Recently, they have been bolstered by allegations of prisoner abuse that some have linked to intelligence organisations. Such demands for judgement are articulated with equal measures of urgency and apprehension: there is a perceived need to make clear statements about what constitutes morally prohibited and permissible conduct with regard to intelligence gathering, and yet the tools with which one might perform such a task are not readily apparent. This article begins with three basic assumptions. First, intelligence collection does not exist in an amoral realm of necessity, but, rather, is a human endeavour involving choice and deliberation and, therefore, is vulnerable to ethical scrutiny. Second, there is no consensus on the moral guidelines to be invoked to engage in such scrutiny. There are many distinct ethical perspectives from which intelligence collection might be evaluated - and from which one might provide disparate judgements of the same action. Finally, the practices involved in intelligence gathering are equally multifarious and it would be unhelpful to attempt to cover them with a blanket justification or condemnation (from any perspective). Following on from these assumptions, this article sets out a simple typology of 'realist', 'consequentialist' and 'deontological' ethical approaches to intelligence collection and explores how different practices might be variously evaluated from each. The aim is to provide an initial step towards thinking about ethics and intelligence collection.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Erskine, Toni},
      title = {"As Rays of Light to the Human Soul"? Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {2},
      pages = {359--381},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302047}
    }
    					
    Esselstrom, Erik W. Japanese police and Korean resistance in prewar China: The problem of legal legitimacy and local collaboration 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (3) , pp. 342-363  
    article
    Abstract: Based on the records of Japanese Foreign Ministry police forces, this article describes a failed attempt by Japanese consular police in south Manchuria during the early 1920s to suppress the Korean independence movement in exile through the employment of local collaborators. Implemented because the Chinese government did not recognize the legal legitimacy of Japanese consular police operations on Chinese soil, this counter-insurgency program reveals the lengths to which Japanese consular authorities were willing to go in the search for solutions to their perceived national security threats in Northeast Asia long before the outbreak of full-scale war with China in the 1930s.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Esselstrom, Erik W.},
      title = {Japanese police and Korean resistance in prewar China: The problem of legal legitimacy and local collaboration},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {3},
      pages = {342--363},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600750620}
    }
    					
    Estévez, Eduardo E. Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador Cases 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (4) , pp. 552-580  
    article
    Abstract: This article aims to contribute to the understanding of the intelligence democratization process in new democracies comparing three South American countries: Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina. With a background of authoritarian legacies ("political police" style intelligence agencies controlled by the military) under particular political circumstances and changing strategic environments, these countries experienced disparate trajectories, prescriptions, and outcomes in their efforts to reform their intelligence communities. Drawing on new institutionalism, historical moments and relevant events shaping the dynamics of intelligence democratization are highlighted for each case, depicting failures and successes, and identifying drivers of change.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Estévez, Eduardo E.},
      title = {Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador Cases},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {4},
      pages = {552--580},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.915177}
    }
    					
    Etges, Andreas All that Glitters is Not Gold: The 1953 Coup against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (4) , pp. 495-508  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract The coup against Mossadegh has often been described as the beginning of the "Golden Age" of the CIA. The article argues that, while the coup was successful in getting rid of Mossadegh, its negative short-term and long-term consequences in Iran but also for the United States weigh heavily. Without thorough analysis why it nearly failed, the coup became a fatal catalyst for other interventions of the CIA that led to the Bay of Pigs disaster. If intelligence activities lose their moral dimension and if success is exclusively measured by "mission accomplished", in the end more will be lost than gained.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Etges, Andreas},
      title = {All that Glitters is Not Gold: The 1953 Coup against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {4},
      pages = {495--508},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.580603}
    }
    					
    Etzioni, Amitai NSA: National Security vs. Individual Rights 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (1) , pp. 100-136  
    article
    Abstract: This paper draws on liberal communitarianism to analyze two National Security Agency programs: the bulk phone records collection program and PRISM. Specifically, the paper addresses the following questions: Does the threat to national security justify such programs? Can this threat be addressed through standard criminal procedures favored by civil libertarians? Are the programs effective? To what extent do they violate the privacy of American citizens? What are the rights of non-Americans with respect to the programs? Are the programs in line with the Constitution and the various laws that govern them? Is there sufficient accountability and oversight of these programs?
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Etzioni, Amitai},
      title = {NSA: National Security vs. Individual Rights},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {100--136},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.867221}
    }
    					
    Evans, Donald James The Ludwig Martens-Maxim Litvinov Connection, 1919-1921 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 434-460  
    article
    Abstract: Research began when the author realized that Antony Sutton had misidentified the author of a key document published in his Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (1974). This article reports on the interception by federal agents of the document (a letter) brought from the Copenhagen office of Soviet diplomat Maxim Litvinov and intended for Kenneth Durant who was employed by Ludwig Martens, Lenin's unrecognized representative in New York City. Analysis of the letter revealed the true author and opened a research channel for learning more about the backgrounds of three Soviet agents: Bornett Bobroff, Nora Hellgren, and Wilfred Humphries.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Evans, Donald James},
      title = {The Ludwig Martens-Maxim Litvinov Connection, 1919-1921},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {434--460},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.875383}
    }
    					
    Everest-Phillips, Max Colin Davidson's British Indian Intelligence Operations in Japan 1915-23 and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (5) , pp. 674-699  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Colin Davidson was the British consular official in Japan during and after World War I delegated to run intelligence operations in the country on behalf of the British Indian security authorities. Davidson's original target, Indian revolutionaries based in Japan, soon expanded to include their clandestine links to powerful Japanese political patrons, violating the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-23). Davidson's expertise on Japan, combined with intelligence on Japanese ultranationalist support of Indian independence, proved crucial for confirming suspicions about secret Japanese intent against the British Empire, contributing to the decision not to renew the Alliance.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Everest-Phillips, Max},
      title = {Colin Davidson's British Indian Intelligence Operations in Japan 1915-23 and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {5},
      pages = {674--699},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520903209431}
    }
    					
    Everest-Phillips, Max Reassessing pre-war Japanese espionage: The Rutland naval spy case and the Japanese intelligence threat before Pearl Harbor 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (2) , pp. 258-285  
    article
    Abstract: Soon after the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921, Squadron Leader Frederick Joseph Rutland covertly offered the Japanese navy technical help to develop aircraft carriers. In doing so Rutland played a significant role in the evolution of Japan's offensive capability that made the attack on Pearl Harbor possible. Of as lasting importance was the impact the case had in shaping the perception of "the Japanese threat". British security and intelligence agencies' knowledge of Japanese naval intelligence actions in accepting this "offer of service" and running Rutland as a clandestine agent was not balanced by any understanding of the fragmented nature of the Japanese leadership and intelligence bureaucracy. The case in the 1920s provided the Security Service and SIS with the apparent evidence to justify reassessing Japan from benign if opportunistic former ally to hostile power, apparently proving that Japan's intelligence actions reflected sustained hostile intent throughout the inter-War period.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Everest-Phillips, Max},
      title = {Reassessing pre-war Japanese espionage: The Rutland naval spy case and the Japanese intelligence threat before Pearl Harbor},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {2},
      pages = {258--285},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600620732}
    }
    					
    Ewing, Humphry Crum Iraq March-April 2003: Outcomes, a Division of Views - and an Abuse of Intelligence? 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (1) , pp. 105-111  
    article
    Abstract: Three things happened in Iraq in March/April 2003 - an invasion, a military campaign and a start on the reconstruction of that country. In making the case for these the UK and US governments drew "with exceptional frankness" on the reports of their intelligence agencies. In using and, it maybe, abusing such material the governments laid themselves open to charges of deception in arguing the case for war. All of this brought out serious differences of view between the United States and others. Such differences are argued by Robert Kagan in his book Paradise & Power: America and Europe in the New World Order as being fundamental and permanent, with the American view to prevail. This article sets out why the author believes that the American view is, at important points, fallacious.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ewing, Humphry Crum},
      title = {Iraq March-April 2003: Outcomes, a Division of Views - and an Abuse of Intelligence?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {1},
      pages = {105--111},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0268452042000222957}
    }
    					
    Fägersten, Björn Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation - The Case of Europol 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (4) , pp. 500-520  
    article
    Abstract: This article analyses the gap between government ambitions and actual outcomes in the case of European counter terrorism intelligence cooperation. Specifically, it investigates why Europol has not managed to live up to its tasks despite outspoken government support. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, the study suggests why bureaucrats might be motivated to resist calls for international cooperation. By examining the process by which Europol has developed as an actor in the counter terrorism field, this article shows how development in the field of intelligence cooperation is not exclusively the reflection of government preferences. It concludes by suggesting that scholars could gain greater insight from a less state centric approach to the study of intelligence. In addition, the article suggests that policy makers cultivate a greater familiarity with bureaucratic factors and that they continually work with those factors in mind.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fägersten, Björn},
      title = {Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation - The Case of Europol},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {4},
      pages = {500--520},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.537028}
    }
    					
    Faligot, Roger France, Sigint and the Cold War 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (1) , pp. 177-208  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Faligot, Roger},
      title = {France, Sigint and the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {1},
      pages = {177--208},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714002843}
    }
    					
    Farson, Stuart Parliament and its servants: Their role in scrutinizing Canadian intelligence 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (2) , pp. 225-258  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Farson, Stuart},
      title = {Parliament and its servants: Their role in scrutinizing Canadian intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {2},
      pages = {225--258},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432609}
    }
    					
    Farson, Stuart & Nancy Teeple Increasing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capability: Is it a Dead Issue? 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (1) , pp. 47-76  
    article
    Abstract: Despite the fact that the issue of whether Canada should develop a greater foreign intelligence capability has been broached numerous times, in various guises, over more than a century, those who have followed the development of the country's intelligence architecture will know it has never had a foreign intelligence service like its close allies. They will also be aware that on each occasion on which the issue has been raised, the Canadian government has declined to proceed. If history is any guide, there is a strong likelihood that the idea of Canada developing a more robust capability will again engage politicians, former intelligence officials, academics, the media, and think tanks in the not too distant future. The view adopted in this paper is that the public discourse has become sterile, and that if it is to advance, aspects of the counterfactual case - why has a foreign Humint capability not been developed? - may prove more fruitful.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Farson, Stuart and Teeple, Nancy},
      title = {Increasing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capability: Is it a Dead Issue?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {47--76},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.961243}
    }
    					
    Faulkner, Marcus The Kriegsmarine, Signals Intelligence and the Development of the B-Dienst Before the Second World War 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (4) , pp. 521-546  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Faulkner, Marcus},
      title = {The Kriegsmarine, Signals Intelligence and the Development of the B-Dienst Before the Second World War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {4},
      pages = {521--546},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.537030}
    }
    					
    Fedor, Julie Chekists Look Back on the Cold War: The Polemical Literature 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (6) , pp. 842-863  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article examines conspiracy theories about the history of the Cold War as presented in post-Soviet memoirs and other writings produced by former KGB officers. It focuses in particular on conspiracy theories positing an ongoing Western plot to destroy and humiliate Russia. The article explores the connections which these texts draw between national identity, morality, memory, and state security.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fedor, Julie},
      title = {Chekists Look Back on the Cold War: The Polemical Literature},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {6},
      pages = {842--863},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.619800}
    }
    					
    Fedorowich, Kent Axis prisoners of war as sources for British military intelligence, 1939-42 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (2) , pp. 156-178  
    article
    Abstract: It was during the Second World War that the Allies developed a sophisticated intelligence system to harness information garnered from the hundreds of thousands of Axis captives taken during hostilities. Indeed, prior to 1942, many Allied field commanders displayed a healthy scepticism towards intelligence obtained from this source. Such suspicions were eventually overcome. This article examines British efforts during the formative period 1939-42 when an integrated infrastructure was painstakingly established to extract, collate and assess material obtained from Axis POWs. It not only examines the intelligence organisations which were established by each of the British armed services, but also analyses the variety of military and political information obtained and how it was interpreted and disseminated.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fedorowich, Kent},
      title = {Axis prisoners of war as sources for British military intelligence, 1939-42},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {2},
      pages = {156--178},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432543}
    }
    					
    Fedorowich, Kent "Toughs and Thugs": The Mazzini Society and Political Warfare amongst Italian POWs in India, 1941-43 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (1) , pp. 147-172  
    article
    Abstract: During the early days of the Second World War, the British government created a number of clandestine agencies whose mission was to undertake covert intelligence and propaganda work. One of the problems these organizations, such as SOE and the PWE, experienced was the lack of qualified linguists who could be used in the murky world of espionage, political warfare and counter-propaganda. By early 1941, unable to find large numbers of qualified people in Britain or the Empire, Whitehall - in desperation - looked towards the United States with its large Italian émigré community and the little known anti-fascist organization known as the Mazzini Society. This article is a study in failure. Using British attempts to forge a Free Italy movement between 1941 and 1943, it examines the sometimes farcical attempts by SOE, and later the PWE, in recruiting Italo-Americans for clandestine political warfare work in the fight against fascist Italy.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fedorowich, Kent},
      title = {"Toughs and Thugs": The Mazzini Society and Political Warfare amongst Italian POWs in India, 1941-43},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {1},
      pages = {147--172},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500059486}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John A New American Way of War? C4ISR, Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation "Iraqi Freedom": A Provisional Assessment 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (4) , pp. 155-174  
    article
    Abstract: This work examines publicly material available released as of 2 September 2003 on the role of intelligence for the Coalition side during the 2003 Gulf War. It assesses how far the Coalition side practised deception, psychological warfare, and information operations during that conflict, and how far intelligence served the needs of military forces. It focuses on failures as well as successes. It compares the real performance of intelligence during the conflict with the role forecast for C4ISR and Information Operations by theorists of the RMA, and modern strategy. It concludes that the Coalition forces practised Information Operations very well, but that at the operational level, there had been no revolution in military intelligence.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {A New American Way of War? C4ISR, Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation "Iraqi Freedom": A Provisional Assessment},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {4},
      pages = {155--174},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520310001688916}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John Whitehall's black chamber: British cryptology and the government code and cypher school, 1919-29 1 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (1) , pp. 54-91  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {Whitehall's black chamber: British cryptology and the government code and cypher school, 1919-29 1},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {1},
      pages = {54--91},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431876}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John The "usual source": Signals intelligence and planning for the eighth army "Crusader" offensive, 1941 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (1) , pp. 84-118  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {The "usual source": Signals intelligence and planning for the eighth army "Crusader" offensive, 1941},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {1},
      pages = {84--118},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529908432525}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John The British army and signals intelligence in the field during the first World War 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (4) , pp. 23-48  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {The British army and signals intelligence in the field during the first World War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {4},
      pages = {23--48},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528808431968}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John The British army, signals and security in the desert campaign, 1940-42 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (2) , pp. 255-291  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {The British army, signals and security in the desert campaign, 1940-42},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {2},
      pages = {255--291},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529008432053}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John "Consistent with an Intention": The Far East Combined Bureau and the Outbreak of the Pacific War, 1940-41 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (1) , pp. 5-26  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract From 1934, Britain expanded its military and naval intelligence agencies against Japan. At the outbreak of war in Europe, they, and most of their personnel, were moved from Hong Kong to Singapore, and joined into an interservice organization, the Far East Combined Bureau. Much of the evidence about the Far East Combined Bureau is lost, but the surviving record illustrates what intelligence was available to decision-makers in Singapore during 1940-41, thus illuminating every debate about this disaster. Even more: it enables a reconceptualization of the relationship between intelligence and the outbreak of the Pacific War as a whole.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {"Consistent with an Intention": The Far East Combined Bureau and the Outbreak of the Pacific War, 1940-41},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {1},
      pages = {5--26},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.621591}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John "The Internationalism of Islam": The British Perception of a Muslim Menace, 1840-1951 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (1) , pp. 57-77  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article assesses British perceptions of a Muslim menace to imperial security between 1840-1951. These ideas had a long life. They rarely stood in the first rank of imperial concerns, but sometimes in the second. Over this period, British ideas of an Islamic menace focused first on the political self-consciousness of all Muslims than on subterranean bodies which tried to bind masses and elites for political ends, and moved to nationalist movements with a narrow popular base, and finally to those with a mass base. Between 1915 and 1924, fear of a pan-Islamic menace significantly affected British strategic and imperial policy. These ideas involved the interaction of observation, intelligence, perception, learning, fear, ignorance and uncertainty. Their study illuminates the evolution both of British intelligence and of its ideas about the political self-consciousness of its subjects, and the threat that posed to its rule, particularly about the nature and power of colonial nationalism.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {"The Internationalism of Islam": The British Perception of a Muslim Menace, 1840-1951},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {1},
      pages = {57--77},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520902756820}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John Michael Handel, 1942-2001 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (2) , pp. vii-xiii  
    article
    Abstract: Only on paper. Not referenced in the archives of the journal.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {Michael Handel, 1942-2001},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {2},
      pages = {vii-xiii}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John The intelligence-deception complex: An anatomy 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (4) , pp. 719-734  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {The intelligence-deception complex: An anatomy},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {4},
      pages = {719--734},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908432024}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence? 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (2) , pp. 199-225  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {2},
      pages = {199--225},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0268452042000302967}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John From Broadway house to Bletchley park: The diary of Captain Malcolm. D. Kennedy, 1934-1946 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (3) , pp. 421-450  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {From Broadway house to Bletchley park: The diary of Captain Malcolm. D. Kennedy, 1934-1946},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {421--450},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908432009}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John The road to Bletchley Park: the British experience with signals intelligence, 1892-1945 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (1) , pp. 53-84  
    article
    Abstract: This essay examines the evidence and the literature on British signals intelligence between 1892 and 1945. It assesses the relative significance of the documents on signals intelligence released since the Waldegrave Initiative. It criticizes many conventional assumptions in the literature and argues that signals intelligence has been a normal practice of the British government throughout the twentieth century. The text sketches an alternative history of British signals intelligence during 1892-1945 and analyses its value for the British state in various aspects of the two world wars and diplomacy during the inter-war period.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {The road to Bletchley Park: the British experience with signals intelligence, 1892-1945},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {1},
      pages = {53--84},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520412331306410}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John Ralph Bennett and the study of ultra 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (2) , pp. 473-486  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {Ralph Bennett and the study of ultra},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {2},
      pages = {473--486},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529108432112}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John Intelligence and diplomatic signalling during crises: The British experiences of 1877-78, 1922 and 1938 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (5) , pp. 675-696  
    article
    Abstract: The roles of intelligence, communications and signals in crisis decision-making routinely are mentioned in passing but rarely assessed in detail. This study examines these issues in three international crises: the great eastern question, 1877-78, Chanak, 1922 and Munich, 1938, and briefly compares these findings to two others, July 1914 and Cuba, 1962. It demonstrates that intelligence, communications and signals are more problematical in crises than is generally believed. This study challenges the conventional view that crises are essentially something to manage. Instead, it argues, crises are explosive, unpredictable and high in risk, dominated by emotion, factionalization, communication failures, missed signals and unintended consequences.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John},
      title = {Intelligence and diplomatic signalling during crises: The British experiences of 1877-78, 1922 and 1938},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {5},
      pages = {675--696},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600957647}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John & Uri Bar-Joseph Getting Marlowe to hold his tongue: The conservative party, the intelligence services and the Zinoviev letter 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (4) , pp. 100-137  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John and Bar-Joseph, Uri},
      title = {Getting Marlowe to hold his tongue: The conservative party, the intelligence services and the Zinoviev letter},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {4},
      pages = {100--137},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529308432229}
    }
    					
    Ferris, John & Michael I. Handel Clausewitz, intelligence, uncertainty and the art of command in military operations 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (1) , pp. 1-58  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ferris, John and Handel, Michael I.},
      title = {Clausewitz, intelligence, uncertainty and the art of command in military operations},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--58},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529508432286}
    }
    					
    Filby, P. William Bletchley park and Berkeley street 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (2) , pp. 272-284  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Filby, P. William},
      title = {Bletchley park and Berkeley street},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {2},
      pages = {272--284},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528808431945}
    }
    					
    Filby, P. W. Floradora and a Unique Break into One-Time Pad ciphers 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (3) , pp. 408-422  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Filby, P. W.},
      title = {Floradora and a Unique Break into One-Time Pad ciphers},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {3},
      pages = {408--422},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432310}
    }
    					
    Fischer, Benjamin The Hitler archive … at last 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (4) , pp. 238-247  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fischer, Benjamin},
      title = {The Hitler archive … at last},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {4},
      pages = {238--247},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306350}
    }
    					
    Fischer, Beth A. Perception, intelligence errors, and the Cuban missile crisis 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (3) , pp. 150-172  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fischer, Beth A.},
      title = {Perception, intelligence errors, and the Cuban missile crisis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {3},
      pages = {150--172},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432497}
    }
    					
    Fischer, Benjamin B. The 1980s Soviet War scare: New evidence from East German documents 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (3) , pp. 186-197  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fischer, Benjamin B.},
      title = {The 1980s Soviet War scare: New evidence from East German documents},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {3},
      pages = {186--197},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529908432558}
    }
    					
    Fischer, Benjamin B. Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet War Scare: The Untold Story 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (1) , pp. 75-92  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract During the Soviet war scare of the 1980s, British intelligence shared vital information from KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky with its American partners. The US intelligence community, however, was suspicious of the message and the messenger, dismissing Soviet "war talk" as disinformation. Some officials even believed that the British had tweaked their reports to influence US policy. President Ronald Reagan, however, on the advice of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, listened to Gordievsky rather than his intelligence advisors. The war scare had a profound influence on Reagan's thinking about nuclear war, Kremlin fears, and Soviet-American relations that led him to seek a new détente with Moscow and the end of the Cold War through diplomacy rather than confrontation. Subsequent events and post-Cold War revelations vindicated Gordievsky. Reagan sought his advice on the eve of his first summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and later expressed his gratitude during a private meeting in the Oval Office.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fischer, Benjamin B.},
      title = {Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet War Scare: The Untold Story},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {1},
      pages = {75--92},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.621596}
    }
    					
    Fitch, Stephen D. The FBI library awareness program: An analysis 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (2) , pp. 101-111  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fitch, Stephen D.},
      title = {The FBI library awareness program: An analysis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {2},
      pages = {101--111},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529208432158}
    }
    					
    Fitzgerald, Michael & Richard Ned Lebow Iraq: The Mother of all intelligence failures 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (5) , pp. 884-909  
    article
    Abstract: The most important American intelligence failure in Iraq was the widespread belief among top administration officials that Saddam could be overthrown at little cost and successfully replaced by a pro-American regime. We trace the causes of these and related intelligence failures to the administration's hubris. It led the Secretary of Defense and Vice President - the men most responsible for the Iraq decisions - to formulate unrealistic expectations about America's ability to impose its will in the Middle East and to rig the feedback networks in the military and intelligence communities to provide them with confirming estimates while downplaying discrepant information.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fitzgerald, Michael and Lebow, Richard Ned},
      title = {Iraq: The Mother of all intelligence failures},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {5},
      pages = {884--909},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600957811}
    }
    					
    Foglesong, David S. Xenophon Kalamatiano: An American spy in revolutionary Russia? 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (1) , pp. 154-195  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Foglesong, David S.},
      title = {Xenophon Kalamatiano: An American spy in revolutionary Russia?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {154--195},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529108432095}
    }
    					
    Foot, M. R. D. Uses and abuses of intelligence 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (1) , pp. 184-190  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Foot, M. R. D.},
      title = {Uses and abuses of intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {1},
      pages = {184--190},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431882}
    }
    					
    Foot, M. R. D. The death of General Sikorski 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (3) , pp. 457-458  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Foot, M. R. D.},
      title = {The death of General Sikorski},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {3},
      pages = {457--458},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600750703}
    }
    					
    Foot, M. R. D. The Dutch Affair 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (2) , pp. 341-343  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Foot, M. R. D.},
      title = {The Dutch Affair},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {2},
      pages = {341--343},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500134115}
    }
    					
    Foot, M. R. D. Obituary for Louis de Jong 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (3) , pp. 468-469  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Foot, M. R. D.},
      title = {Obituary for Louis de Jong},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {3},
      pages = {468--469},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600750810}
    }
    					
    Footitt, Hilary Another Missing Dimension? Foreign Languages in World War II Intelligence 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (3) , pp. 271-289  
    article
    Abstract: This article argues that foreign languages are another part of the "missing dimension" of intelligence. By examining the role of linguists in Y stations and at Bletchley Park in the Second World War, the article explores the institutional language policies developed for intelligence, and the working practices of those with foreign language skills. The article suggests that certain issues raised by this case study might be usefully examined in other intelligence contexts: the ways in which foreign language requirements are officially represented, the problematics of foreignness for recruiters, the status and identities of language workers, and the implications of professional translation practice within an intelligence environment.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Footitt, Hilary},
      title = {Another Missing Dimension? Foreign Languages in World War II Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {3},
      pages = {271--289},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.489779}
    }
    					
    Ford, Douglas "A Conquerable Yet Resilient Foe": British Perceptions of the Imperial Japanese Army's Tactics on the India-Burma Front, September 1942 to Summer 1944 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (1) , pp. 65-90  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Britain's ability to discard its image of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) as an invincible enemy during the Burma campaign hinged upon two key factors. First, accurate assessments of the appropriate means to overcome the IJA not only hinged upon reliable intelligence, but of greater importance, the level of experience which the British-Indian army had in engaging its opponent. Second, the uncertainty was compounded by concerns arising from the IJA's ability to inflict considerable delays and casualties on its Allies counterparts, in spite of its shortage of modern weapons and lack of adequate training in their use. Apprehensions could not be lifted until Allied forces had proven themselves capable of conducting operations against the Japanese without incurring excessive losses. The Fourteenth Army's victories at Imphal and Kohima in June 1944 did not discredit the IJA's ability to pose a difficult challenge. The only reassurance which field commanders could draw was that their own forces had developed the skills necessary to undertake their quest to dislodge the IJA from its positions in Burma.
    Abstract Britain's ability to discard its image of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) as an invincible enemy during the Burma campaign hinged upon two key factors. First, accurate assessments of the appropriate means to overcome the IJA not only hinged upon reliable intelligence, but of greater importance, the level of experience which the British-Indian army had in engaging its opponent. Second, the uncertainty was compounded by concerns arising from the IJA's ability to inflict considerable delays and casualties on its Allies counterparts, in spite of its shortage of modern weapons and lack of adequate training in their use. Apprehensions could not be lifted until Allied forces had proven themselves capable of conducting operations against the Japanese without incurring excessive losses. The Fourteenth Army's victories at Imphal and Kohima in June 1944 did not discredit the IJA's ability to pose a difficult challenge. The only reassurance which field commanders could draw was that their own forces had developed the skills necessary to undertake their quest to dislodge the IJA from its positions in Burma.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ford, Douglas},
      title = {"A Conquerable Yet Resilient Foe": British Perceptions of the Imperial Japanese Army's Tactics on the India-Burma Front, September 1942 to Summer 1944},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {1},
      pages = {65--90},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520308559247}
    }
    					
    Ford, Douglas Dismantling the "Lesser Men" and "Supermen" Myths: US Intelligence on the Imperial Japanese Army after the Fall of the Philippines, Winter 1942 to Spring 1943 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (4) , pp. 542-573  
    article
    Abstract: During the opening stages of the Pacific War, between December 1941 and spring 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army appeared unstoppable. US forces in the Philippines, despite their efforts, could not hold out against the enemy advance, and by April the last vestiges of their resistance at Bataan and Corregidor became untenable. The intelligence obtained during the initial encounters provided the US defense establishment with undeniable reasons to conclude that Japanese ground forces possessed a high level of tactical skill, and assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army tended to exaggerate the latter's capabilities.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ford, Douglas},
      title = {Dismantling the "Lesser Men" and "Supermen" Myths: US Intelligence on the Imperial Japanese Army after the Fall of the Philippines, Winter 1942 to Spring 1943},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {4},
      pages = {542--573},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520903069496}
    }
    					
    Ford, Harold P. The US government's experience with intelligence analysis: Pluses and minuses 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (4) , pp. 34-53  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ford, Harold P.},
      title = {The US government's experience with intelligence analysis: Pluses and minuses},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {4},
      pages = {34--53},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432324}
    }
    					
    Ford, Ronnie E. Tet revisited: The strategy of the communist Vietnamese 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (2) , pp. 242-286  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ford, Ronnie E.},
      title = {Tet revisited: The strategy of the communist Vietnamese},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {2},
      pages = {242--286},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529408432249}
    }
    					
    Ford, Ronnie E. Secret army, secret war, recent disclosures and the Vietnam War: The significance of American 34 alpha and DESOTO operations with regard to the Tonkin Gulf resolution 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 364-373  
    article
    Abstract: Sedgwick Tourison, Secret Army, Secret War: Washington's Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995). Pp.xxiii + 389, 17 illus, biblio. index. $29.95. ISBN 1-55750-818-6.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ford, Ronnie E.},
      title = {Secret army, secret war, recent disclosures and the Vietnam War: The significance of American 34 alpha and DESOTO operations with regard to the Tonkin Gulf resolution},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {364--373},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432364}
    }
    					
    Ford, Ronnie E. Intelligence and the significance of Khe Sanh 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (1) , pp. 144-169  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ford, Ronnie E.},
      title = {Intelligence and the significance of Khe Sanh},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {1},
      pages = {144--169},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432290}
    }
    					
    Frank, Willard C. Politico-Military deception at Sea in the Spanish civil war, 1936-39 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (3) , pp. 84-112  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Frank, Willard C.},
      title = {Politico-Military deception at Sea in the Spanish civil war, 1936-39},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {3},
      pages = {84--112},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432064}
    }
    					
    Fraser, Andrew Architecture of a broken dream: The CIA and Guatemala, 1952-54 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (3) , pp. 486-508  
    article
    Abstract: In 1954, the United States launched a coup against Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. In 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State declassified new documents pertaining to the fall of the Arbenz regime. In this paper I argue that although the new information does not substantially alter the overall debate about the causes and consequences of the action, it offers a portrait of the operation which is richer and more complex than what has been seen before. The documents reveal details of the operation which have been hidden for half a century. They illustrate how the mission faltered under the weight of security breaches and miscommunications. They also offer a fascinating glimpse at a shadowy figure in the plot to topple the Arbenz regime who has until now largely evaded the public record. In the end the documents affirm what many scholars had previously concluded, that at the end of the day it was the actions of the Guatemalan Army that made the difference between victory and defeat in the crusade to oust a democratically elected head of state.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fraser, Andrew},
      title = {Architecture of a broken dream: The CIA and Guatemala, 1952-54},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {3},
      pages = {486--508},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500269010}
    }
    					
    Freedman, Lawrence Intelligence operations in the Falklands 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (3) , pp. 309-335  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Freedman, Lawrence},
      title = {Intelligence operations in the Falklands},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {3},
      pages = {309--335},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528608431860}
    }
    					
    Freedman, Lawrence The CIA and the soviet threat: The politicization of estimates, 1966-1977 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (1) , pp. 122-142  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Freedman, Lawrence},
      title = {The CIA and the soviet threat: The politicization of estimates, 1966-1977},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {122--142},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432402}
    }
    					
    Freedman, Lawrence [Book review] "Powerful intelligence" 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (2) , pp. 198-202  
    article
    Abstract: Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press for RIIA 1996). Pp.414, 19 figures, further reading, index. £16.95 (paper). ISBN 0-521-56636-3.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Freedman, Lawrence},
      title = {[Book review] "Powerful intelligence"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {2},
      pages = {198--202},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432423}
    }
    					
    Freedman, Lawrence The politics of warning: Terrorism and risk communication 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (3) , pp. 379-418  
    article
    Abstract: The problem of risk communication in the context of imperfect intelligence regarding a prospective, rather than actual, terrorist attack is examined in order to assess recommendations for precise guidance for the public. Particular problems are noted with the iterative quality of risk communications about terrorism, as they allow the terrorists to change their behaviour, the difficulty of offering tactical warning without a prior strategic analysis, and the tendency to focus on the vulnerabilities of a society rather than the intent of the terrorists. These issues are assessed through a case study of the Bali attacks of 2002, before an analysis of the American experience following the attacks of 9/11. This experience confirms the difficulties of attempting to convey risks to the public by altering public alert levels.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Freedman, Lawrence},
      title = {The politics of warning: Terrorism and risk communication},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {3},
      pages = {379--418},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520500281502}
    }
    					
    Freeman, Peter MI1(b) and the origins of British diplomatic cryptanalysis 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (2) , pp. 206-228  
    article
    Abstract: The War Office's First World War cryptanalytic bureau MI1(b) has been severely overshadowed by its more glamorous equivalent in the Admiralty, "Room 40". In particular its diplomatic decryption work has gone completely unnoticed; yet this was its main activity, and it contributed more than did Room 40 to their common successor, the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). This article, drawing on the past decade's releases of GC&CS archives, traces the development of MI1(b)'s diplomatic work, disentangles its achievements from those of its better-known naval colleague, describes how the two organizations were merged to become GC&CS, and suggests why MI1(b)'s achievements were so quickly forgotten.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Freeman, Peter},
      title = {MI1(b) and the origins of British diplomatic cryptanalysis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {2},
      pages = {206--228},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701553550}
    }
    					
    French, David Watching the allies: British intelligence and the French mutinies of 1917 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (3) , pp. 573-592  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {French, David},
      title = {Watching the allies: British intelligence and the French mutinies of 1917},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {3},
      pages = {573--592},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432118}
    }
    					
    Friedman, Hal M. The "Bear" in the Pacific? US intelligence perceptions of Soviet strategic power projection in the Pacific Basin and East Asia, 1945-1947 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (4) , pp. 75-101  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Friedman, Hal M.},
      title = {The "Bear" in the Pacific? US intelligence perceptions of Soviet strategic power projection in the Pacific Basin and East Asia, 1945-1947},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {4},
      pages = {75--101},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432449}
    }
    					
    Friedman, Jeffrey A. & Richard Zeckhauser Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (6) , pp. 824-847  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article addresses the challenge of managing uncertainty when producing estimative intelligence. Much of the theory and practice of estimative intelligence aims to eliminate or reduce uncertainty, but this is often impossible or infeasible. This article instead argues that the goal of estimative intelligence should be to assess uncertainty. By drawing on a body of nearly 400 declassified National Intelligence Estimates as well as prominent texts on analytic tradecraft, this article argues that current tradecraft methods attempt to eliminate uncertainty in ways that can impede the accuracy, clarity, and utility of estimative intelligence. By contrast, a focus on assessing uncertainty suggests solutions to these problems and provides a promising analytic framework for thinking about estimative intelligence in general.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Friedman, Jeffrey A. and Zeckhauser, Richard},
      title = {Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {6},
      pages = {824--847},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.708275}
    }
    					
    Friedman, Jeffrey A. & Richard Zeckhauser Handling and Mishandling Estimative Probability: Likelihood, Confidence, and the Search for Bin Laden 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (1) , pp. 77-99  
    article
    Abstract: In a series of reports and meetings in Spring 2011, intelligence analysts and officials debated the chances that Osama bin Laden was living in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Estimates ranged from a low of 30 or 40 per cent to a high of 95 per cent. President Obama stated that he found this discussion confusing, even misleading. Motivated by that experience, and by broader debates about intelligence analysis, this article examines the conceptual foundations of expressing and interpreting estimative probability. It explains why a range of probabilities can always be condensed into a single point estimate that is clearer (but logically no different) than standard intelligence reporting, and why assessments of confidence are most useful when they indicate the extent to which estimative probabilities might shift in response to newly gathered information.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Friedman, Jeffrey A. and Zeckhauser, Richard},
      title = {Handling and Mishandling Estimative Probability: Likelihood, Confidence, and the Search for Bin Laden},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {77--99},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.885202}
    }
    					
    Fripp, Will Takedown: Inside the Hunt for Al Qaeda 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 595-597  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fripp, Will},
      title = {Takedown: Inside the Hunt for Al Qaeda},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {595--597},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.913392}
    }
    					
    Fripp, Will [Book review] Peter Finn and Petra Couvée, "The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle Over a Forbidden Book", 2014 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (5) , pp. 760-763  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fripp, Will},
      title = {[Book review] Peter Finn and Petra Couvée, "The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle Over a Forbidden Book", 2014},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {5},
      pages = {760--763},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.955671}
    }
    					
    Fry, Michael Graham The uses of intelligence: The United Nations confronts the United States in the Lebanon crisis, 1958 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (1) , pp. 59-91  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fry, Michael Graham},
      title = {The uses of intelligence: The United Nations confronts the United States in the Lebanon crisis, 1958},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {1},
      pages = {59--91},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432287}
    }
    					
    Fry, Michael G. & Miles Hochstein Epistemic communities: Intelligence studies and international relations 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (3) , pp. 14-28  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fry, Michael G. and Hochstein, Miles},
      title = {Epistemic communities: Intelligence studies and international relations},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {3},
      pages = {14--28},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529308432212}
    }
    					
    Fursenko, Aleksandr & Timothy Naftali Soviet intelligence and the Cuban missile crisis 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (3) , pp. 64-87  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Fursenko, Aleksandr and Naftali, Timothy},
      title = {Soviet intelligence and the Cuban missile crisis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {3},
      pages = {64--87},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432494}
    }
    					
    Gallagher, Michael J. Intelligence and National Security Strategy: Reexamining Project Solarium 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 461-485  
    article
    Abstract: This article reexamines President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1953 competitive review of Cold War strategy known as Project Solarium. It argues intelligence played a key role in this exercise and in the design of NSC 162/2, Eisenhower's "New Look". Intelligence professionals were involved in all aspects of Project Solarium. Intelligence products provided a common baseline of analysis while stimulating debate. The process - a transparent system of structured deliberation among experts - encouraged a thorough consideration of intelligence and productive dissent. These findings underscore the need for a broader reexamination of the role of intelligence in the design of national security strategy.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gallagher, Michael J.},
      title = {Intelligence and National Security Strategy: Reexamining Project Solarium},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {461--485},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.885203}
    }
    					
    Ganser, Daniele The British secret service in neutral Switzerland: An unfinished debate on NATO's cold war stay-behind armies 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (4) , pp. 553-580  
    article
    Abstract: In 1990, the existence of a secret anti-Communist stay-behind army in Italy, codenamed "Gladio" and linked to NATO, was revealed. Subsequently, similar stay-behind armies were discovered in all NATO countries in Western Europe. Based on parliamentary and governmental reports, oral history, and investigative journalism, the essay argues that neutral Switzerland also operated a stay-behind army. It explores the role of the British secret service and the reactions of the British and the Swiss governments to the discovery of the network and investigates whether the Swiss stay-behind army, despite Swiss neutrality, was integrated into the International NATO stay-behind network.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ganser, Daniele},
      title = {The British secret service in neutral Switzerland: An unfinished debate on NATO's cold war stay-behind armies},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {4},
      pages = {553--580},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520500425083}
    }
    					
    Ganser, Daniele The CIA in Western Europe and the abuse of human rights 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (5) , pp. 760-781  
    article
    Abstract: Covert action by the CIA and other intelligence services is designed to remain secret. Academics and the public at large therefore to this very day face great difficulties in answering two specific questions: What covert action has the CIA carried out in Europe during its almost 60 years of existence? Did CIA covert action violate human rights in Europe? Some operations, however, have become known and are now in the public research domain. Among them are the clandestine anti-communist stay-behind networks set up by the CIA in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. As the details of the operation emerge only gradually some sources suggest that the stay-behind network was linked to terrorist groups, adding further interest to this largely unknown research subject at a time when the so called "war on terrorism" has forced academics to examine present and historical terrorism data once again.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ganser, Daniele},
      title = {The CIA in Western Europe and the abuse of human rights},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {5},
      pages = {760--781},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600957712}
    }
    					
    Gardiner, L. Keith Squaring the circle: Dealing with intelligence-policy breakdowns 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (1) , pp. 141-153  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gardiner, L. Keith},
      title = {Squaring the circle: Dealing with intelligence-policy breakdowns},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {141--153},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432094}
    }
    					
    Garthoff, Raymond L. A commentary on Merom's methodology 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (3) , pp. 146-153  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Garthoff, Raymond L.},
      title = {A commentary on Merom's methodology},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {3},
      pages = {146--153},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432621}
    }
    					
    Garthoff, Raymond L. US intelligence in the Cuban missile crisis 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (3) , pp. 18-63  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Garthoff, Raymond L.},
      title = {US intelligence in the Cuban missile crisis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {3},
      pages = {18--63},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432493}
    }
    					
    Garthoff, Raymond L. The KGB reports to Gorbachev 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 224-244  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Garthoff, Raymond L.},
      title = {The KGB reports to Gorbachev},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {224--244},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432354}
    }
    					
    Garthoff, Raymond L. Intelligence aspects of cold war scientific exchanges: US-USSR atomic energy exchange visits in 1959 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (1) , pp. 1-13  
    article
    Abstract: Scientific exchange visits between the United States (and other Western countries) and the Soviet Union were inaugurated in the late 1950s, both for their intrinsic value, and for more broad political purposes. Such exchanges, also involved risks - and opportunities — for intelligence exploitation by both sides. In this article, drawing on previously classified records, the author describes his experience as the CIA officer responsible for intelligence exploitation of an important early exchange of visits of US and Soviet atomic energy delegations, while serving under cover as the interpreter for the two delegations.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Garthoff, Raymond L.},
      title = {Intelligence aspects of cold war scientific exchanges: US-USSR atomic energy exchange visits in 1959},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--13},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432585}
    }
    					
    Garthoff, Raymond L. Intelligence aspects of early cold war summitry (1959-60) 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (3) , pp. 1-22  
    article
    Abstract: The author recounts, on the basis of personal experience as the responsible CIA officer and using previously classified documentation, intelligence aspects of summit-level visits of Vice President Richard Nixon to the Soviet Union and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to the United States in 1959, and the planned but aborted visit of President Dwight Eisenhower to the Soviet Union in 1960. He discusses both the role of intelligence in support of US in policymakers in these encounters, and the exploitation of opportunities to acquire intelligence information.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Garthoff, Raymond L.},
      title = {Intelligence aspects of early cold war summitry (1959-60)},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {3},
      pages = {1--22},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432550}
    }
    					
    Gartner, Scott Sigmund All Mistakes Are Not Equal: Intelligence Errors and National Security 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (5) , pp. 634-654  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Strategic situations create motivational biases that help to predict the type of errors intelligence communities are more likely to commit (Type I errors predict behavior never observed, while Type II errors fail to predict behavior later observed). When the dangers of inaction are low and the cost of action high, the intelligence community is more likely to fail to predict threats (Type II error). If the dangers of inaction are high and the costs of military action low, it is more likely to predict mistakenly threats never observed (Type I error). Studies of US and Israeli decision-making and analyses of two new experimental studies support this theory. The key is to recognize the incentives for error and to develop systems that, at worst, lead to intelligence errors (mistakes consistent with a state's national security needs) and not intelligence failures (errors contrary to national security requirements).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gartner, Scott Sigmund},
      title = {All Mistakes Are Not Equal: Intelligence Errors and National Security},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {5},
      pages = {634--654},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.701436}
    }
    					
    Gazit, Shlomo Intelligence estimates and the decision-maker 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (3) , pp. 261-287  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gazit, Shlomo},
      title = {Intelligence estimates and the decision-maker},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {3},
      pages = {261--287},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431963}
    }
    					
    Gazit, Shlomo Intelligence and the peace process in Israel 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (3) , pp. 35-66  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gazit, Shlomo},
      title = {Intelligence and the peace process in Israel},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {3},
      pages = {35--66},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432430}
    }
    					
    Gelber, Harry G. The hunt for spies: Another inside story 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (2) , pp. 385-400  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gelber, Harry G.},
      title = {The hunt for spies: Another inside story},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {2},
      pages = {385--400},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432004}
    }
    					
    Gelber, Yoav The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence's Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt's Alleged Intention to Open War in May 1973 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (4) , pp. 1-27  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article attempts to contradict the commonly accepted assumption in Israel and the West that in April-May 1973 Egypt and Syria were about to open war against Israel and were deterred by a series of measures that Israel took, including partial mobilization of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) reserves. The article ventures to separate the apologetics and (flawed) memories from the information provided by the now available documentary evidence. After presenting the prevailing Israeli version, the article analyses the memoirs on the Egyptian side about the preparations for war and determining D-Day, to refute this version. Based on the contemporary protocols of government and general staff meetings and political-military consultations, it argues that the Israeli government, general staff and intelligence community did not regard at the time the outbreak of war as an imminent threat. The steps they took concerned the medium and long run, and were irrelevant in the short run. Similarly, the mobilization of reserves was not connected to the alarm of war but to the Day of Independence parade in Jerusalem. The article claims on the basis of these protocols that the reason for the excitement was the collapse of the Israeli intelligence"s conception that Egypt would not resume hostilities before it could hit at the interior of Israel, and Syria would not go to war without Egypt. The arrival of Libyan Mirages and Iraqi Hunters to Egypt in April fulfilled this condition and the possibility of war could not be dismissed offhand. Israel responded to the new situation by the book. It shared the information and analysis with the White House and the CIA; it refreshed the IDF planning down to the divisional level and the IDF general staff held a series of thorough discussions to estimate the situation. The bottom line of this process was a government directive to the IDF to prepare for war at the end of the summer of 1973 (as it actually happened). In the latter portion of the article I explain why this directive was ignored when it was put to test in late September and early October of 1973.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gelber, Yoav},
      title = {The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence's Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt's Alleged Intention to Open War in May 1973},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {4},
      pages = {1--27},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.699289}
    }
    					
    Gentile, Col. Gian [Book review] James H. Lebovic, "The Limits of U.S. Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (5) , pp. 765-766  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gentile, Col. Gian},
      title = {[Book review] James H. Lebovic, "The Limits of U.S. Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {5},
      pages = {765--766},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.755042}
    }
    					
    Gentry, John A. Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (1) , pp. 50-75  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Critics of US intelligence focus extensively on the alleged inability and unwillingness of intelligence agencies to learn and adapt. Analysis of eight counterinsurgency wars suggests instead that external factors largely influence the intelligence-related performance of whole governments, including organizational structures, unity of effort and command, adequacy of resources, and leadership quality. Assessment of the performance of US intelligence since 9/11 indicates that the same variables influence the performance of US intelligence, suggesting that the US intelligence reform debate focuses too narrowly and on the wrong factors.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gentry, John A.},
      title = {Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {1},
      pages = {50--75},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684521003588112}
    }
    					
    Gentry, John A. Intelligence analyst/manager relations at the CIA 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (4) , pp. 133-146  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gentry, John A.},
      title = {Intelligence analyst/manager relations at the CIA},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {4},
      pages = {133--146},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432329}
    }
    					
    Gentry, John A. & David E. Spencer Colombia's FARC: A Portrait of Insurgent Intelligence 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (4) , pp. 453-478  
    article
    Abstract: The literature on intelligence little describes or comparatively analyzes the intelligence services of insurgent groups. This article partially fills the gap by assessing the intelligence activities of FARC - the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. FARC intelligence displays similarities to, as well as sharp differences from, the intelligence activities of other insurgent groups and established states. Like FARC as a whole, FARC intelligence is decentralized. Its strength is its focus on tactical military intelligence. Collection on strategic political issues, analysis, and counterintelligence are relatively weak. FARC's intelligence weaknesses limit its prospects for strategic success and its intelligence-related vulnerabilities offer the Colombian government opportunities to exploit.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gentry, John A. and Spencer, David E.},
      title = {Colombia's FARC: A Portrait of Insurgent Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {4},
      pages = {453--478},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.537024}
    }
    					
    George, Roger Zane [Book review] Robert Jervis, "Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (5) , pp. 761-765  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {George, Roger Zane},
      title = {[Book review] Robert Jervis, "Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {5},
      pages = {761--765},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.755041}
    }
    					
    George, Roger Z. Reflections on CIA Analysis: Is it Finished? 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (1) , pp. 72-81  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Despite the CIA's improved analytical tradecraft and increased resources, the future of its analytic mission remains in doubt. Post-9/11 improvements have been coupled with a continued focus on current intelligence priorities that minimize attention to the development of strategic research and deeper knowledge. Simply increasing the number of analysts has not produced deeper expertise. The CIA's traditional recruitment and training methods, as well as its rewards and promotion system, encourage analysts to avoid concentrating on any single area of regional or functional expertise in favor of moving around the agency to build a successful career. A continued reliance on risk-avoidance security practices also restricts analysts' contact with non-government and foreign experts who often have needed political and cultural knowledge of intelligence topics. To rectify these inadequacies, the CIA's analytic directorate needs to develop incentives for analysts who wish to develop more strategic analysis and remove the security barriers to closer collaboration with experts outside the US government. Developing cross-agency analytic collaboration would also maximize expertise and would benefit from intelligence community-wide training programs similar to what the US military does at its senior service colleges.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {George, Roger Z.},
      title = {Reflections on CIA Analysis: Is it Finished?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {1},
      pages = {72--81},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.556360}
    }
    					
    Gienow-Hecht, Jessica "How good are we?" culture and the Cold War 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (2) , pp. 269-282  
    article
    Abstract: This analysis addresses the question of how different levels of culture were used in the Cold War by political and civil institutions to influence public opinion in Western Europe, and, more specifically, in Germany. It illuminates how what are commonly defined as "cultural exports" or "cultural propaganda" refer to a highly heterogeneous and complex group of governmental and non-governmental agents, actions and motivations. While governmental exports focused increasingly on highbrow products such as book and art exhibits, manifestations of popular culture were only admitted if they revealed a specific educational purpose. It can be argued that high culture provided the basis for much Cold War propaganda as much as the Cold War manipulated representations of high culture. Competing against communist claims that America had no high culture, US Cold War programs invoked previous instances of high cultural exchange, particularly with Germany. In doing so, they sealed and politicized a cultural partnership that had been in existence for almost 100 years.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gienow-Hecht, Jessica},
      title = {"How good are we?" culture and the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {2},
      pages = {269--282},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306850}
    }
    					
    Gill, David W. J. Harry Pirie-Gordon: Historical research, journalism and intelligence gathering in the Eastern Mediterranean (1908-18) 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (6) , pp. 1045-1059  
    article
    Abstract: British scholars were active in the Levant during the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War. Harry Pirie-Gordon toured medieval castles in the region during the spring of 1908 under the auspices of the British School at Athens; T.E. Lawrence used his maps in the following year. Pirie-Gordon continued to travel widely in the Near East as a member of the Foreign Department of The Times and was involved with the survey of the Syrian coastline around Alexandretta. He was commissioned in the RNVR in 1914 and took part in the raid by HMS Doris on Alexandretta. Pirie-Gordon served in an intelligence capacity at Gallipoli before returning to Cairo to work with David Hogarth. In 1916 he was involved with the occupation of Makronisi (Long Island) in the Gulf of Smyrna. Later that year he took charge of the EMSIB operation at Salonica until its purge in early 1917. Pirie-Gordon returned to the Arab Bureau in Cairo and took part in the Palestine campaign.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gill, David W. J.},
      title = {Harry Pirie-Gordon: Historical research, journalism and intelligence gathering in the Eastern Mediterranean (1908-18)},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {6},
      pages = {1045--1059},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520601046382}
    }
    					
    Gill, Paul [Book review] Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, "Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (1) , pp. 136-138  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gill, Paul},
      title = {[Book review] Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, "Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {1},
      pages = {136--138},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.713795}
    }
    					
    Gill, Peter Symbolic or real? The impact of the Canadian security intelligence review committee, 1984-88 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (3) , pp. 550-575  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gill, Peter},
      title = {Symbolic or real? The impact of the Canadian security intelligence review committee, 1984-88},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {550--575},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908432016}
    }
    					
    Gill, Peter Intelligence, Threat, Risk and the Challenge of Oversight 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (2) , pp. 206-222  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Intelligence studies has traditionally talked in terms of "threats" though the idea of "risk" has now entered its language, as it has so many other areas of policy. The key distinction remains the notion of threat of intentional action to cause harm: this is the central preoccupation of intelligence agencies that would not normally consider risks that might arise from, say, the unintended outcomes of accidents or interrupted supplies of resources. Another distinction is that intelligence is normally preoccupied with increasing knowledge in conditions of ignorance or uncertainty, while risk analysis is more likely to be quantifiable. The perception of a "new terrorism" has led to the importation of the "precautionary principle" to intelligence with potentially dangerous consequences for democracy. This requires enhanced thinking and practice with respect to the oversight of intelligence activities, especially in developing security networks.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gill, Peter},
      title = {Intelligence, Threat, Risk and the Challenge of Oversight},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {2},
      pages = {206--222},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.661643}
    }
    					
    Gill, Peter Evaluating intelligence oversight committees: The UK Intelligence and Security Committee and the "war on terror" 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (1) , pp. 14-37  
    article
    Abstract: After a brief introduction giving a short history of legislative oversight, a number of criteria by which committees can be evaluated are enumerated, including their mandate, membership, resources and access to information. The development of parliamentary oversight in the UK culminating in the creation of the Intelligence and Security Committee in 1994 is outlined. Its performance between 2001 and 2006 is described and assessed. It is concluded that, while it has made some appropriate criticisms of the agencies, it can be faulted in that both the style and substance of its reports are essentially managerialist and have paid inadequate attention to questions of human rights and the need for public education.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gill, Peter},
      title = {Evaluating intelligence oversight committees: The UK Intelligence and Security Committee and the "war on terror"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {1},
      pages = {14--37},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701200756}
    }
    					
    Gill, Peter Reasserting control: Recent changes in the oversight of the UK intelligence community 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 313-331  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gill, Peter},
      title = {Reasserting control: Recent changes in the oversight of the UK intelligence community},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {313--331},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529608432359}
    }
    					
    Gill, Peter Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from 'Liddism' to 'Drainism' 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (3) , pp. 467-489  
    article
    Abstract: Significant shifts have been underway in security intelligence agencies and processes since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Whereas the previous quarter of a century had seen a considerable democratization of intelligence, the article examines whether UK and US government responses risk the re-creation of 'security states'. Changes since 9/11 in law, doctrine, the intelligence process - targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action - and oversight are considered and it is concluded that there is a danger of the rebirth of independent security states.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gill, Peter},
      title = {Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from 'Liddism' to 'Drainism'},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {3},
      pages = {467--489},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0268452042000316241}
    }
    					
    Gill, Peter Security Intelligence and Human Rights: Illuminating the "Heart of Darkness"? 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (1) , pp. 78-102  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Following some democratization of intelligence in the 1990s, the prosecution of the "war on terror" since 9/11 has apparently reinforced the incompatibility of secret intelligence and respect for human rights. The primary reason for this is the changed perception of security risks in the context of a "new" terrorism. The roles of law, rights and ethics in intelligence are discussed with reference to some of the more controversial intelligence activities: informers, interrogation, intelligence sharing, rendition and covert action. Re-invigorated oversight is necessary to protect human rights without hindering agencies' ability to maintain pubic safety.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gill, Peter},
      title = {Security Intelligence and Human Rights: Illuminating the "Heart of Darkness"?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {1},
      pages = {78--102},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520902756929}
    }
    					
    Ginor, Isabella & Gideon Remez Too Little, Too Late: The CIA and US Counteraction of the Soviet Initiative in the Six-Day War, 1967 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (2-3) , pp. 291-312  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract The authors' previous research has established that the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War resulted from a deliberate Soviet plan to provoke Israel into a pre-emptive strike, which would legitimize and trigger a massive Soviet military intervention to aid an Egyptian-Syrian counteroffensive. However, US documents released until recently provided no evidence that the American intelligence community, and particularly the CIA, detected this threat or informed the political leadership about it - even though some indications were picked up at the field level. A newly declassified, retrospective report appears for the first time to show that there was awareness of major components of the Soviet operation (preparations for a naval landing and parachute drop). But closer scrutiny finds that this report reflects Soviet propaganda more than factual intelligence - thus further tarnishing what has hitherto been held as an outstanding achievement for the Agency and its chief.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Ginor, Isabella and Remez, Gideon},
      title = {Too Little, Too Late: The CIA and US Counteraction of the Soviet Initiative in the Six-Day War, 1967},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {291--312},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.559320}
    }
    					
    Gladman, Brad W. Air power and intelligence in the western desert campaign, 1940-43 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (4) , pp. 144-162  
    article
    Abstract: During the fighting in the Western Desert of North Africa, the Royal Air Force conducted a land-based interdiction campaign against Axis motorized transport supply columns which was guided by intelligence. It was this campaign, and not the Ultra-driven sea interdiction campaign, which was responsible for the destruction of the bulk of Axis supply. The impact of land-based interdiction totally destroyed the morale and fighting ability of the Axis forces at El Alamein in late 1942, and set a pattern for operations which was replayed with success throughout the remainder of the war.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gladman, Brad W.},
      title = {Air power and intelligence in the western desert campaign, 1940-43},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {144--162},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432508}
    }
    					
    Gladwin, Lee A. Cautious collaborators: The struggle for Anglo-American cryptanalytic co-operation 1940-43 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (1) , pp. 119-145  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gladwin, Lee A.},
      title = {Cautious collaborators: The struggle for Anglo-American cryptanalytic co-operation 1940-43},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {1},
      pages = {119--145},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432526}
    }
    					
    Glantz, David M. Soviet operational intelligence in the Kursk operation, July 1943 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (1) , pp. 5-49  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Glantz, David M.},
      title = {Soviet operational intelligence in the Kursk operation, July 1943},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {1},
      pages = {5--49},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529008432034}
    }
    					
    Glantz, David M. The Red mask: The nature and legacy of Soviet military deception in the Second World War 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (3) , pp. 175-259  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Glantz, David M.},
      title = {The Red mask: The nature and legacy of Soviet military deception in the Second World War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {3},
      pages = {175--259},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431907}
    }
    					
    Gleditsch, Nils Petter The Treholt case: A review of the literature 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (3) , pp. 529-538  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gleditsch, Nils Petter},
      title = {The Treholt case: A review of the literature},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {3},
      pages = {529--538},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432318}
    }
    					
    Glees, Anthony War crimes: The security and intelligence dimension 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (3) , pp. 242-267  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Glees, Anthony},
      title = {War crimes: The security and intelligence dimension},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {3},
      pages = {242--267},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529208432167}
    }
    					
    Glees, Anthony [Book review] John C. Schmeidel, "Stasi: Shield and Sword of the Party" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (1) , pp. 165-166  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Glees, Anthony},
      title = {[Book review] John C. Schmeidel, "Stasi: Shield and Sword of the Party"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {1},
      pages = {165--166},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628530}
    }
    					
    Glees, Anthony & Philip H. J. Davies Intelligence, Iraq and the limits of legislative accountability during political crisis 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (5) , pp. 848-883  
    article
    Abstract: This article argues that there is an inherent tension in legislative intelligence oversight bodies between their responsibility to the voters who elect them and their political parties who select them to run for office. At a time of acute political crisis, the partisan interests of the legislators who sit on oversight bodies may override their other responsibilities. This can result in distorted and misleading investigations and reports. This hypothesis is examined against the evidence of precisely such a mode of failure in both the British and American legislative inquiries into intelligence on Iraqi "weapons of mass destruction". The authors conclude that any effective oversight must include a range of parallel legislative, judicial, executive and independent mechanisms to try and minimize the inherent weaknesses in each oversight model.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Glees, Anthony and Davies, Philip H. J.},
      title = {Intelligence, Iraq and the limits of legislative accountability during political crisis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {5},
      pages = {848--883},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600957787}
    }
    					
    Goldberg, Robert Alan "Who Profited from the Crime?" Intelligence Failure, Conspiracy Theories and the Case of September 11 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (2) , pp. 249-261  
    article
    Abstract: The study of intelligence is often inward-looking. Scholars focus upon the means of gathering, evaluating, and distributing information with subsequent evaluation of its impact on decision making. Institution-based analysis ignores the role that the intelligence craft plays in the broader social and political context. This is apparent in the case of intelligence failures which reach beyond government to influence public opinion and ultimately the ability of authorities to mobilise support and govern. In the wake of failure, competing elites contest for power with conspiratorial interpretations of events that provide psychological comfort by offering explanations for events, targeting culprits, and fixing blame. This essay considers the intelligence failure of September 11, 2001, and outlines the conspiracy theories of left and right raised in its wake. Among those charged were the usual suspects - Zionists, the anti-Christ, advocates of a New World Order, and members of the military-industrial complex. In response, American government authorities validated their opponents' plot-making by defending themselves with their own cries of conspiracy. Heightened government secrecy, efforts to intensify surveillance, and the rhetoric of fear deepened the intrigue. In such a culture of conspiracy, charges of subversion bring only short-run gain. Public faith in institutions is eroded and paranoia becomes the conventional wisdom.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goldberg, Robert Alan},
      title = {"Who Profited from the Crime?" Intelligence Failure, Conspiracy Theories and the Case of September 11},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {2},
      pages = {249--261},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302985}
    }
    					
    Goldstein, Cora The control of visual representation: American art policy in occupied Germany, 1945-1949 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (2) , pp. 283-299  
    article
    Abstract: The development of the fine arts in post-war West Germany was influenced by the Office of Military Government for Germany, US (OMGUS). In mid-1946, a small group of OMGUS officers proposed the development of a fine arts policy aimed at neutralizing the Soviet cultural offensive. They were also interested in overcoming the cultural isolationism inherited from the Third Reich, and in strengthening the link between Western Germany and the democratic West. In 1947 the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Branch (MFA&A) of OMGUS began to develop an active fine arts policy. Its officers organized art exhibitions, provided exhibition space, established art contests, invited international speakers to lecture on art, created art appreciation groups, purchased work by German artists, channeled funds to German artists, and connected German artists with American museums, universities, and art patrons. Formal and informal, overt and covert networks were established to develop German-American artistic relations in the context of a cultural policy emphasizing collaboration.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goldstein, Cora},
      title = {The control of visual representation: American art policy in occupied Germany, 1945-1949},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {2},
      pages = {283--299},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306860}
    }
    					
    Gonçalves, Joanisval Brito The Spies Who Came from the Tropics: Intelligence Services and Democracy in Brazil 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (4) , pp. 581-599  
    article
    Abstract: Despite the emergence of Brazil as a global power, little is known about its security and intelligence services and the way they are seen by Brazilian society. This article analyzes the Brazilian perception of the role of its intelligence services and the relationship between the intelligence community (IC) and the decision makers. The historical background of intelligence in Brazil and a general overview of the Brazilian IC after the reestablishment of democracy are presented, as well as the general mechanisms of control and accountability of the secret services. Finally, there is consideration of some concerns on reforming the intelligence sector and its control and oversight apparatus.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gonçalves, Joanisval Brito},
      title = {The Spies Who Came from the Tropics: Intelligence Services and Democracy in Brazil},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {4},
      pages = {581--599},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.915178}
    }
    					
    Gooch, John Major Mundey, Miss Dwyer and the dog: An episode in passport control 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (2) , pp. 322-325  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gooch, John},
      title = {Major Mundey, Miss Dwyer and the dog: An episode in passport control},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {2},
      pages = {322--325},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431948}
    }
    					
    Goodman, Allan E. The future of US intelligence 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (4) , pp. 645-656  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goodman, Allan E.},
      title = {The future of US intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {4},
      pages = {645--656},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432384}
    }
    					
    Goodman, Allan E. Shifting paradigms and shifting gears: A perspective on why there is no post-cold war intelligence agenda 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (4) , pp. 3-9  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goodman, Allan E.},
      title = {Shifting paradigms and shifting gears: A perspective on why there is no post-cold war intelligence agenda},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {4},
      pages = {3--9},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432322}
    }
    					
    Goodman, Allan E. & Bruce D. Berkowitz Intelligence without the Cold War 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (2) , pp. 301-319  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goodman, Allan E. and Berkowitz, Bruce D.},
      title = {Intelligence without the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {2},
      pages = {301--319},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529408432251}
    }
    					
    Goodman, Michael Research note: the Daniel report on UK atomic intelligence, 1954 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (3) , pp. 154-167  
    article
    Abstract: Following an Open Goverment initiative request the 1954 Daniel Report on atomic intelligence was declassified. The Report was the culmination of a request by the Chiefs of Staff for a comprehensive evaluation of the British atomic intelligence organisation. This previously classified document details the Directorate of Atomic Energy (Intelligence), from its organisation to its performances - it therefore represents an insight into the hitherto closed environment of the British intelligence machinery's highest priority target in the postwar world.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goodman, Michael},
      title = {Research note: the Daniel report on UK atomic intelligence, 1954},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {3},
      pages = {154--167},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306960}
    }
    					
    Goodman, Melvin A. 9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (4) , pp. 59-71  
    article
    Abstract: Professor Goodman analyses the failure of US intelligence prior to 9/11 setting the context in the 1980s and 1990s. He dissects the flaws of the CIA, FBI and the Pentagon. He argues that the State Department should be strengthened because its capabilities are the most important. He also recommends that the FBI be split in two and that the CIA's budget be disclosed.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goodman, Melvin A.},
      title = {9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {4},
      pages = {59--71},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520310001688871}
    }
    					
    Goodman, Michael S. Jones' Paradigm: The How, Why, and Wherefore of Scientific Intelligence 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (2) , pp. 236-256  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Scientific intelligence was coined during World War II, yet despite its age and relative importance it has not received the attention it should have. This is surprising given the recent and growing interest in WMD programmes. This article sets out the main components of scientific intelligence, seeking to explore how scientific intelligence has been defined, how it operates, and contemplates the key issues involved. In doing so it aims to set an agenda for future research into this crucial area.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goodman, Michael S.},
      title = {Jones' Paradigm: The How, Why, and Wherefore of Scientific Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {2},
      pages = {236--256},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520902819651}
    }
    					
    Goodman, Michael S. [Book review] Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds), "Intelligence, Crises and Security: Prospects and Retrospects" ; Len Scott, R. Gerald Hughes and Martin S. Alexander (eds), "Intelligence and International Security: New Perspectives and Agendas" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (4) , pp. 595-597  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goodman, Michael S.},
      title = {[Book review] Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds), "Intelligence, Crises and Security: Prospects and Retrospects" ; Len Scott, R. Gerald Hughes and Martin S. Alexander (eds), "Intelligence and International Security: New Perspectives and Agendas"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {4},
      pages = {595--597},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.688320}
    }
    					
    Gordievsky, Oleg New memoirs from Moscow 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (3) , pp. 586-592  
    article
    Abstract: Nikolai Leonov, Likholetye [The Troubled Years] (Moscow: Mezhdunardonyye Otnosheniya 1995) Pp.400. ISBN 5-71330836-7. Vadim Bakatin, Izbavlenie of KGB [Deliverance from the KGB] (Moscow: Novosti, 1992). Pp.268. ISBN 5-7020-0721-2. Vadim Kirpichenko, It arkhiva razvedchika [From an Intelligence officer's archive] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 1993). Vadim Kirpichenko; Veterany vneshnei razvedki Rossii [Veterans of Russia's Foreign Intelligence service] (Moscow: Shizhba Vneshnei Razvedki 1995). Pp.174 Mikhail Lyubimov, Zapiski neputevogo rezidenta ili Will-o'-the-wisp [Notes of a good-for-nothing resident, or Will-o'-the-wisp] (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura 1995). Pp.480. ISBN 5-280-03067-8. Leonid Shebarshin, Iz zhizni nachal-nika razvedki [From the life of the Head of the Intelligence] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 1994). Pp.192. ISBN 5-7133-0781-6. Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster (London: Smith Gryphon Publishers 1994). Pp.376. ISBN 82-574-1131-0. Viktor Grusjko, Mit Liv I KGB (My life in the KGB (Oslo: Gyldendal 1995). Pp.272. ISBN 82-574-1131-0. Yevgenia Albats, The State within a State (London: I.B. Tauris 1995). Pp.416. £10.95. ISBN 1-8504-3995-8.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gordievsky, Oleg},
      title = {New memoirs from Moscow},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {3},
      pages = {586--592},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432377}
    }
    					
    Gordievsky, Oleg The KGB after the coup 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (3) , pp. 68-71  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gordievsky, Oleg},
      title = {The KGB after the coup},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {3},
      pages = {68--71},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432215}
    }
    					
    Gordievsky, Oleg The KGB archives 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (1) , pp. 7-14  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gordievsky, Oleg},
      title = {The KGB archives},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {7--14},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432090}
    }
    					
    Gorst, Anthony & W. Scott Lucas The other collusion: Operation straggle and Anglo-American intervention in Syria, 1955-56 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (3) , pp. 576-595  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gorst, Anthony and Lucas, W. Scott},
      title = {The other collusion: Operation straggle and Anglo-American intervention in Syria, 1955-56},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {576--595},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432017}
    }
    					
    Goscha, Christopher E. Intelligence in a time of decolonization: The case of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at war (1945-50) 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (1) , pp. 100-138  
    article
    Abstract: The renaissance in intelligences studies over the last two decades has offered new and exciting insights into war, societies, ideologies, institutions, and even cultures and mindsets. Yet, its geographical reach has remained largely limited to the West or Western cases. We still know relatively little about intelligence services and their roles in the making of postcolonial nation-states in Africa or Asia, much less their perceptions of the world outside. This article uses the case of communist Vietnam during the First Indochina War to provide a general overview of the birth, development, and major functions of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's Public Security and Intelligence services in a time of decolonization. It then examines three Vietnamese case studies as a way of considering wider themes relating to the question of intelligence and decolonization. In wider terms, this article seeks to contribute to the expansion of intelligence studies on the non-Western,"postcolonial" world.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goscha, Christopher E.},
      title = {Intelligence in a time of decolonization: The case of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at war (1945-50)},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {1},
      pages = {100--138},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200848}
    }
    					
    Goscha, Translated by Christopher E. Three documents on early Vietnamese intelligence and security services 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (1) , pp. 139-146  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goscha, Translated by Christopher E.},
      title = {Three documents on early Vietnamese intelligence and security services},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {1},
      pages = {139--146},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701200863}
    }
    					
    Goulter, Christina The role of intelligence in coastal command's anti-shipping campaign, 1940-45 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (1) , pp. 84-109  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goulter, Christina},
      title = {The role of intelligence in coastal command's anti-shipping campaign, 1940-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {1},
      pages = {84--109},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432036}
    }
    					
    Goulter-Zervoudakis, Christina The politicization of intelligence: The British experience in Greece, 1941-1944 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (1) , pp. 165-194  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Goulter-Zervoudakis, Christina},
      title = {The politicization of intelligence: The British experience in Greece, 1941-1944},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {1},
      pages = {165--194},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432467}
    }
    					
    Grant, Jennifer The Role of MI5 in the Internment of British Fascists during the Second World War 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (4) , pp. 499-528  
    article
    Abstract: Despite the controversy that will inevitably continue to surround Britain's use of executive detention to contain domestic fascists during the Second World War, recently declassified Security Service (MI5) records reveal the details of MI5's role in the defence regulations. MI5 was one of three bodies responsible for the administration of Defence Regulation 18b (DR18b) and as such its power was limited by an inherent system of checks and balances. As others have suggested, the administration of DR18b was full of tension; however, it is now apparent that this tension was a positive feature of the defence regulations and one that protected the individual rather than condemned him. The strategic detention of key figures from Britain's fascist circles effectively destroyed the ability of fascists to function in unified organizations. Newly available records provide answers to previously unanswerable questions related to the nature of the fascist threat as it was perceived and as it changed throughout the war.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Grant, Jennifer},
      title = {The Role of MI5 in the Internment of British Fascists during the Second World War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {4},
      pages = {499--528},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520903069447}
    }
    					
    Gray, Robert C. [Book review] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, "The Evolution of International Security Studies" 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (5) , pp. 752-754  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gray, Robert C.},
      title = {[Book review] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, "The Evolution of International Security Studies"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {5},
      pages = {752--754},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.638813}
    }
    					
    Greenberg, Harold M. Is the Department of Homeland Security an Intelligence Agency? 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (2) , pp. 216-235  
    article
    Abstract: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) applies a variation of the intelligence cycle - the process of planning, collecting, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information characteristic of intelligence agencies - to mitigate the risk of terrorist attack and respond to national security breaches. The intelligence cycle helps DHS encourage voluntary security measures, serve its customers, and avoid economic disruption, but the Department's program setbacks and failures illustrate the difficulty of applying the intelligence model to the needs of homeland security. The Department's particular means of producing intelligence and information challenge the conventional conception and definitions of the intelligence cycle.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Greenberg, Harold M.},
      title = {Is the Department of Homeland Security an Intelligence Agency?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {2},
      pages = {216--235},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520902819644}
    }
    					
    Greenberg, Harold M. The Doolittle commission of 1954 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (4) , pp. 687-694  
    article
    Abstract: Many scholars and other writers have dismissed the 1954 Doolittle Commission as an Eisenhower administration tactic to protect CIA covert operations from congressional investigation. Evidence about the commission and its report, however, suggests that this view may be incomplete. Clarification of the commission's precise purpose may serve the wider study of US covert action policy in the 1950s and congressional oversight of the CIA. In particular, the report's recommendations for bold covert action abroad may reveal how administration covert action policy attracted congressional attention to the CIA.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Greenberg, Harold M.},
      title = {The Doolittle commission of 1954},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {4},
      pages = {687--694},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500428160}
    }
    					
    Grey, Christopher The Making of Bletchley Park and Signals Intelligence 1939-42 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (6) , pp. 785-807  
    article
    Abstract: The article argues that signals intelligence was an organizational accomplishment in the sense of requiring a) the establishment of an independent organization and b) that this organization combine cryptanalysis with intelligence analysis, traffic analysis and interception. This was not pre-ordained but the outcome of specific conflicts and decisions at Bletchley Park during the first three years of the Second World War which transformed the Government Code and Cypher School from a cryptanalytical bureau to a fully-fledged signals intelligence agency. Detailed archival evidence is presented in support of this claim.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Grey, Christopher},
      title = {The Making of Bletchley Park and Signals Intelligence 1939-42},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {785--807},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.703043}
    }
    					
    Gries, David A new look for intelligence 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (1) , pp. 170-183  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gries, David},
      title = {A new look for intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {1},
      pages = {170--183},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432291}
    }
    					
    Grunden, Walter E. Hungnam and the Japanese atomic bomb: Recent historiography of a postwar Myth 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (2) , pp. 32-60  
    article
    Abstract: Since 1946, journalists in the US have alleged that Japanese scientists successfully built and tested an atomic bomb hear the city of Hungnam, Korea, during the closing days of World War II. Based upon reports from US military intelligence investigations conducted after the war, as well as from Japanese corporate histories and memoirs, the present essay attempts to dispel the myth of Japans atomic bomb by providing a detailed examination of the events that occurred in Hungnam in the final days of the war. Reasons for the endurance of the myth in the historiography of modern Japan are also considered.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Grunden, Walter E.},
      title = {Hungnam and the Japanese atomic bomb: Recent historiography of a postwar Myth},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {2},
      pages = {32--60},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432475}
    }
    					
    Guillaume, Laura (Review article) Risk and War in the Twenty-First Century 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (3) , pp. 406-420  
    article
    Abstract: Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq (Cambridge: Polity Press 2006). £14.99. Pb. ISBN 0-7456-3411-7.
    Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006). £17.99. Pb. ISBN 0-521-68731-4.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Guillaume, Laura},
      title = {(Review article) Risk and War in the Twenty-First Century},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {3},
      pages = {406--420},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802121273}
    }
    					
    Guillaume, Laura [Book review] Nick Davies, "Flat Earth News: An Award-winning Reporter Exposes Falsehood, Distortion and Propaganda in the Global Media" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (3) , pp. 430-433  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Guillaume, Laura},
      title = {[Book review] Nick Davies, "Flat Earth News: An Award-winning Reporter Exposes Falsehood, Distortion and Propaganda in the Global Media"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {3},
      pages = {430--433},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628541}
    }
    					
    Gustafson, Kristian Strategic Horizons: Futures Forecasting and the British Intelligence Community 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (5) , pp. 589-610  
    article
    Abstract: The article deals with the role and benefit added by the use of horizon scanning in intelligence analysis in the UK. It asserts that horizon scanning as a technique, while not entirely akin to the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, has much to contribute to its success. Specifically, is asserts that a horizon scanning function in the JIO and the Cabinet Office should be made permanent, as bureaucratic tumult in the wake of the 2010 SDSR have left the capability un-staffed, though still established. Within the UK intelligence community, such an organization may have positive roles to play in the processes of challenge, the setting of collection priorities, and overall long-term UK intelligence assessment at the national level.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Gustafson, Kristian},
      title = {Strategic Horizons: Futures Forecasting and the British Intelligence Community},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {5},
      pages = {589--610},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.537118}
    }
    					
    Hack, Karl Corpses, prisoners of war and captured documents: British and communist narratives of the Malayan emergency, and the dynamics of intelligence transformation 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (4) , pp. 211-241  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hack, Karl},
      title = {Corpses, prisoners of war and captured documents: British and communist narratives of the Malayan emergency, and the dynamics of intelligence transformation},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {211--241},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432578}
    }
    					
    Hack, Karl British intelligence and counter-insurgency in the era of decolonisation: The example of Malaya 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (2) , pp. 124-155  
    article
    Abstract: This article uses two approaches to show the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and intelligence were reaching a turning point before the 1952 appointment of a single commander; and to show the reason for this success was a counter-insurgency technique which placed population control at its core. First, the article outlines the development of intelligence, in order to identify when and why it became effective. Second, it re-examines intelligence on the Malayan Communist Party's (MCP) so-called "October" 1951 Directives. It argues these confirm the MCP was virtually forced to change its tactics by late 1951. Together, these approaches challenge existing historiography, which makes Sir Gerald Templer's era of 1952-54, when he was both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, the turning point.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hack, Karl},
      title = {British intelligence and counter-insurgency in the era of decolonisation: The example of Malaya},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {2},
      pages = {124--155},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432542}
    }
    					
    Haines, Gerald The CIA'S own effort to understand and document its past: A brief history of the CIA history program, 1950-1995 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (1) , pp. 201-223  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Haines, Gerald},
      title = {The CIA'S own effort to understand and document its past: A brief history of the CIA history program, 1950-1995},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {201--223},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432406}
    }
    					
    Haines, Gerald K. CIA's role in the study of UFOs, 1947-90: A die-hard issue 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (2) , pp. 26-48  
    article
    Abstract: This article is a reprint from a declassified issue of the CIA's in-house journal. It testifies to the enormous impact of UFOs in North America and the involvement of the CIA and USAF from their very year of creation (1947). This year also featured the notorious Roswell incident in New Mexico. The phenomenon is examined decade by decade for the entire Cold War. The mere existence of official records and their release or non-release has become a never-ending bone of contention.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Haines, Gerald K.},
      title = {CIA's role in the study of UFOs, 1947-90: A die-hard issue},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {2},
      pages = {26--48},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432538}
    }
    					
    Haire, Emily Jane A Debased Currency? Using Memoir Material in the Study of Anglo-French Intelligence Liaison 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (5) , pp. 758-777  
    article
    Abstract: Using memoirs can be a vital way of supplementing archival evidence or indeed of overcoming a shortage of contemporaneous sources, and they offer insights into the attitudes and motivations of participants as well as how they recorded and remembered events. Memoirs retain an inherent value that must not be ignored, particularly in the study of intelligence liaison which addresses the kinds of personal and cultural aspects which are often especially well illuminated through autobiographical writing. This paper explores some of the theoretical and practical issues associated with the use of memoir material and examines them through the prism of selected autobiographical writings related to Anglo-French intelligence liaison from the Great War up to the Second World War.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Haire, Emily Jane},
      title = {A Debased Currency? Using Memoir Material in the Study of Anglo-French Intelligence Liaison},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {5},
      pages = {758--777},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.846727}
    }
    					
    Hall, Suzanne Politics of prisoner of war recovery: SOE and the Burma-Thailand Railway during world war II 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (2) , pp. 51-80  
    article
    Abstract: This article considers why SOE were given a prominent role in POW recovery in the Far East during the last months of the war and immediately after VJ Day. This was a task normally allotted to the International Committee of the Red Cross. It examines both strategic and humanitarian motivations as possible explanations of this policy. It reviews the means used to execute this policy along the Burma-Thailand Railway, including close cooperation with the Thai resistance movement. The success of SOE's operations are assessed and the impact of their testimony in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials is also reviewed against the background of a growing appreciation of the role of secret service in providing evidence to international tribunals.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hall, Suzanne},
      title = {Politics of prisoner of war recovery: SOE and the Burma-Thailand Railway during world war II},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {2},
      pages = {51--80},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306490}
    }
    					
    Halverson, Sean Dangerous Patriots: Washington's Hidden Army during the American Revolution 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (2) , pp. 123-146  
    article
    Abstract: How did George Washington's intelligence networks during the American Revolution operate in a more open and proficient manner than their British counterparts? British and American forces developed competing understandings of intelligence gathering. Both used spies to obtain information. Washington, however, guided his intelligence officers to avoid monopolizing information and maintain their own tools of communication that did not require him to approve all the Rebels' covert operations or read through innumerable reports. Relying on his spies to develop their own roles of intelligencer far outside his direct command, Washington gave his spies more autonomy, while being able to overlap more sources. This allowed him to overcome the limitations of his forces. A close reading of the messages between Washington and his covert agents demonstrates that his intelligence system became an essential arm in molding the Americans partisan style asymmetrical strategy. This laid the groundwork for Washington to formulate intelligence gathering as an important tool in presidential power.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Halverson, Sean},
      title = {Dangerous Patriots: Washington's Hidden Army during the American Revolution},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {2},
      pages = {123--146},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.489272}
    }
    					
    Hamm, Geoffrey British Intelligence in the Middle East, 1898-1906 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (6) , pp. 880-900  
    article
    Abstract: This article examines British intelligence efforts in Turkish Arabia at the turn of the twentieth century. It argues that intelligence collection was really three separate efforts, carried out by the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Government of India, and it reflected concerns about British decline, the problems experienced during the Boer War, as well as an effort to penetrate the "information order" of India's sub-empire. Although intelligence efforts suffered from bureaucratic disharmony in Whitehall, and between London and the Government of India, valuable contributions were nevertheless made to Britain's knowledge of Turkish Arabia.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hamm, Geoffrey},
      title = {British Intelligence in the Middle East, 1898-1906},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {6},
      pages = {880--900},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.846728}
    }
    					
    Handel, Michael Shorter notes 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (1) , pp. 121-121  
    article
    Abstract: John B. Dwyer, Seaborne Deception: The History of the U.S. Navy Beach Jumpers (New York: Praeger, 1992). A.B. Feuer (ed.), Coast-watching in the Solomon Islands: The Bougenville Reports, December 1941-1943 (New York: Praeger, 1992).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Handel, Michael},
      title = {Shorter notes},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {121--121},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432196}
    }
    					
    Handel, Michael I. Technological surprise in war 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (1) , pp. 1-53  
    article
    Abstract: Republished as chapter 3 of War, Strategy and Intelligence in 1989.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Handel, Michael I.},
      title = {Technological surprise in war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--53},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431875}
    }
    					
    Handel, Michael I. Introduction: Strategic and operational deception in historical perspective 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (3) , pp. 1-91  
    article
    Abstract: Republished as chapter 8 of War, Strategy and Intelligence in 1989.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Handel, Michael I.},
      title = {Introduction: Strategic and operational deception in historical perspective},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {3},
      pages = {1--91},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431904}
    }
    					
    Handel, Michael I. Leaders and intelligence 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (3) , pp. 3-39  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Handel, Michael I.},
      title = {Leaders and intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {3},
      pages = {3--39},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528808431957}
    }
    					
    Handel, Michael I. Methodological mischief: A reply to Professor Müller 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (1) , pp. 161-164  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Handel, Michael I.},
      title = {Methodological mischief: A reply to Professor Müller},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {1},
      pages = {161--164},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908431990}
    }
    					
    Handel, Michael I. The politics of intelligence 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (4) , pp. 5-46  
    article
    Abstract: Republished as chapter 4 of War, Strategy and Intelligence in 1989.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Handel, Michael I.},
      title = {The politics of intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {4},
      pages = {5--46},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431914}
    }
    					
    Handel, Michael I. Shorter note 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (4) , pp. 167-167  
    article
    Abstract: US Senate Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence, 102nd Congress, First Session on the Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence: Vol. 1, September 16, 17, 19, 20 1991; Vol.2, September 24, October 1, 2 1991; Vol.3, October 3, 4, 18 1991 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Handel, Michael I.},
      title = {Shorter note},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {4},
      pages = {167--167},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432232}
    }
    					
    Handel, Michael I. Intelligence and military operations 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (2) , pp. 1-95  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Handel, Michael I.},
      title = {Intelligence and military operations},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {2},
      pages = {1--95},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529008432047}
    }
    					
    Hannant, Larry Access to the inside: An assessment of "Canada's security service: A history" 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (3) , pp. 149-159  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hannant, Larry},
      title = {Access to the inside: An assessment of "Canada's security service: A history"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {3},
      pages = {149--159},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432219}
    }
    					
    Hannant, Larry Inter-war security screening in Britain, the United States and Canada 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (4) , pp. 711-735  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hannant, Larry},
      title = {Inter-war security screening in Britain, the United States and Canada},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {4},
      pages = {711--735},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432129}
    }
    					
    Hansen, Morten Intelligence Contracting: On the Motivations, Interests, and Capabilities of Core Personnel Contractors in the US Intelligence Community 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (1) , pp. 58-81  
    article
    Abstract: In the debate on intelligence contracting, intelligence officers are grouped into two personnel categories characterized by opposing sets of motivations and interests. Government employees are assumed to be motivated by a higher goal related to national security, while intelligence contractors are said to be motivated primarily by pecuniary interests and loyal first and foremost to their shareholders. Contemporary research on human motivation, however, suggests that the two personnel categories are not all that different in that both appear to be intrinsically motivated and loyal primarily to the mission at hand, namely national security. Moreover, comparative research on public organizations and private corporations suggests that there are more similarities between the two than there are differences. This must lead us to re-examine the recent criticism fielded against the practice of intelligence contracting.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hansen, Morten},
      title = {Intelligence Contracting: On the Motivations, Interests, and Capabilities of Core Personnel Contractors in the US Intelligence Community},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {1},
      pages = {58--81},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.703044}
    }
    					
    Hanyok, Robert [Book review] Alan D. Zimm, "Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions", 2011 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (3) , pp. 445-447  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hanyok, Robert},
      title = {[Book review] Alan D. Zimm, "Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions", 2011},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {3},
      pages = {445--447},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2013.786606}
    }
    					
    Harris, J. P. British military intelligence and the rise of German mechanized forces, 1929-40 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (2) , pp. 395-417  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Harris, J. P.},
      title = {British military intelligence and the rise of German mechanized forces, 1929-40},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {2},
      pages = {395--417},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432108}
    }
    					
    Harrison, E.D.R. J.C. Masterman and the Security Service, 1940-72 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (6) , pp. 769-804  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract The significance of J.C. Masterman's relationship with the Security Service, MI5, has not been fully appreciated. As a junior officer during World War II, he consistently sought to achieve good working relations with the Secret Intelligence Service. After the war he continued to take an interest in the Security Service and worked closely with other MI5 elder statesmen to ensure that the successor to Percy Sillitoe as Director-General came from within the Service. Masterman always hoped that his account of the double agents run by British Intelligence during World War II would one day be published. As the public image of the British secret services deteriorated during the 1960s, Masterman believed that MI5 did not grasp how his book could promote its interests, and so he insisted on forcing through publication anyway. The correspondence from serving and former MI5 officers in Masterman's papers vividly illustrate changing attitudes to official secrecy and the declining ability of the British Government to enforce it.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Harrison, E.D.R.},
      title = {J.C. Masterman and the Security Service, 1940-72},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {6},
      pages = {769--804},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520903320386}
    }
    					
    Harrison, E. D. R. More thoughts on Kim Philby's My Silent War 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (3) , pp. 514-525  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Harrison, E. D. R.},
      title = {More thoughts on Kim Philby's My Silent War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {3},
      pages = {514--525},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529508432316}
    }
    					
    Hart, John L. Pyotr Semyonovich Popov: The tribulations of faith 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (4) , pp. 44-74  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hart, John L.},
      title = {Pyotr Semyonovich Popov: The tribulations of faith},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {4},
      pages = {44--74},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432448}
    }
    					
    Hashimoto, Chikara British Security Liaison in the Middle East: The Introduction of Police/Security Advisers and the Lebanon-Iraq-Jordan "Anti-Communist Triangle" from 1949 to 1958 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (6) , pp. 848-874  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Using newly released and previously unexploited records, this article explores the existence of Anglo-Arab secret liaison and cooperation in instituting anti-communist measures in the early Cold War. It shows that owing to their concern about a war against the Soviet Union, the placing of a British security/police adviser in specific countries was the preferred method by Britain for checking and combatting communism in the Middle East. It argues that the development of the "anti-communist triangle" (the security liaison between Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan) was largely influenced by British concern about the expansion of communist influence. Moreover, the expansion of British influence in the region also converged with the demands from Middle Eastern countries for a British expert in anti-communist measures. The article implies the importance of the role of secret liaison in historical enquiries.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hashimoto, Chikara},
      title = {British Security Liaison in the Middle East: The Introduction of Police/Security Advisers and the Lebanon-Iraq-Jordan "Anti-Communist Triangle" from 1949 to 1958},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {6},
      pages = {848--874},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.722763}
    }
    					
    Hashimoto, Chikara [Book review] Donal O'Sullivan, "Dealing with the Devil: Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During the Second World War" 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (6) , pp. 918-920  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hashimoto, Chikara},
      title = {[Book review] Donal O'Sullivan, "Dealing with the Devil: Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During the Second World War"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {6},
      pages = {918--920},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628525}
    }
    					
    Haslam, Jonathan Why rehabilitate Stalin? 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (2) , pp. 362-367  
    article
    Abstract: J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Pp.275; £25. Robert Conquest, Inside Stalin's Secret Police: NVKD Politics 1936-39 (London: Macmillan, 1985). Pp.222; £29.50.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Haslam, Jonathan},
      title = {Why rehabilitate Stalin?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {2},
      pages = {362--367},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431899}
    }
    					
    Haslam, Jonathan Stalin's fears of a separate peace, 1942 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (4) , pp. 97-99  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Haslam, Jonathan},
      title = {Stalin's fears of a separate peace, 1942},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {4},
      pages = {97--99},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432228}
    }
    					
    Haslam, Jonathan The KAL shootdown (1983) and the state of Soviet air defence 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (4) , pp. 128-133  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Haslam, Jonathan},
      title = {The KAL shootdown (1983) and the state of Soviet air defence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {4},
      pages = {128--133},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431975}
    }
    					
    Hastedt, Glen Foreign policy by commission: Reforming the intelligence community 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (4) , pp. 443-472  
    article
    Abstract: Can presidential commissions serve as a source of significant policy innovation in the area of intelligence analysis? This study shows that intelligence commission recommendations present a decidedly mixed bag. We cannot speak of a linear movement toward improving the quality or management of intelligence analysis in which one problem is solved and attention then is turned to the next. Yet presidential commissions looking into intelligence analysis cannot be mere symbolic window dressing. Many of their recommendations have been listened to. It would be more accurate to see them as having in each instance narrowed the range of policy choices receiving serious consideration as means of improving the intelligence product.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hastedt, Glen},
      title = {Foreign policy by commission: Reforming the intelligence community},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {4},
      pages = {443--472},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701640431}
    }
    					
    Hastedt, Glenn [Book review] "Challenges in Intelligence Analysis, Lessons from 1300 BC to the Present" 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (6) , pp. 914-915  
    article
    Abstract: Timothy Walton, Challenges in Intelligence Analysis, Lessons from 1300 BC to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hastedt, Glenn},
      title = {[Book review] "Challenges in Intelligence Analysis, Lessons from 1300 BC to the Present"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {914--915},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.755046}
    }
    					
    Hastedt, Glenn The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (1) , pp. 5-31  
    article
    Abstract: The relationship between intelligence analysis and policy decisions is a contentious one with both policymakers and intelligence analysts frequently expressing frustration over its underlying dynamics and with each faulting the behavior of the other. This article examines one aspect of this relationship, the manner in which intelligence analysis can become politicized. Rather than view politicization as an aberration it is treated here as a normal feature of intelligence analysis. A typology of politicization organized around the concepts of hard and soft politicization is presented and illustrated with historical examples from the American experience with intelligence analysis.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hastedt, Glenn},
      title = {The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {1},
      pages = {5--31},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.749062}
    }
    					
    Hastedt, Glenn The Schlesinger Report: Its Place in Past, Present and Future Studies of Improving Intelligence Analysis 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (3) , pp. 422-428  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hastedt, Glenn},
      title = {The Schlesinger Report: Its Place in Past, Present and Future Studies of Improving Intelligence Analysis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {3},
      pages = {422--428},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520903037006}
    }
    					
    Hastedt, Glenn Public intelligence: Leaks as policy instruments-the case of the Iraq war 2005 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 20 (3) , pp. 419-439  
    article
    Abstract: The study of intelligence has focused almost exclusively on "secret" intelligence in its analysis of intelligence failures and the relationship of policy and intelligence. This is not surprising since intelligence analysis takes place in secret. Yet sometimes intelligence becomes public. It does so in ways that hold implications for the quality of the overall intelligence product. In order to develop a complete understanding of the relationship between intelligence and policy we need to more systematically examine the nature of public intelligence. This article provides a framework for doing so, presents historical examples from the American experience and applies the framework to the intelligence used in justifying the Iraq War.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hastedt, Glenn},
      title = {Public intelligence: Leaks as policy instruments-the case of the Iraq war},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {20},
      number = {3},
      pages = {419--439},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500268897}
    }
    					
    Hastedt, Glenn P. The constitutional control of intelligence 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (2) , pp. 255-271  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hastedt, Glenn P.},
      title = {The constitutional control of intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {2},
      pages = {255--271},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431852}
    }
    					
    Hastings, Justin V. [Book review] Martin N. Murphy, "Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa" 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (6) , pp. 919-920  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hastings, Justin V.},
      title = {[Book review] Martin N. Murphy, "Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {6},
      pages = {919--920},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.713797}
    }
    					
    Hatlebrekke, Kjetil Anders & M. L.R. Smith Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (2) , pp. 147-182  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Oscar Wilde captures the deep challenges relating to intelligence when he states that, ?it is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors?. This statement elucidates the negative force of cognitive closure on intelligence, as well as bringing attention to the importance of an understanding of the human factor in intelligence production, and its relationship to discourse failure. Intelligence literature after 9/11 has focused on the causes and nature of intelligence failure, though few inquests have conceived intelligence as a deeply cognitive, and therefore mental and moral landscape that needs to be explored in all its complexity. Intelligence operators, like art spectators, perceive reality filtered through all sorts of implicit and explicit ideological prisms, and these ideologies, whether they are political assumptions or social orthodoxies, manifest themselves as cognitive closure, and shape the discourse in intelligence organizations, as well as between these organizations and society at large. This paper consequently argues that discourse failure is increased because of a flaw in the epistemic process among intelligence operators and consumers.
    Abstract Oscar Wilde captures the deep challenges relating to intelligence when he states that, ?it is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors?. This statement elucidates the negative force of cognitive closure on intelligence, as well as bringing attention to the importance of an understanding of the human factor in intelligence production, and its relationship to discourse failure. Intelligence literature after 9/11 has focused on the causes and nature of intelligence failure, though few inquests have conceived intelligence as a deeply cognitive, and therefore mental and moral landscape that needs to be explored in all its complexity. Intelligence operators, like art spectators, perceive reality filtered through all sorts of implicit and explicit ideological prisms, and these ideologies, whether they are political assumptions or social orthodoxies, manifest themselves as cognitive closure, and shape the discourse in intelligence organizations, as well as between these organizations and society at large. This paper consequently argues that discourse failure is increased because of a flaw in the epistemic process among intelligence operators and consumers.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hatlebrekke, Kjetil Anders and Smith, M. L.R.},
      title = {Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {2},
      pages = {147--182},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.489274}
    }
    					
    Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis Propaganda, Internal Security and Alliance Politics: Greek Proposals to NATO in the 1950s 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (1) , pp. 137-158  
    article
    Abstract: In a prolonged multidimensional conflict such as the Cold War, military threats were aggravated by the challenges of internal subversion and propaganda. These posed huge problems to the smaller NATO members, who lacked the resources to respond to Soviet bloc/communist tactics. This article focuses on two Greek proposals to NATO, in 1952 and 1958, which intended to address such issues. In the first instance, Athens contributed to the creation of the NATO Special Committee. In 1958, a Greek proposal on psychological warfare was brushed aside. The article tries to interpret Greek motives, the alliance's response and the reasons which led to the rejection of the latter proposal.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis},
      title = {Propaganda, Internal Security and Alliance Politics: Greek Proposals to NATO in the 1950s},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {137--158},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.846729}
    }
    					
    Hazelton, Jacqueline L. [Book review] Emile Simpson, "War From the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics" 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 605-609  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hazelton, Jacqueline L.},
      title = {[Book review] Emile Simpson, "War From the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {605--609},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.924259}
    }
    					
    Heather, Randall W. Intelligence and counter-insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (3) , pp. 57-83  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Heather, Randall W.},
      title = {Intelligence and counter-insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {3},
      pages = {57--83},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432063}
    }
    					
    Heazle, Michael Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (3) , pp. 290-308  
    article
    Abstract: This paper focuses on how pre-existing policy priorities and goals among policy elites in the US, UK, and Australia encouraged the blurring of strategic and tactical intelligence assessment as a mechanism for legitimising the Iraq invasion. Through the selective use and interpretation of sometimes vague or unsubstantiated tactical and technical intelligence and the many uncertainties it contained, proponents of the war were able to undermine existing strategic assessments on Iraq by introducing a range of possible, but largely unsubstantiated, threat scenarios as justification for military action. The paper argues that in so far as intelligence reforms are needed, they should be focused primarily on the interface between analysis and policy making, and the issue of how policy makers interpret and understand the uncertainties that intelligence assessments necessarily contain.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Heazle, Michael},
      title = {Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {3},
      pages = {290--308},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.489780}
    }
    					
    Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. Late imperial romance: Magsaysay, Lansdale and the Philippine-American "special relationship" 1999 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 14 (4) , pp. 181-194  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hedman, Eva-Lotta E.},
      title = {Late imperial romance: Magsaysay, Lansdale and the Philippine-American "special relationship"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {181--194},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432576}
    }
    					
    Heley, Jesse [Book review] Nick Megoran and Sevara Sharapova (eds.), "Central Asia in International Relations: The Legacies of Halford Mackinder" 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 570-573  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Heley, Jesse},
      title = {[Book review] Nick Megoran and Sevara Sharapova (eds.), "Central Asia in International Relations: The Legacies of Halford Mackinder"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {570--573},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.875372}
    }
    					
    Hendrickson, Ryan C. [Book review] Vincent Pouliot, "International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy", 2010 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (5) , pp. 766-768  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hendrickson, Ryan C.},
      title = {[Book review] Vincent Pouliot, "International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy", 2010},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {5},
      pages = {766--768},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.755044}
    }
    					
    Hennessy, Peter & Kathleen Townsend The documentary spoor of Burgess and Maclean 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (2) , pp. 291-301  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hennessy, Peter and Townsend, Kathleen},
      title = {The documentary spoor of Burgess and Maclean},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {2},
      pages = {291--301},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431891}
    }
    					
    Herbig, Katherine L. American strategic deception in the Pacific: 1942-44 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (3) , pp. 260-300  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herbig, Katherine L.},
      title = {American strategic deception in the Pacific: 1942-44},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {3},
      pages = {260--300},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431908}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael Threat assessments and the legitimation of policy? 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (3) , pp. 174-178  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {Threat assessments and the legitimation of policy?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {3},
      pages = {174--178},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520412331306980}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael What Difference Did It Make? 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (6) , pp. 886-901  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Western governments counted on intelligence's assessments of Soviet military power, present and future. Initially these were mixtures of accuracy and exaggeration, with important effects on policy. Intelligence's quality subsequently improved, and Western defence procurement was kept in some contact with reality. Something of this may have been true on the Soviet side, in its much easier task of studying Western power. On the more important assessment of Soviet intentions, by contrast, Western intelligence was never able to develop reliable sources at the centre of the Soviet regime, and its contributions were secondary and confirmatory; while Soviet intelligence for its part selected and presented reports to emphasize the received views of Western hostility and threats.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {What Difference Did It Make?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {6},
      pages = {886--901},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.619802}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (4) , pp. 40-58  
    article
    Abstract: Since 11 September 2001 Counter-Terrorism has been Intelligence's super-priority. It puts a special emphasis on the potential of advanced Information Technology for integrating different databases in different organizations. The problems of applying it fully are organizational and cultural, not technical. They should be met through emphasizing the unity of modern intelligence power, and through personnel policies across separate agencies designed to develop this holistic view. Central authority and leadership will be needed for these purposes. Since 11 September 2001 Counter-Terrorism has been Intelligence's super-priority. It puts a special emphasis on the potential of advanced Information Technology for integrating different databases in different organizations. The problems of applying it fully are organizational and cultural, not technical. They should be met through emphasizing the unity of modern intelligence power, and through personnel policies across separate agencies designed to develop this holistic view. Central authority and leadership will be needed for these purposes.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {4},
      pages = {40--58},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520310001693181}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael Antipodean dilemmas 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (4) , pp. 215-222  
    article
    Abstract: Nicky Hager, Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network (Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potten, 1996). Pp.299, index. NP. ISBN 908802-35-8.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {Antipodean dilemmas},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {4},
      pages = {215--222},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432456}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael Assessment machinery: British and American models 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (4) , pp. 13-33  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {Assessment machinery: British and American models},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {4},
      pages = {13--33},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529508432323}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (2) , pp. 342-358  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {2},
      pages = {342--358},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0268452042000302038}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael [Book review] Antipodean dilemmas 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (4) , pp. 215-222  
    article
    Abstract: Nicky Hager, "Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network" (Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potten, 1996). pp.299, index.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {[Book review] Antipodean dilemmas},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {4},
      pages = {215--222},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432456}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael Intelligence and policy: A comment 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (1) , pp. 229-239  
    article
    Abstract: Comment of Reginald Hibbert, "Intelligence and Policy," Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (1990), pp. 110-128.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {Intelligence and policy: A comment},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {229--239},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529108432098}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael Intelligence and the assessment of military capabilities: Reasonable sufficiency or the worst case? 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (4) , pp. 765-799  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {Intelligence and the assessment of military capabilities: Reasonable sufficiency or the worst case?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {4},
      pages = {765--799},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528908432026}
    }
    					
    Herman, Michael Intelligence as Threats and Reassurance 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (6) , pp. 791-817  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Intelligence's activities provoked feelings of threat in the adversary, and its capabilities provided reassurance for its own side. Fear of espionage (and associated covert action) was common to both sides. Intrusive technical collection had a similar effect, principally through the scale of Western operations around Soviet territory, and in overflights up to May 1960. On the other hand intelligence's capabilities provided reassurance for both sides in the mutually legitimized verification of the US-Soviet strategic arms control agreements. As the Cold War progressed they also increased Western governments' confidence that they would not be caught by a Soviet surprise attack, or by an overturning of the military balance of power. Yet for both sides the threat of the opponent's intelligence activities - the enemy within - remained the more important part of Cold War psychology.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Herman, Michael},
      title = {Intelligence as Threats and Reassurance},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {6},
      pages = {791--817},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.619798}
    }
    					
    Hers, J. F. Ph The rise of the Dutch resistance: A memoir 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (4) , pp. 454-472  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hers, J. F. Ph},
      title = {The rise of the Dutch resistance: A memoir},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {4},
      pages = {454--472},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529208432180}
    }
    					
    Hershberg, James G. Their men in Havana: Anglo-American intelligence exchanges and the Cuban crises, 1961-62 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (2) , pp. 121-176  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hershberg, James G.},
      title = {Their men in Havana: Anglo-American intelligence exchanges and the Cuban crises, 1961-62},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {2},
      pages = {121--176},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432606}
    }
    					
    Hewitt, Steve "Strangely Easy to Obtain": Canadian Passport Security, 1933-73 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (3) , pp. 381-405  
    article
    Abstract: Since December 1999 when an Algerian member of Al Qaeda was arrested at the US border carrying a fraudulently obtained Canadian passport, the issue of Canadian passport security has been widely discussed. However, the controversy is nothing new. This article explores the long history of the misuses of Canadian passports, which began in the early 1930s, and the efforts by the Canadian government to combat these abuses. These efforts involved considerable debate within the Canadian government, specifically between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Department of External Affairs, over what measures were acceptable. Ultimately, the discussions around passport security have relevance to debates in the present over biometric passports and identity cards.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hewitt, Steve},
      title = {"Strangely Easy to Obtain": Canadian Passport Security, 1933-73},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {3},
      pages = {381--405},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802137014}
    }
    					
    Hewitt, Steve Reforming the Canadian security state: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police security service and the "Key Sectors" program 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (4) , pp. 165-184  
    article
    Abstract: Although a significant component of Cold War domestic security, counter-subversion has not received the same attention as counterespionage in recent historical writing. This article examines one aspect of the history of counter-subversion, specifically an internal attempt by the Canadian Security Service to reform itself in the face of the social change of the 1960s. "Key Sectors" attempted to modernize the RCMP's pursuit of subversives by emphasizing qualitative factors and broader criteria for what constituted subversion beyond an association with communism. In the end, however, the program failed because it could not free itself from the anti-communism paradigm that the Canadian security state had been constructed on in the first place.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hewitt, Steve},
      title = {Reforming the Canadian security state: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police security service and the "Key Sectors" program},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {4},
      pages = {165--184},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306680}
    }
    					
    Hewitt, Steve Royal Canadian mounted spy: The secret life of John Leopold/Jack Esselwein 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (1) , pp. 144-168  
    article
    Abstract: John Leopold spied his way into becoming the most famous member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the intewar period. Too short, and from the wrong ethnic background to have become a Mountie under normal circumstances, the immigrant Leopold was accepted specifically because of his eastern European origins. He infiltrated the fledgling Communist Party of Canada and after is exposure in 1928 became the RCMP's top expert on communism. His life provides insight into the developing Canadian security state, the nature of undercover intelligence gathering at the time, and the toll a life of secrecy can exact.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hewitt, Steve},
      title = {Royal Canadian mounted spy: The secret life of John Leopold/Jack Esselwein},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {1},
      pages = {144--168},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432590}
    }
    					
    Hibbert, Reginald Intelligence and policy 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (1) , pp. 110-128  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hibbert, Reginald},
      title = {Intelligence and policy},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {1},
      pages = {110--128},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432037}
    }
    					
    Hiley, Nicholas Internal security in wartime: The rise and fall of P.M.S.2, 1915-1917 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (3) , pp. 395-415  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hiley, Nicholas},
      title = {Internal security in wartime: The rise and fall of P.M.S.2, 1915-1917},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {3},
      pages = {395--415},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431864}
    }
    					
    Hiley, Nicholas Decoding German spies: British spy fiction 1908-18 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (4) , pp. 55-79  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hiley, Nicholas},
      title = {Decoding German spies: British spy fiction 1908-18},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {4},
      pages = {55--79},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432079}
    }
    					
    Hiley, Nicholas Entering the Lists: MI5's great spy round-up of August 1914 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (1) , pp. 46-76  
    article
    Abstract: One of the most famous successes of the British Security Service, popularly known as MI5, was its great spy round-up of August 1914. According to all previous histories, official and unofficial, Vernon Kell, the first head of MI5, masterminded the arrest of 21 out of the 22 German agents working in Britain, crippling the German intelligence network within hours of the outbreak of the First World War. The event is still celebrated by MI5, but a careful study of the recently-opened records shows it to be a complete fabrication. This article examines the six surviving lists of suspects to show how and why MI5 created and perpetuated this remarkable lie.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hiley, Nicholas},
      title = {Entering the Lists: MI5's great spy round-up of August 1914},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {1},
      pages = {46--76},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600568303}
    }
    					
    Hiley, Nicholas The play, the parody, the censor and the film 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (1) , pp. 218-228  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hiley, Nicholas},
      title = {The play, the parody, the censor and the film},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {218--228},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529108432097}
    }
    					
    Hiley, Nicholas The strategic origins of room 40 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (2) , pp. 245-273  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hiley, Nicholas},
      title = {The strategic origins of room 40},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {2},
      pages = {245--273},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431889}
    }
    					
    Hiley, Nicholas Re-entering the Lists: MI5's Authorized History and the August 1914 Arrests 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (4) , pp. 415-452  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract The 2009 Authorized History of MI5 carried a new defence of its August 1914 operation, in which Vernon Kell, its first Director, supposedly scored a coup by capturing all 21 German agents working in Britain. The Authorized History went against the version of events given in my article "Entering the Lists", published by this journal in 2006, and backed up its case with a new arrest list. This article considers that new list, and its supposed origins in an MI5 document from 1931. Once again it demonstrates the impossibility of turning MI5's foundation myth into history, by showing that not only is the account in the Authorized History internally inconsistent, but the arrest list consists of 22 names arbitrarily selected from later case summaries, then wrongly footnoted to an MI5 document which contains a different list of 21 names. Indeed, by claiming authority from the only arrest list known to have been challenged within MI5 itself, the Authorized History merely reinforces the conclusion that Kell fabricated his most famous victory.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hiley, Nicholas},
      title = {Re-entering the Lists: MI5's Authorized History and the August 1914 Arrests},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {4},
      pages = {415--452},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.537022}
    }
    					
    Hiley, Nicholas & Julian Putkowski A postscript on P.M.S.2 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (2) , pp. 326-331  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hiley, Nicholas and Putkowski, Julian},
      title = {A postscript on P.M.S.2},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {2},
      pages = {326--331},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431949}
    }
    					
    Hill, J. N. C. Decolonization and the Challenges of Independence in Modern Algeria 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (4) , pp. 612-622  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hill, J. N. C.},
      title = {Decolonization and the Challenges of Independence in Modern Algeria},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {4},
      pages = {612--622},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520903069538}
    }
    					
    Hillebrand, Claudia The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (5) , pp. 689-706  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article explores the role of the news media in overseeing intelligence services and their work. As an informal mechanism, how do they fit into the wider landscape of intelligence oversight? By drawing on examples of US counter-terrorism efforts in the post-9/11 era, the article identifies three roles for the news media in intelligence oversight: as an information transmitter and stimulator for formal scrutinizers, as a substitute watchdog and as a legitimizing institution. Yet there is a danger of the news media acting merely as a lapdog. Other limitations include the impact of regulatory frameworks, government secrecy and the media strategies of intelligence services. The article concludes that the news media play an important role in the wider intelligence oversight landscape, but that their ability to scrutinize is uneven and ad hoc and as a result the picture they produce is blurred.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hillebrand, Claudia},
      title = {The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {5},
      pages = {689--706},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.708521}
    }
    					
    Hindley, Meredith Teaching intelligence project 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (1) , pp. 191-218  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hindley, Meredith},
      title = {Teaching intelligence project},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {1},
      pages = {191--218},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432594}
    }
    					
    Hindley, Meredith First annual list of dissertations on intelligence 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (4) , pp. 208-230  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hindley, Meredith},
      title = {First annual list of dissertations on intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {208--230},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432513}
    }
    					
    Hindley, Meredith The strategy of rescue and relief: The use of OSS intelligence by the war refugee board in Sweden, 1944-45 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (3) , pp. 145-165  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hindley, Meredith},
      title = {The strategy of rescue and relief: The use of OSS intelligence by the war refugee board in Sweden, 1944-45},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {3},
      pages = {145--165},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432435}
    }
    					
    Hinsley, F. H. Correspondence 1993 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 8 (1) , pp. 122-122  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hinsley, F. H.},
      title = {Correspondence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {122--122},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432197}
    }
    					
    Hitz, Frederick P. The truth of espionage is stranger than fiction 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (1) , pp. 55-60  
    article
    Abstract: Using two 2007 films - Breach and Lives of Others- the author furthers the argument he has made elsewhere that, indeed, truth is stranger than fiction as far as movies about espionage are concerned. Robert P. Hanssen, the FBI agent who spied first for the Soviet Union and then for Russia for more than two decades, defies logic. His outward persona contradicted his real self more than one can imagine. In Lives of Others, the paper submits that the reality of the totalitarian existence in East Germany was also almost impossible to imagine. But both of these films do a creditable job in trying to make the unimaginable seem possible. Moreover, the paper argues that the famous "outing" of CIA undercover officer, Valerie Plame, has all of the material for good cinema, but that the failure to prosecute those who violated the law by revealing her true position is what is unimaginable in that case.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hitz, Frederick P.},
      title = {The truth of espionage is stranger than fiction},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {1},
      pages = {55--60},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701798122}
    }
    					
    Hoare, Oliver Introduction 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (1) , pp. 1-5  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hoare, Oliver},
      title = {Introduction},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--5},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306370}
    }
    					
    Hoffman, Bruce Intelligence and terrorism: Emerging threats and new security challenges in the post-cold war era 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 207-223  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hoffman, Bruce},
      title = {Intelligence and terrorism: Emerging threats and new security challenges in the post-cold war era},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {207--223},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432353}
    }
    					
    Hofmann, Peter The making of national estimates during the period of the "missile gap" 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (3) , pp. 336-356  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hofmann, Peter},
      title = {The making of national estimates during the period of the "missile gap"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {3},
      pages = {336--356},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431861}
    }
    					
    Holmström, Lauri Finland in American Intelligence 1941-1944 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (4) , pp. 479-499  
    article
    Abstract: This article analyses the content and nature of American intelligence with regard to Finland in 1941-1944. The significance of intelligence was that it supported connections between the United States and Finland at a time when both external and internal circumstances inhibited the functioning of normal state to state relations between the two nations. The evolution of wartime conditions guided the interests of American intelligence. The main conclusion is that American intelligence in Finland can be interpreted as communication on multiple levels between two states.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Holmström, Lauri},
      title = {Finland in American Intelligence 1941-1944},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {4},
      pages = {479--499},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.537025}
    }
    					
    Homberger, Eric English spy thrillers in the age of appeasement 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (4) , pp. 80-91  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Homberger, Eric},
      title = {English spy thrillers in the age of appeasement},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {4},
      pages = {80--91},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432080}
    }
    					
    Homberger, Eric "Uncle Max" and his Thrillers 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (2) , pp. 312-321  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Homberger, Eric},
      title = {"Uncle Max" and his Thrillers},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {2},
      pages = {312--321},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431947}
    }
    					
    Hope, John G. Surveillance or collusion? Maxwell Knight, MI5 and the British Fascisti 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (4) , pp. 651-675  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hope, John G.},
      title = {Surveillance or collusion? Maxwell Knight, MI5 and the British Fascisti},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {4},
      pages = {651--675},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529408432275}
    }
    					
    Hopkins III, Robert S. An expanded understanding of Eisenhower, American policy and overflights 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (2) , pp. 332-344  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hopkins III, Robert S.},
      title = {An expanded understanding of Eisenhower, American policy and overflights},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {332--344},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432360}
    }
    					
    Hopkins, Michael Britain and the Korean war after 50 years: The slow emergence of an intelligence dimension 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (1) , pp. 177-182  
    article
    Abstract: Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War. Volume I: A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990). Pp.xxii + 512, illus., bibliog., index. ISBN 0-11-630953-9. Volume II: An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1995). Pp.xx + 534, illus., bibliog., index. £90. ISBN 0-11-630-958-X. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993; distributed in UK by Cambridge University Press, 1995). Pp.xvi + 393. £15.95, bibliog., index. ISBN 0-8047-2521-7. Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in Asia: British policies towards Japan, China and Korea, 1945-1953 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997). Pp.xii + 288, bibliog., index. £45. ISBN 0-7190-2508-7. H. J. Yasamee and K. A. Hamilton (ed.), Documents on British Policy Overseas. Series II Volume IV: The Korean War, June 1950-June 1951 (London: HMSO, 1991). Pp.liv + 460, index. £47. ISBN 0-11-591695-4.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hopkins, Michael},
      title = {Britain and the Korean war after 50 years: The slow emergence of an intelligence dimension},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {1},
      pages = {177--182},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432592}
    }
    					
    Hopkins, Michael F. A British cold war? 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (4) , pp. 479-482  
    article
    Abstract: Anne Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (London: Macmillan in association with GSEIS, 1990). Pp.301. £40.00. John Zametica (ed.), British Officials and British Foreign Policy, 1945-1950 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990). Pp.256. £29.00. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (eds), British Foreign Policy, 1945-1956 (London: Macmillan, 1989). Pp.256. £35.00.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hopkins, Michael F.},
      title = {A British cold war?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {4},
      pages = {479--482},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529208432182}
    }
    					
    Houston, Lawrence R. & Ralph Erskine Correspondence 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (2) , pp. 384-386  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Houston, Lawrence R. and Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {Correspondence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {2},
      pages = {384--386},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431902}
    }
    					
    Howard, Jean, Gilbert Bloch & Ralph Erskine Correspondence 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (2) , pp. 299-302  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Howard, Jean and Bloch, Gilbert and Erskine, Ralph},
      title = {Correspondence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {2},
      pages = {299--302},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431858}
    }
    					
    Hoyt, Stephen V. Cold War Pioneers in Combined Intelligence and Analysis 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (4) , pp. 463-487  
    article
    Abstract: From its inception in 1947 until the late 1970s the primary missions of the United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) involved maintaining a presence in East Germany for confidence building measures and reporting on items related to indicators and warnings of hostilities initiated by the Soviet Army. While not abandoning its traditional missions, the unit underwent a major transformation in the early 1980s and became the first Humint integrated collection, analysis and production center. Through a combination of factors, USMLM was able to link targeting, single-source collection and analysis while providing insights in a wide range of areas, from nuclear weapons, troop morale, equipment production, technical data, health and ethnic issues and literacy. Most significantly, USMLM confirmed severely reduced manning levels in GSFG combat arms units. "Intelligence is best done by a minimum number of men and women of the greatest possible ability." (R.V. Jones, the "father" of modern scientific and technical intelligence)
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hoyt, Stephen V.},
      title = {Cold War Pioneers in Combined Intelligence and Analysis},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {4},
      pages = {463--487},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802293064}
    }
    					
    Huckabey, Jessica M. & Mark Stout Al Qaida's Views of Authoritarian Intelligence Services in the Middle East 2010 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 25 (3) , pp. 327-349  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Huckabey, Jessica M. and Stout, Mark},
      title = {Al Qaida's Views of Authoritarian Intelligence Services in the Middle East},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {25},
      number = {3},
      pages = {327--349},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2010.489782}
    }
    					
    Hucker, Daniel The Unending Debate: Appeasement, Chamberlain and the Origins of the Second World War 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (4) , pp. 536-551  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hucker, Daniel},
      title = {The Unending Debate: Appeasement, Chamberlain and the Origins of the Second World War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {4},
      pages = {536--551},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802293114}
    }
    					
    Hughes, Gwilym Intelligence in the Cold War 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (6) , pp. 755-758  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hughes, Gwilym},
      title = {Intelligence in the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {6},
      pages = {755--758},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.619795}
    }
    					
    Hughes, Matthew [Book review] Calder Walton, "Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire", 2013 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (5) , pp. 787-789  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hughes, Matthew},
      title = {[Book review] Calder Walton, "Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire", 2013},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {5},
      pages = {787--789},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.814283}
    }
    					
    Hughes, Matthew [Book review] David Pryce-Jones, "Treason of the Heart: From Thomas Paine to Kim Philby", 2011 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (2) , pp. 307-308  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hughes, Matthew},
      title = {[Book review] David Pryce-Jones, "Treason of the Heart: From Thomas Paine to Kim Philby", 2011},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {2},
      pages = {307--308},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.790649}
    }
    					
    Hughes, R. Gerald Of Revelatory Histories and Hatchet Jobs: Propaganda and Method in Intelligence History 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (6) , pp. 842-877  
    article
    Abstract: This article explores a number of issues in the contemporary study of intelligence. These issues are methodological (relating to engagement with "primary" sources), epistemological (concerned with notions of "bias" and objectivity), and presentational (dealing with how scholars locate their work within existing debates). The article will contend that the study of intelligence, largely because of its ambiguous positioning on the borderland between political science and history, has been somewhat isolated from the debates over theory and method that have flourished in the wider historical discipline in recent decades, and that an engagement with such literature will yield commensurate benefits. Finally, the article will explore the place of intelligence history within the wider discourse of "popular" history. Given its potentially sensational content, some intelligence literature is targeted at a "popular" readership, but many of the claims made in authoring, promoting and reviewing such books are highly problematic. Since this is inimical to scholarly rigour, and is unlikely to facilitate wider public understanding of major historical issues, such matters need to be addressed.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hughes, R. Gerald},
      title = {Of Revelatory Histories and Hatchet Jobs: Propaganda and Method in Intelligence History},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {6},
      pages = {842--877},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802591459}
    }
    					
    Hughes, R. Gerald, Philip Murphy & Philip H. J. Davies The British Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (5) , pp. 701-729  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hughes, R. Gerald and Murphy, Philip and Davies, Philip H. J.},
      title = {The British Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {5},
      pages = {701--729},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.620789}
    }
    					
    Hughes, R. Gerald & Kristan Stoddart Hope and Fear: Intelligence and the Future of Global Security a Decade after 9/11 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (5) , pp. 625-652  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article explores a number of debates that have dominated intelligence studies since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It examines a number of inherent tensions, involving individuals and institutions, which threaten the long-term compatibility of the national security state with liberal democracy. The notion as to whether or not the use of extreme coercive measures (such as torture) can ever be justified is examined, as is the question as to whether such measures are self-defeating. The piece examines how liberal democracies seek to protect themselves in the light of rapid changes via a globalised media, the Information Revolution, and the proliferation of advanced technology and weapons of mass destruction amongst state and non-state actors. These issues are discussed with particular reference to the use of intelligence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea and other global trouble spots. Finally, the article speculates on the future of the increasingly enmeshed relationship between policy-makers, intelligence agencies and the media. It is concluded that, without a clear agenda for the modification of the mechanisms for accountability and oversight, this triangular relationship will, despite its interdependence, be fraught with increasing difficulties.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hughes, R. Gerald and Stoddart, Kristan},
      title = {Hope and Fear: Intelligence and the Future of Global Security a Decade after 9/11},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {5},
      pages = {625--652},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.708518}
    }
    					
    Hugh-Jones, Martin Wickham steed and German biological warfare research 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (4) , pp. 379-402  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hugh-Jones, Martin},
      title = {Wickham steed and German biological warfare research},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {4},
      pages = {379--402},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529208432176}
    }
    					
    Hulnick, Arthur S. What's wrong with the Intelligence Cycle 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (6) , pp. 959-979  
    article
    Abstract: In the modern era, almost all intelligence professionals will study the Intelligence Cycle as a kind of gospel of how intelligence functions. Yet it is not a particularly good model, since the cyclical pattern does not describe what really happens. Policy officials rarely give collection guidance. Collection and analysis, which are supposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel. Finally, the idea that decision makers wait for the delivery of intelligence before making policy decisions is equally incorrect. In the modern era, policy officials seem to want intelligence to support policy rather than to inform it. The Intelligence Cycle also fails to consider either counter-intelligence or covert action. Taken as a whole, the cycle concept is a flawed model, but nevertheless continues to be taught in the US and around the world.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hulnick, Arthur S.},
      title = {What's wrong with the Intelligence Cycle},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {6},
      pages = {959--979},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520601046291}
    }
    					
    Hulnick, Arthur S. The intelligence producer - policy consumer linkage: A theoretical approach 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (2) , pp. 212-233  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hulnick, Arthur S.},
      title = {The intelligence producer - policy consumer linkage: A theoretical approach},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {2},
      pages = {212--233},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528608431850}
    }
    					
    Hunt, David Remarks on "a German perspective on Allied deception operations" 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (1) , pp. 190-194  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hunt, David},
      title = {Remarks on "a German perspective on Allied deception operations"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {1},
      pages = {190--194},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431935}
    }
    					
    Hutchinson, Harold R. Intelligence: Escape from Prisoner's Dilemma 1992 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 7 (3) , pp. 327-334  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hutchinson, Harold R.},
      title = {Intelligence: Escape from Prisoner's Dilemma},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {7},
      number = {3},
      pages = {327--334},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529208432171}
    }
    					
    Hutton, Ronald [Book review] Geoffrey Smith, "Royalist Agents, Conspirators and Spies: Their Role in the British Civil Wars, 1640-1660" 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (6) , pp. 902-904  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Hutton, Ronald},
      title = {[Book review] Geoffrey Smith, "Royalist Agents, Conspirators and Spies: Their Role in the British Civil Wars, 1640-1660"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {6},
      pages = {902--904},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.628516}
    }
    					
    Imlay, Talbot Allied economic intelligence and strategy during the "Phoney War" 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (4) , pp. 107-132  
    article
    Abstract: This article examines the efforts of French and British intelligence services to assess the German economy before and during the opening stage of World War II. The French and British, attached to a long-war strategy based on the assumption time worked in their favour, looked to economic intelligence to indicate whether this was in fact the case. Yet for a variety of reasons clear and consistent assessments were impossible. Rather than accept uncertainty, the French and British chose to impose certainty by assuming the worst, a decision which contributed to the abandonment of a long-war strategy as the Allies began to search for some way to win a short war.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Imlay, Talbot},
      title = {Allied economic intelligence and strategy during the "Phoney War"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {107--132},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432506}
    }
    					
    Immerman, Richard H. Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community's Best Kept Secret 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (2-3) , pp. 159-181  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract This article argues that analytic practices and processes within the US intelligence community have undergone far more fundamental reform than the public or scholarly communities recognize. It identifies the dimensions of this "Analytic Transformation" and explains the reasons for optimism about the future.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Immerman, Richard H.},
      title = {Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community's Best Kept Secret},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {2-3},
      pages = {159--181},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.559138}
    }
    					
    Jablonsky, David The paradox of duality: Adolf Hitler and the concept of military surprise 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (3) , pp. 55-117  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jablonsky, David},
      title = {The paradox of duality: Adolf Hitler and the concept of military surprise},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {3},
      pages = {55--117},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528808431959}
    }
    					
    Jackson, Peter France and the guarantee to Romania, April 1939 1995 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 10 (2) , pp. 242-272  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jackson, Peter},
      title = {France and the guarantee to Romania, April 1939},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {10},
      number = {2},
      pages = {242--272},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529508432298}
    }
    					
    Jackson, Peter French Military Intelligence responds to the German Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936 - A look at French intelligence machinery in 1936 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (4) , pp. 546-562  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jackson, Peter},
      title = {French Military Intelligence responds to the German Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936 - A look at French intelligence machinery in 1936},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {4},
      pages = {546--562},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701640514}
    }
    					
    Jackson, Peter Intelligence and the state: An emerging "French school" of intelligence studies 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (6) , pp. 1061-1065  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jackson, Peter},
      title = {Intelligence and the state: An emerging "French school" of intelligence studies},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {6},
      pages = {1061--1065},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520601046408}
    }
    					
    Jackson, Peter & Martin S. Alexander French Military Intelligence responds to the German Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936 - Note concerning the consequences that follow, from a military point of view, from Germany's renunciation of the Locarno Treaty 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (4) , pp. 537-545  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jackson, Peter and Alexander, Martin S.},
      title = {French Military Intelligence responds to the German Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 1936 - Note concerning the consequences that follow, from a military point of view, from Germany's renunciation of the Locarno Treaty},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {4},
      pages = {537--545},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701640506}
    }
    					
    Jackson, William H. Congressional oversight of intelligence: Search for a framework 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (3) , pp. 113-147  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jackson, William H.},
      title = {Congressional oversight of intelligence: Search for a framework},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {3},
      pages = {113--147},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432065}
    }
    					
    Jacobsen, Alf R. Scandinavia, Sigint and the Cold War 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (1) , pp. 209-242  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jacobsen, Alf R.},
      title = {Scandinavia, Sigint and the Cold War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {1},
      pages = {209--242},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714002837}
    }
    					
    Jacobsen, Philip Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (4) , pp. 695-718  
    article
    Abstract: Despite solid documentation that the Japanese Strike Force maintained strict radio silence, recent revisionists have seriously misinterpreted new US archival releases in an effort to 'prove' that US Officials acquired advance knowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Using twenty-year-old 'remembrances', long dismissed claims that the British also acquired such 'foreknowledge' have been recently resurrected and supplemented with similar Canadian allegations. Instead of code-breaking, it is now is suggested that such 'foreknowledge' was acquired by tracking the Strike Force by direction finder bearings and 'fixes'. However, these revisionist claims are fraught with a wide range of serious errors that render them baseless. Therefore, their allegations of advance knowledge of the attack and suggestions of a deliberate US failure to warn Hawaiian military officials must be completely disregarded as without any foundation whatsoever.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jacobsen, Philip},
      title = {Radio Silence and Radio Deception: Secrecy Insurance for the Pearl Harbor Strike Force},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {4},
      pages = {695--718},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000327537}
    }
    					
    Jacobsen, Philip H. Correspondence 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (1) , pp. 233-234  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jacobsen, Philip H.},
      title = {Correspondence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {1},
      pages = {233--234},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432596}
    }
    					
    Jacobsen, Philip H. Letter from Philip H. Jacobsen 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (2) , pp. 318-319  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jacobsen, Philip H.},
      title = {Letter from Philip H. Jacobsen},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {2},
      pages = {318--319},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600620807}
    }
    					
    Jansen, Marc & Ben de Jong Stalin's hand in Rotterdam: The murder of the Ukrainian nationalist Yevhen Konovalets in May 1938 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (4) , pp. 676-694  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jansen, Marc and Jong, Ben de},
      title = {Stalin's hand in Rotterdam: The murder of the Ukrainian nationalist Yevhen Konovalets in May 1938},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {4},
      pages = {676--694},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432276}
    }
    					
    Javorsek II, Daniel & John G. Schwitz Probing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Human Agency in Intelligence 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (5) , pp. 639-653  
    article
    Abstract: Geopolitical dynamics associated with nuclear proliferation, the Arab Spring, the rapid rise of Chinese power, an oil-fueled Russian resurgence, and the post-Afghan and Iraq eras will demand significant changes in intelligence focus, processes, and resources. Nearly a decade after intelligence failures required a restructuring of the Intelligence Community with mandates for a scientific approach to intelligence analysis, current efforts continue to focus on overly deterministic individual analyst methods. We argue for a process-oriented approach to analysis resembling the collaborative scientific process successful in other professions that is built on shared theory and models. After demonstrating that events in the real world are path dependent and contingent on deterministic and random elements, we highlight the role of uncertainty in intelligence analysis with specific emphasis on intelligence failures. We then describe how human agency in an interconnected and interdependent system leads to a landscape of dancing strategies as agents dynamically modify their responses to events. Unfortunately, the consequences of the present deterministic intelligence mindset are significant time delays in adjusting to emerging adversaries leading to an increased susceptibility to intelligence failures. In contrast with the existing analyst-centric methods, we propose a risk management approach enhanced by outside collaboration on theory and models that embrace lessons from the twentieth-century science of uncertainty, human agency, and complexity.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Javorsek II, Daniel and Schwitz, John G.},
      title = {Probing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Human Agency in Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {5},
      pages = {639--653},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.834218}
    }
    					
    Jeffery, Keith The government code and Cypher school: A memorandum by lord Curzon 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (3) , pp. 454-458  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffery, Keith},
      title = {The government code and Cypher school: A memorandum by lord Curzon},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {3},
      pages = {454--458},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431869}
    }
    					
    Jeffery, Keith Intelligence and counter-insurgency operations: Some reflections on the British experience 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (1) , pp. 118-149  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffery, Keith},
      title = {Intelligence and counter-insurgency operations: Some reflections on the British experience},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {1},
      pages = {118--149},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528708431879}
    }
    					
    Jeffery, Keith & Eunan O'Halpin Ireland in spy fiction 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (4) , pp. 92-116  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffery, Keith and O'Halpin, Eunan},
      title = {Ireland in spy fiction},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {4},
      pages = {92--116},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529008432081}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri [Book review] Raymond W. Holcomb with Lillian S. Weiss, "Endless Enemies: Inside FBI Counterterrorism" 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (1) , pp. 180-182  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {[Book review] Raymond W. Holcomb with Lillian S. Weiss, "Endless Enemies: Inside FBI Counterterrorism"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {180--182},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.862969}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri [Book review] Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), "Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies" 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (1) , pp. 174-177  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {[Book review] Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), "Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {174--177},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.855388}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri Why was the CIA established in 1947? 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (1) , pp. 21-40  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {Why was the CIA established in 1947?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {21--40},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432397}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri Inter-Allied Commando Intelligence and Security Training in Gwynedd: The Coates Memoir 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 545-559  
    article
    Abstract: John Gordon Coates was an intelligence instructor with 10 Commando, a force drawn from several European nations in the Second World War. His brief memoir together with supporting documents and oral histories throw light on the intelligence training of a unit whose memorialization has until now been patchy. 10 Commando's Troops (fighting units) were quartered in various Welsh villages according to nationality, for example the French in Criccieth, the Dutch in Porthmadog, and the relatively renowned Jewish group in Aberdyfi. They were dispatched in small numbers as specialist add-ons to military missions engaged in secret operations in occupied Europe, achieving success but a high casualty rate. In an embryonic way, 10 Commando could be regarded as an intelligence-orientated precursor to the idea of a European Union Rapid Reaction Force.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {Inter-Allied Commando Intelligence and Security Training in Gwynedd: The Coates Memoir},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {545--559},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.989686}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri American intelligence: A spur to historical genius? 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (2) , pp. 332-337  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {American intelligence: A spur to historical genius?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {2},
      pages = {332--337},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528808431950}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri Bin Laden, Dead and Alive 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (4) , pp. 566-569  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {Bin Laden, Dead and Alive},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {4},
      pages = {566--569},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.586864}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri The End of an Exclusive Special Intelligence Relationship: British-American Intelligence Co-operation Before, During and After the 1960s 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (5) , pp. 707-721  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Secret intelligence became a major ingredient in international relations in the twentieth century, vital as much to peace as to war. Cooperation was an ingredient in intelligence success, with the British-American special relationship the century's prime and dominant example. The US-UK arrangement reached a Churchillian apogee in the 1940s and 1950s, then in the 1960s there were signs of change. Upheavals within American society, new challenges to US foreign policy, a decline in British capabilities and the end of the Cold War did not destroy the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, but they did undermine its exclusive character.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {The End of an Exclusive Special Intelligence Relationship: British-American Intelligence Co-operation Before, During and After the 1960s},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {5},
      pages = {707--721},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.708523}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri Manual Indices and digital pathways: Developments in United States intelligence bibliography 1994 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 9 (3) , pp. 555-559  
    article
    Abstract: Neal H. Petersen (comp. and ed.), American Intelligence, 1775-1990: A Bibliographical Guide, The New War/Peace Bibliography Series, 2 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1992). Pp.xvi + 406. $49.95. The Electronic Database of the Russell J. Bowen Collection of Works on Intelligence, Security and Covert Activities, National Intelligence Book Center, Lock Mail Unit 18757, Washington DC 20036-8757. 1992. $400. CIABASE, PO Box 5022, Herndon, VA 22070. Cumulative. 1992. $99.00. NameBase, Public Information Research, Box 5199, Arlington, VA 22205. Cumulative. 1992. $79.00.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {Manual Indices and digital pathways: Developments in United States intelligence bibliography},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {3},
      pages = {555--559},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529408432268}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri The myth of recovered innocence in US intelligence history 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (4) , pp. 231-236  
    article
    Abstract: David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale University Press, 1997). Pp. 530, index. £19.95. ISBN 0-300-07233-3. James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh (eds.) Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined (Boulder, Colo, and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998). Pp. 284, index. £35.95. ISBN 1-55587-783-4.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {The myth of recovered innocence in US intelligence history},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {231--236},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432514}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri The role of British intelligence in the mythologies underpinning the OSS and early CIA 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (2) , pp. 5-19  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {The role of British intelligence in the mythologies underpinning the OSS and early CIA},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {2},
      pages = {5--19},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520008432600}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri The sins of the founding fathers 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (4) , pp. 211-214  
    article
    Abstract: Stephen F. Knott, Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Pp.258, biblio., index. £19.50. ISBN 0-19-510098-0. Notes 1. Richard B. Morris, Witnesses at the Creation: Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and the Constitution (NY: Plume 1986) p.160. 2. Ralph Ketcham (ed.) The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Debates (NY: Mentor 1986) p.27. 3. Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (NY: Macmillan 1961 [1913]) pp.vi, 160. 4. Max Beloff (ed.) The Federalist, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1987 [1948]) p.482, n27. 5. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (NY: Knopf 1996) p.5. Rakove's "originalism" might be regarded as a particular example of a general malpractice that historians sometimes call "presentism", a tendency to look at the past with a contemporary political agenda in mind.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {The sins of the founding fathers},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {4},
      pages = {211--214},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432455}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri Rise, Fall and Regeneration: From CIA to EU 2009 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 24 (1) , pp. 103-118  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract The rise of the CIA and its Cold War analytical successes provided Europe with a model of how a federal polity might conduct foreign intelligence. The shortcomings and recent decline of the CIA are instructive, too, and have the additional effect of adding urgency to the need for the European Union to develop its own intelligence capability. Lessons of possible relevance have to do with, inter alia, the advantages of centralization, the politicization of intelligence, the interaction of covert action with analysis, the phenomenon of competitive estimates, and the need for proactive parliamentary oversight. But the prospects for the development of EU foreign intelligence are for the time being blighted by nationalism, not least in the case of the British, and by the relative immaturity of EU constitutional arrangements.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {Rise, Fall and Regeneration: From CIA to EU},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {24},
      number = {1},
      pages = {103--118},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520902756937}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri In search of a textbook: Recent overviews of United States intelligence history since the days of the founding fathers 1991 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 6 (4) , pp. 750-756  
    article
    Abstract: Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1990). Pp. xix + 458. US $24.95. Nathan Miller, Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence (New York: Paragon House, 1989). Pp. xi + 482. US $24.95. Ernest Volkman and Blaine Baggett, Secret Intelligence: The Inside Story of America's Espionage Empire (London: W.H. Allen, 1989). Pp. xxi + 265. £16.99 (paperback).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {In search of a textbook: Recent overviews of United States intelligence history since the days of the founding fathers},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {6},
      number = {4},
      pages = {750--756},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529108432131}
    }
    					
    Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri & David Stafford Introduction [to "American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000"] 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (2) , pp. 1-4  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri and Stafford, David},
      title = {Introduction [to "American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000"]},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {2},
      pages = {1--4},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520008432599}
    }
    					
    Jenkins, Philip The assassins revisited: Claire sterling and the politics of intelligence 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (3) , pp. 459-471  
    article
    Abstract: Claire Sterling, The Time of the Assassins: Anatomy of an Investigation (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983, new edition 1985), pp. 295, $4.95 (paperback).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jenkins, Philip},
      title = {The assassins revisited: Claire sterling and the politics of intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {3},
      pages = {459--471},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431870}
    }
    					
    Jenkins, Philip Spy fiction and terrorism 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (4) , pp. 185-203  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jenkins, Philip},
      title = {Spy fiction and terrorism},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {4},
      pages = {185--203},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529008432085}
    }
    					
    Jenkins, Philip Terrorism 1988 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 3 (1) , pp. 205-207  
    article
    Abstract: Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, War Without End: The Terrorists - an Intelligence Dossier (London: Harrap, 1986). Pp.279. £9.95. James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986). Pp.293. £12.95. Benjamin Netanyahu (ed.) Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986). Pp.254. $18.95.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jenkins, Philip},
      title = {Terrorism},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {3},
      number = {1},
      pages = {205--207},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528808431937}
    }
    					
    Jensen, Kurt F. Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program, 1953-90 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (1) , pp. 95-104  
    article
    Abstract: Canada's Interview Program, established in 1953, was a modest overt human intelligence collector conducting voluntary debriefings of persons with knowledge of "denied areas". Interviews focused on East European industrial capabilities and orders of battle information. Initially housed with intelligence at National Defence, the Interview Program moved to External Affairs in 1968, where it remains.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jensen, Kurt F.},
      title = {Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program, 1953-90},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {1},
      pages = {95--104},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000222948}
    }
    					
    Jensen, Mark A. Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them? 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (2) , pp. 261-282  
    article
    Abstract: Abstract Intelligence failures occur for more reasons than just sloppy tradecraft and are often attributable to decision-makers as well as to the intelligence community. Before exploring the subjective nature of intelligence failures, this article first discusses three foundational concepts underlying them: process vs. product, fact vs. judgment, and prediction. It then outlines major components of intelligence failures: accuracy, surprise, and the role of decision-makers, particularly unrealistic expectations and the use or non-use of intelligence. The article concludes with a discussion of what the intelligence community and decision-makers can do to deal with these three components.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jensen, Mark A.},
      title = {Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them?},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {2},
      pages = {261--282},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.661646}
    }
    					
    Jervis, Robert Frustrating Intelligence 2012 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 27 (4) , pp. 576-581  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jervis, Robert},
      title = {Frustrating Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2012},
      volume = {27},
      number = {4},
      pages = {576--581},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.688315}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. A conversation with former DCI William E. Colby: Spymaster during the "Year of the Intelligence Wars" 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (2) , pp. 250-269  
    article
    Abstract: In this previously unpublished interview, William Colby, former US Director of Central Intelligence, discusses the Intelligence Community's relationships with Congress and the White House, the value and conditions for effective human intelligence, the challenges of managing the Central Intelligence Agency, and his experience leading the Agency during the domestic spying scandals of the 1970s. Colby argues that the attentiveness of congressional intelligence committees waxes and wanes, just as it does for any other oversight committee. He states that Congress and the press, along with the integrity and initiative of individual citizens working in the intelligence community, provide the strongest guards against abuse. The interview was conducted in 1991, the last year of the Cold War.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {A conversation with former DCI William E. Colby: Spymaster during the "Year of the Intelligence Wars"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {2},
      pages = {250--269},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701303865}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. A Conversation with James R. Clapper, Jr., The Director Of National Intelligence in the United States 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (1) , pp. 1-25  
    article
    Abstract: In this previously unpublished interview, James R. Clapper, Jr., the current Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the United States, discusses his experiences as spymaster leading an Intelligence Community widely viewed as organizationally decentralized and criticized in the past for failing to work together harmoniously. Director Clapper argues that the Community has become much more structurally integrated, and that the Office of the DNI (ODNI) provides an opportunity for leadership that is more effective than outside critics have acknowledged. I conducted this interview in August 2014 at his office near Tyson's Corner in North Arlington, Virginia. It was a time of rising unrest in the world, with elite Russian troops carrying out forays across the border into Ukraine, a Middle East terrorist faction known as ISIS gathering momentum in a march from Syria toward Baghdad, and with recurring violence that continued to plague the relationship between the Hamas faction in Palestine and the state of Israel.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {A Conversation with James R. Clapper, Jr., The Director Of National Intelligence in the United States},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1--25},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.972613}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. A Farewell to Harry Howe Ransom 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (2) , pp. 157-158  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {A Farewell to Harry Howe Ransom},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {2},
      pages = {157--158},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.894324}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. Spies in the American Movies: Hollywood's take on Lese Majesté 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (1) , pp. 5-24  
    article
    Abstract: In the genre of spy thrillers, the films Three Days of the Condor and Spy Game have been among the top box office attractions in the American cinema. They both star Robert Redford and both portray the Central Intelligence Agency as a wicked organization. In light of Hollywood's distorted depiction of the CIA in these movies, their contribution to the health and well-being of the American polity - which depends, like all democracies, on the presence of an informed citizenry - is questionable. As with the best written scholarship on the subject of intelligence, film-goers deserve to know accurately not only what is bad but what is good within the shadows of America's dark side of government, and how the bad might be redressed. The United States needs to try harder to bring the best form of art to the spy movie: cinematography that seeks to tell the truth.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {Spies in the American Movies: Hollywood's take on Lese Majesté},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {1},
      pages = {5--24},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701798064}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. Spymaster Richard Helms: an interview with the former US Director of Central Intelligence 2003 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 18 (3) , pp. 24-44  
    article
    Abstract: In this previously unpublished interview with Richard Helms in 1990, the former US Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) offered his views on a wide range of intelligence issues. Contrary to conventional wisdom, he argued that members of Congress had maintained rigorous accountability over the secret agencies in the years before the major spy scandal of 1975, when the Central Intelligence Agency was found to have spied on American citizens. He emphasized, too, the vital importance of human (as opposed to technical) intelligence, and expressed cynicism about the effectiveness of large-scale covert actions. For Helms, the DCI's most important job was to bring the facts to the table at high policy meetings.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {Spymaster Richard Helms: an interview with the former US Director of Central Intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {18},
      number = {3},
      pages = {24--44},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520412331306910}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. Challenges of strategic intelligence 1990 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 5 (3) , pp. 215-225  
    article
    Abstract: Bruce D. Beikowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). Pp. xiii + 232. $19.95. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1989). Pp. x + 338. $30.00. Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). Pp. xv + 266. $19.95.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {Challenges of strategic intelligence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {5},
      number = {3},
      pages = {215--225},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529008432072}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. Analysis for a new age 1996 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 11 (4) , pp. 657-671  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {Analysis for a new age},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {11},
      number = {4},
      pages = {657--671},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529608432385}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern Intelligence Accountability 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (2) , pp. 198-225  
    article
    Abstract: Since 1975, lawmakers have displayed four responses to the call for greater intelligence accountability on Capitol Hill. Some have taken the approach of "ostriches", content to bury their heads in the sand and continue the earlier era of trust when members of Congress deferred to the decisions of the executive branch within the domains of intelligence. Others - indeed, a majority - have chosen to become unalloyed boosters for intelligence -" cheerleaders" who view their job primarily as one of explaining the value of intelligence to the American people and supporting intelligence missions with robust funding and encouragement. Taking the opposite approach, another set of lawmakers - the "lemon-suckers" - have consistently found fault with America's attempts to spy on adversaries or overthrow regimes that fail to accommodate US interests. Finally, some lawmakers have been "guardians", striking a balance between serving as partners of the intelligence agencies on Capitol Hill and, through a persistent examination of budgets and operations, demanding competence and law-abiding behavior from these agencies. The guardian model fits best into the framework of democratic theory.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern Intelligence Accountability},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {2},
      pages = {198--225},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520801977337}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. The CIA and the media 1986 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 1 (2) , pp. 143-169  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {The CIA and the media},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {1},
      number = {2},
      pages = {143--169},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684528608431847}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. The CIA and the question of accountability 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (1) , pp. 178-200  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {The CIA and the question of accountability},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {178--200},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432405}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. National Security Intelligence in the United States: A Performance Checklist 2011 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 26 (5) , pp. 607-615  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {National Security Intelligence in the United States: A Performance Checklist},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {26},
      number = {5},
      pages = {607--615},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2011.604198}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch k. [Book review] Mark Mazzetti, "The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth", 2013 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (6) , pp. 932-934  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch k.},
      title = {[Book review] Mark Mazzetti, "The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth", 2013},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {6},
      pages = {932--934},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.913393}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. [Book review] Michael Allen, "Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11", 2013 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (1) , pp. 141-146  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {[Book review] Michael Allen, "Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11", 2013},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {1},
      pages = {141--146},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2013.876743}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (3) , pp. 333-370  
    article
    Abstract: The two most prestigious products prepared by the US intelligence agencies for use by decision-makers in Washington, DC, are the President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate. The Brief, an example of "current intelligence," adds value to what policy officials in Washington can learn about world affairs from the best newspapers, especially in the domains of foreign weaponry, activities within closed societies, and the machinations of terrorist organizations. The National Intelligence Estimate, an example of "research intelligence," has added value, too, on occasion, but has often been wrong. Each of these forms of intelligence has their critics, and the NIE in particular is frequently considered too long a document and too diluted in content. The production of NIEs has varied over the years since 1950, averaging twenty-three a year with a low of five (in 1976) and a high of fifty-six (in 1992).
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {3},
      pages = {333--370},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802121257}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. Harry Howe Ransom and American intelligence studies 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (3) , pp. 402-428  
    article
    Abstract: In this interview Harry Howe Ransom, a leading American scholar of intelligence studies over the past 50 years, discusses how he entered the field and his views regarding some key intelligence topics. Foremost on his research agenda has been the study of whether in democratic societies secret agencies can operate side-by-side with an otherwise open government without violating basic civil liberties - the difficult balancing act between the need for security, on the one hand, and the cherished value of liberty, on the other. He has also been a leading critic of intelligence politicization, noting in this interview that there is a tendency for intelligence systems to provide information they think their top bosses want to hear, and for the top bosses - more often than not - to do what they wish in spite of intelligence to the contrary. Professor Ransom began his research into intelligence as a young political scientist at Harvard University and continued this work throughout his subsequent distinguished career at Vanderbilt University and into his retirement years.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {Harry Howe Ransom and American intelligence studies},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {3},
      pages = {402--428},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701415222}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. Intelligence and the challenge of collaborative government 1998 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 13 (2) , pp. 177-182  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K.},
      title = {Intelligence and the challenge of collaborative government},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {13},
      number = {2},
      pages = {177--182},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432484}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K., Richard J. Aldrich, Christopher Moran, David M. Barrett, Glenn Hastedt, Robert Jervis, Wolfgang Krieger, Rose McDermott, David Omand, Mark Phythian & Wesley K. Wark An INS Special Forum: Implications of the Snowden Leaks 2014 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 29 (6) , pp. 793-810  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K. and Aldrich, Richard J. and Moran, Christopher and Barrett, David M. and Hastedt, Glenn and Jervis, Robert and Krieger, Wolfgang and McDermott, Rose and Omand, David and Phythian, Mark and Wark, Wesley K.},
      title = {An INS Special Forum: Implications of the Snowden Leaks},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2014},
      volume = {29},
      number = {6},
      pages = {793--810},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.946242}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. & Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones [Book review] Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA 2008 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 23 (6) , pp. 878-891  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K. and Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri},
      title = {[Book review] Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {23},
      number = {6},
      pages = {878--891},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520802591475}
    }
    					
    Johnson, Loch K. & Allison M. Shelton Thoughts on the State of Intelligence Studies: A Survey Report 2013 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 28 (1) , pp. 109-120  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, Loch K. and Shelton, Allison M.},
      title = {Thoughts on the State of Intelligence Studies: A Survey Report},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2013},
      volume = {28},
      number = {1},
      pages = {109--120},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.748368}
    }
    					
    Johnson, R. W. Correspondence 1989 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 4 (3) , pp. 612-614  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson, R. W.},
      title = {Correspondence},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3},
      pages = {612--614},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528908432019}
    }
    					
    Johnson-Freese, Joan & Lance Gatling Security Implications of Japan's Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) System 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (3) , pp. 538-552  
    article
    Abstract: Countries which previously limited their space activity to civilian purposes have increasingly come to employ dual-use technology as a first step into the world of military space. Japan's Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) system, intended to support disaster relief situations, and provide information for diplomatic and defense policy decision-making, is exemplary of this trend. Not coincidentally, the program was approved shortly after the 31 August 1998 North Korean launch of a Taepo Dong missile that sailed over Japan. While the program had been unsuccessfully proposed previously, Japanese politicians, surprised by the launch, became amenable to the point of perhaps rushing their decision. This article suggests that what capabilities these satellites render appear to Japanese policy makers to be a secondary concern to the initiation of an autonomous intelligence capability.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnson-Freese, Joan and Gatling, Lance},
      title = {Security Implications of Japan's Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) System},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {19},
      number = {3},
      pages = {538--552},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000316278}
    }
    					
    Johnston, Otto W. British espionage and Prussian politics in the age of napoleon 1987 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 2 (2) , pp. 230-244  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnston, Otto W.},
      title = {British espionage and Prussian politics in the age of napoleon},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1987},
      volume = {2},
      number = {2},
      pages = {230--244},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431888}
    }
    					
    Johnston, Paul No cloak and dagger required: Intelligence support to UN peacekeeping 1997 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 12 (4) , pp. 102-112  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Johnston, Paul},
      title = {No cloak and dagger required: Intelligence support to UN peacekeeping},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {12},
      number = {4},
      pages = {102--112},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432450}
    }
    					
    Jones, Calvert Intelligence reform: The logic of information sharing 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (3) , pp. 384-401  
    article
    Abstract: A cornerstone of US intelligence reform is "information sharing" as a means of adapting to contemporary security challenges. It was a central recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, reflected in the wide-ranging "Information Sharing Environment" mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Yet the underlying logic of information sharing for intelligence reform has received little attention. Drawing on information and communications theory, this paper critiques the logic by highlighting problems of sense-making and interpretation overlooked amid the scholarly enthusiasm for an intelligence "culture of sharing". With their impersonal, technical, and highly bureaucratic approach, today's reforms may favor the flow of information and its sheer volume at the expense of the context and analytic tradecraft that render it meaningful, actionable intelligence. For effective information sharing, the paper suggests reformers pay more attention to the socio-technical environment of analysis when interpreting ambiguous, uncertain information.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, Calvert},
      title = {Intelligence reform: The logic of information sharing},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {3},
      pages = {384--401},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520701415214}
    }
    					
    Jones, Clive "A reach greater than the grasp": Israeli intelligence and the conflict in south Lebanon 1990-2000 2001 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 16 (3) , pp. 1-26  
    article
    Abstract: This article examines the way in which intelligence was used by Israel in its war against Hizb'allah in south Lebanon. By using ideas drawn from the literature on strategic culture, it argues that in trying to replicate methods used in countering Palestinian insurgents, Israel's intelligence agencies failed to appreciate fully the finite political aims of Hizb'allah's guerrilla struggle. As such, the paucity in Israel's collective intelligence effort allowed operatives of Hizb'allah's military wing, al-Muqawama, to score notable intelligence triumphs over Israel, triumphs that did much force the IDF into a unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, Clive},
      title = {"A reach greater than the grasp": Israeli intelligence and the conflict in south Lebanon 1990-2000},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {3},
      pages = {1--26},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306190}
    }
    					
    Jones, Clive "Where the state feared to tread": Britain, Britons, covert action and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-64 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (5) , pp. 717-737  
    article
    Abstract: The Egyptian-inspired revolution that overthrew the Imamate in Yemen in September 1962 presented British policy makers with a series of acute dilemmas. While the defence of Aden was regarded by the Chiefs of Staff as central to the protection of British interests in the Middle East, the means by which this was to be achieved exposed deep cleavages among policy-makers chastened by the experience of Suez. While officials in Whitehall condoned a series of official covert operations along the Federation border with Yemen they remained strictly controlled and defensive in nature. By contrast, a group of influential Conservative MPs, having already engaged in what might be termed para-diplomacy that effectively stymied British recognition of the new regime in Sana'a , looked to extend British clandestine activity to include direct aid to, and training of, the Royalist Forces deep inside Yemen itself. With the initial support of key Middle Eastern potentates, a private mercenary organization emerged that, while enjoying the tacit encouragement of some in Whitehall, acted above and beyond the control of London in support of what they considered to be Britain's interest, an interest which, despite the huge political and diplomatic risks involved, came to enlist the help of Israel. At a time when much academic attention has been focused on the rise of the private military organization, the debates over their efficacy, both political and moral, as a tool of foreign policy can be traced to events in the mountains and deserts of the Yemen over four decades ago.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, Clive},
      title = {"Where the state feared to tread": Britain, Britons, covert action and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-64},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {5},
      pages = {717--737},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600957688}
    }
    					
    Jones, Dr Clive Letter from Clive Jones 2006 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 21 (2) , pp. 316-317  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, Dr Clive},
      title = {Letter from Clive Jones},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {21},
      number = {2},
      pages = {316--317},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600620765}
    }
    					
    Jones, David Martin & Michael Smith The perils of hyper-vigilance: the war on terrorism and the surveillance state in South-East Asia 2002 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 17 (4) , pp. 31-54  
    article
    Abstract: The analysis examines the puzzle as to why the intelligence structures of South-East Asia largely failed to detect the evolving threat of violently inclined radical Islamic groups, despite the existence of elaborate and pervasive internal security arrangements within the states of the region. The article explores this issue by positing contending viewpoints about how authoritarianism in South-East Asia might have affected the awareness of such threats. Answers to these questions enable an assessment of the current ASEAN response to the "war on terrorism" and to discern whether South-East Asia's elites will move either to improve the quality of their intelligence and threat analysis in the future, or whether they will, instead, extend the instruments of authoritarian rule, further curtailing civil and political space under the rubric of combating terrorism. The evidence so far suggests that the latter outcome is the more likely.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, David Martin and Smith, Michael},
      title = {The perils of hyper-vigilance: the war on terrorism and the surveillance state in South-East Asia},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {17},
      number = {4},
      pages = {31--54},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306630}
    }
    					
    Jones, J. Graham [Book review] Richard Toye, "The Roar of the Lion: The Untold Story of Churchill's World War II Speeches" 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 587-590  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, J. Graham},
      title = {[Book review] Richard Toye, "The Roar of the Lion: The Untold Story of Churchill's World War II Speeches"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {587--590},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.896507}
    }
    					
    Jones, J. Graham Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 581-583  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, J. Graham},
      title = {Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {581--583},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.896505}
    }
    					
    Jones, J. Graham [Book review] David Reynolds, "The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century" 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 593-595  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, J. Graham},
      title = {[Book review] David Reynolds, "The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century"},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {593--595},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.900265}
    }
    					
    Jones, J. Graham Peter Clarke, Mr Churchill's Profession: Statesman, Orator, Writer 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 590-592  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, J. Graham},
      title = {Peter Clarke, Mr Churchill's Profession: Statesman, Orator, Writer},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {590--592},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.900264}
    }
    					
    Jones, J. Graham Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain, 1918-1945 2015 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 30 (4) , pp. 598-601  
    article
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, J. Graham},
      title = {Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain, 1918-1945},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2015},
      volume = {30},
      number = {4},
      pages = {598--601},
      url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.913394}
    }
    					
    Jones, Kevin A Curb on Ambition: Intelligence and the Planning of Eighth Army's Liri Valley Offensive, May 1944 2007 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 22 (5) , pp. 745-766  
    article
    Abstract: In assessing the British Army's combat capability during the Second World War, its inability to exploit successful attacks has been much criticised by historians. This, in part, has been traced to the doctrinal instruction that, following an initially successful attack, rather than exploiting potential enemy weakness and disorganisation, ground gained was to be consolidated in preparation to repel enemy counter-attacks. By examining the planning of Eighth Army's offensive in the Liri valley, this article will demonstrate how this emphasis on consolidation over exploitation could exert a strong influence on the planning of operations. Moreover, rather than intelligence being employed to identify opportunities for exploitation, it was used on this occasion to reinforce caution and place a curb on ambition.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, Kevin},
      title = {A Curb on Ambition: Intelligence and the Planning of Eighth Army's Liri Valley Offensive, May 1944},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {5},
      pages = {745--766},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701718187}
    }
    					
    Jones, Kevin From the horse's mouth: Luftwaffe POWs as sources for air ministry intelligence during the battle of Britain 2000 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 15 (4) , pp. 60-80  
    article
    Abstract: British military intelligence as derived from the interrogation of prisoners?of?war (POWs) during the Second World War has been under?valued by historians, whose attention has focused primarily on signals intelligence. While Sigint, in particular Ultra, was of undoubted value, Britain's armed services nevertheless attached much credence to POW?derived intelligence, and by the war's end an abundance of information had been gleaned from the half a million plus Axis prisoners by then held in Britain. This article will examine the work of the Air Ministry Intelligence section known as AI1(K), which was responsible for POW interrogation, during the Battle of Britain, and attempt to illustrate both the wealth and value of such intelligence at a time when Ultra was still in its infancy.
    British military intelligence as derived from the interrogation of prisoners?of?war (POWs) during the Second World War has been under?valued by historians, whose attention has focused primarily on signals intelligence. While Sigint, in particular Ultra, was of undoubted value, Britain's armed services nevertheless attached much credence to POW?derived intelligence, and by the war's end an abundance of information had been gleaned from the half a million plus Axis prisoners by then held in Britain. This article will examine the work of the Air Ministry Intelligence section known as AI1(K), which was responsible for POW interrogation, during the Battle of Britain, and attempt to illustrate both the wealth and value of such intelligence at a time when Ultra was still in its infancy.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,
      author = {Jones, Kevin},
      title = {From the horse's mouth: Luftwaffe POWs as sources for air ministry intelligence during the battle of Britain},
      journal = {Intelligence and National Security},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {15},
      number = {4},
      pages = {60--80},
      url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520008432628}
    }
    					
    Jones, Matthew The "Preferred Plan": The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957 2004 Intelligence and National Security
    Vol. 19 (3) , pp. 401-415  
    article
    Abstract: Taking as its central focus the contents of the September 1957 Anglo-American Working Group Report on Syria, this article examines the background to the covert action plans that were drawn up to topple the incumbent regime in Damascus. By drawing on the contents of the report, it shows how US and British officials hoped to stir up unrest within Syria and instigate border incidents that would provide a pretext for armed intervention by the pro-Western governments of Iraq and Jordan (with possible Turkish support). The article also brings to light the fact that the 'elimination' of named Syrian figures was included as a recommendation in the report. The article concludes by explaining why the report's so-called 'Preferred Plan' was never implemented and reflects on the 'special political action' culture that still prevailed in SIS during the latter 1950s.
    BibTeX:
    @article{,